[The consensus in the literature is that the use of only lump-sum taxation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the dynamic consistency of optimal open-loop government policies. We show that this does not hold for models with nonhomogeneous agents. Then the stated condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. Dynamic inconsistency arises because of a shortage of appropriate government policy instruments which amounts to the consensus condition only in special cases.]
[This paper shows how to test firm demand and supply data for consistency with profit maximization and cost minimization models; test for special restrictions on technology such as constant returns to scale, homotheticity, and separability; recover estimates of the underlying technology; and forecast firm behavior in new situations without making any assumptions concerning the parametric form of underlying production technology.]
IN THIS NOTE, we present a stochastic adjustment process which has nice optimality and (probablistic) dynamic stability properties for a large class of economic environments. In addition, the process relies on a strikingly simple information exchange procedure at each iteration. It can also be termed as strongly locally individually incentive compatible2 in that each consumer agent has no incentive to lie about his preferences provided he is concerned only with maximization of one-step expected utility gain at each iteration. The obvious source of inspiration for this process is the stochastic decentralized resource allocation mechanism (the B process) by Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter [2]. Indeed, it should be regarded as the latter's informationally simplified descendent. For general background information on resource allocation mechanisms and motivations for designing such mechanisms, see Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter [2] and Hahn [1]. In order to simplify the exposition, we present the process only for the case of pure exchange economies with possible consumption externalities. For more general cases, see Mitsui [4]. Mitsui [4] also constructs a core-convergent version of the process.
It is shown that cardinal value allocations may fail to be symmetric. Specifically, agents with identical preferences and identical endowments can be treated very differently at a cardinal value allocation. This casts further doubt on the interpretation of the weights as endogenous utility comparisons.
[Many distributions have been used as descriptive models for the size distribution of income. This paper considers two generalized beta distributions which include many of these models as special or limiting cases. These generalized distributions have not been used as models for the distribution of income and provide a unified method of comparing many models previously considered. Expressions are reported which facilitate parameter estimation and the analysis of associated means, variances, and various measures of inequality. The distributions considered are fit to U.S. family income and their relative performance is compared.]
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
[Results associated with Neumann-type economic growth models are described. We present a new generalization of the Neumann model with the idea of explaining and unifying certain basic results obtained by M. Morishima and J. L̵os̄ in proving general existence theorems. The idea of replacing constant input and output matrices in the Neumann model by those which depend continuously on the growth rate and on the price vector suggested and developed by Morishima, is coupled with an asymmetric-type generalization of the original Neumann model, developed by J. L̵os̄. Consequently, many of our results resemble and partly replace those obtained in both model generalizations.]