Knowledge that Transforms

The study examines the impact of convertible security calls on securityholder's wealth. On average common stock values fall by approximately two percent at the announcements of convertible debt calls, but common stockholder's wealth is unaffected by convertible preferred stock calls. These findings are consistent with a corporate tax effect. A small average decrease in firm value is also found at the announcements of convertible debt calls. The study raises, but leaves unanswered, the interesting question of what motivates managers to make capital structure decisions that reduce stockholder wealth and firm value.

The paper examines the optimal behavior of a single dealer who is faced with a stochastic demand to trade (modeled by a continuous time Poisson jump process) and facing return risk on his stock and on the rest of his portfolio (modeled by diffusion processes). Using stochastic dynamic programming, we derive the optimal bid and ask prices that maximize the dealer's expected utility of terminal wealth as a function of the state in which he finds himself. The relationship of the bid and ask prices to inventory of the dealer, instantaneous variance of return, stochastic arrival of transactions and other variables is examined.

Miller and Scholes have shown that under certain conditions the Federal Income Tax taxes dividend income at a rate no higher than the rate on capital gains. Tabulations of actual 1977 tax returns show that the special circumstances under which this can occur apply to recipients of two and one half percent of dividend income and that no dominant role may therefore be ascribed to their hypothesis in the determination of corporate dividend policy.

This study examines the empirical relationship between the return and the total market value of NYSE common stocks. It is found that smaller firms have had higher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms. This ‘size effect’ has been in existence for at least forty years and is evidence that the capital asset pricing model is misspecified. The size effect is not linear in the market value; the main effect occurs for very small firms while there is little difference in return between average sized and large firms. It is not known whether size per se is responsible for the effect or whether size is just a proxy for one or more true unknown factors correlated with size.

This paper is designed to provide additional evidence on the positive theory of accounting policy choice by combining individual accounting principles into firm income strategies. These strategies were the dependent variable in a probit analysis where the independent variables were size, management compensation, industry concentration ratio, systematic risk, capital intensity and the total debt to total asset ratio. The results indicate that four of these factors (size, management compensation, concentration ratio, and the total debt to total asset ratio) have a significant association with the choice of a firm's income strategy. This test provides strong evidence consistent with the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. We also present evidence that smaller firms and/or firms in less concentrated industries do not appear to make accounting policy choice decisions that are consistent with this theory.

Portfolios are formed directly and exclusively upon residual return behavior in the months prior to portfolio formation. The empirical behavior of residual return in the post-formation period is then examined. Based upon the overall time period studied (1932 through 1977), the average residual return is essentially zero in the months subsequent to the portfolio formation. However, systematic (i.e., non-zero) residual behavior is observed in particular years. Moreover, the results suggest the possibility that ‘abnormal’ returns observed after certain events (e.g., earnings announcements) may at least in part reflect more general phenomena associated with being ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of residual returns in the months previous to the event.

Regulators and small audit firms allege that audit firm size does not affect audit quality and therefore should be irrelevant in the selection of an auditor. Contrary to this view, the current paper argues that audit quality is not independent of audit firm size, even when auditors initially possesses identical technological capabilities. In particular, when incumbent auditors earn client-specific quasi-rents, auditors with a greater number of clients have ‘more to lose’ by failing to report a discovered breach in a particular client's records. This collateral aspect increases the audit quality supplied by larger audit firms. The implications for some recent recommendations of the AICPA Special Committee on Small and Medium Sized Firms are developed.

The impact that a firm's earnings releases have on the stock prices of other firms in its industry is examined. For an identifiable sub-set of firms, the results are consistent with a significant information transfer occurring between the earnings release firm and the other firms in its industry. This subset is identified by examining the impact of the release on the stock price of the announcing firm. The magnitude of this impact is more significant for a sample of firms which have a larger percentage of their revenues in the same line of business as the earnings release firm vis-á-vis a sample with a lower percentage of their revenues from the same line of business. Alternative interpretations of the empirical results are also discussed. The research findings have implications for information content and market efficiency research and for research on policy issues associated with disclosure regulation.

Until 1974, firms could choose, within GAAP, to capitalize or expense interest costs associated with capital expenditures. The predominant practice had been to treat interest as a period expense. However, in 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission imposed a moratorium on further adoption of interest capitalization by non-regulated firms. This study empirically examines economic factors potentially influencing firms' decisions to expense or capitalize interest prior to the SEC moratorium. We hypothesize that the choice may be affected by (1) the existence of management compensation agreements tied to reported earnings, (2) debt covenant constraints, and (3) the political costs (for some firms) of reporting higher earnings. When compared to the control group, our findings are that (1) the frequency of explicit management compensation packages was not greater for the interest capitalization group, (2) firms with financial ratios closer to likely debt agreement constraints (on dividends, interest coverage, and leverage) tended to elect interest capitalization, and (3) other than the largest firms in the ‘politically sensitive’ petroleum refining industry, the larger firms were more likely to capitalize interest.