Knowledge that Transforms

Personal connections can function as privileged channels of information and trust. When the reliability of information is particularly important applying for a job, needing capital for a new enterprise, moving to a new country their role often becomes crucial. Hence the ethnic enclaves, both residential and professional, in New York City; the economic weight of the Overseas Chinese in their countries of residence; the success of Medieval networks of merchants, organized along ethnic or religious lines. Personal networks are often very successful, but they are by their nature discriminatory and thus tend to generate resentment and opposition among those excluded. Economists and sociologists debate whether networks can be replicated artificially. Not surprisingly, economists tend to be more optimistic, believing that appropriate market mechanisms, encouraged and supported by policy where necessary, can substitute for the missing personal channels. Sociologists on the other hand, see the personal, spontaneous link as the essence of the relation, and thus as something that by its nature cannot be replicated at will (e.g. Marta Tienda and Rebeca Raijman (2001), discussing James E. Rauch (2001)). We address this question in a simple model of labor markets where workers differ in their unobservable productivity. We ask how signaling the possibility of engaging

Today’s American mercantile pressure on China to appreciate the renminbi against the dollar is eerily similar to the American pressure on Japan to appreciate the yen that began over 30 years ago. Indeed, the yen went all the way from 360 to the dollar in August 1971, at the end of the Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rate parities, to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. Then the American government relented and announced a strong dollar policy that signaled the end of “Japan bashing”. But the overvalued yen, and the expectation of appreciation, destabilized the Japanese financial system; the bubble economy of the late 1980s was followed by a deflationary slump and a zero-interest liquidity trap in the 1990s [McKinnon and Ohno 1997]. At least some of today’s critics of East Asian countries ’ pegging to the dollar would agree that international saving imbalances rather than misaligned exchange rates are the root cause of the U.S. current-account deficit. One can argue whether it is mainly a saving deficiency in the United States or a saving glut in the rest of the world [Bernanke 2005]. Either way, the central position of the United States under the world dollar standard gives it alone an unlimited international line of credit in its own currency. However, suppose that the U.S. trade deficit is misdiagnosed to result from a misaligned exchange rate, so that a surplus country on the dollar’s periphery is forced to appreciate against the world’s dominant money. It will suffer a slowdown in economic

In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with the ruling political party, Fatah, and subsequent Palestinian fatalities. We do not find a similar relationship for Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian factions. We conjecture that these differences are due to the different positions of the factions vis-à-vis bargaining over a two-state solution to the conflict as well as the organizational structures of the factions.

By taking sets of utility functions as primitive, we define an ordering over assumptions on utility functions that gauges their measurement requirements. Cardinal and ordinal assumptions constitute two levels of measurability, but other assumptions lie between these extremes. We apply the ordering to explanations of why preferences should be convex. The assumption that utility is concave qualifies as a compromise between cardinality and ordinality, while the Arrow-Koopmans explanation, supposedly an ordinal theory, relies on utilities in the cardinal measurement class. In social choice theory, a concavity compromise between ordinality and cardinality is also possible and rationalizes the core utilitarian policies.

The introduction of Medicare in 1965 was the single largest change in health insurance coverage in U.S. history.Many economists and commentators have conjectured that the introduction of Medicare may have also been an important impetus for the development of new drugs that are now commonly used by the elderly and have substantially extended their life expectancy.In this paper, we investigate whether Medicare induced pharmaceutical innovations directed towards the elderly.Medicare could have played such a role only if two conditions were met.First, Medicare would have to increase drug spending by the elderly.Second, the pharmaceutical companies would have to respond to the change in market size for drugs caused by Medicare by changing the direction of their research.Our empirical work finds no evidence of a "first-stage" effect of Medicare on prescription drug expenditure by the elderly.Correspondingly, we also find no evidence of a shift in pharmaceutical innovation towards therapeutic categories most used by the elderly.On the whole, therefore, our evidence does not provide support for the hypothesis that Medicare had a major effect on the direction of pharmaceutical innovation.

A new field of “forensic economics” has begun to emerge, applying price-theoretic models to uncover evidence of corruption in domains previously outside the purview of economists. By emphasizing the incentives that yield corruption, these approaches also provide insight into how to reduce such behavior. This paper contributes to this agenda, highlighting how the structure of gambling on college basketball yields pay-offs to gamblers and players that are both asymmetric and nonlinear, thereby encouraging mutually beneficial effort manipulation through “point shaving.” Initial evidence suggests that point shaving may be quite widespread. The incentives for gambling-related corruption derive from the structure of basketball betting. To highlight a simple example, the University of Pennsylvania played Harvard on March 5, 2005, and was widely expected to win. Rather than offering short odds on Penn winning the game, bookmakers offered an almost even bet (bet $11 to win $10) on whether Penn would win relative to a “spread.” In this example, the spread was 14.5, meaning that a bet on Penn would win only if Penn won the game by 15 or more points, while a bet on Harvard would be successful if Harvard either won, or lost by 14 or fewer points. The incentive for corruption derives directly from the asymmetric incentives of players, who care about winning the game, and gamblers, who care about whether a team beats (or covers) the spread. Indeed, the example above is ripe for corruption: the outcome that maximizes the joint surplus of the Penn players and the gambler occurs when Penn wins the game, but fails to cover the spread (and the gambler has bet on Harvard). The contract required to induce this outcome simply involves the gambler offering a contingent payment to the player, with the contingency being that he pays only if Penn fails to cover the spread. Given the player’s (approximate) indifference over the size of the winning margin, even small bribes may dominate his desire to increase the winning margin above 14 points, and this, in turn, yields large profits for the gambler who has bet accordingly. The betting market offers a simple technology for the gambler to commit to paying this outcomecontingent bribe: he can simply give the player the ticket from a $1,000 bet on his opponent not covering the spread. Such attempts to shave the winning margin below the point spread are colloquially referred to as “point shaving” and form the focus of my inquiry. I start by outlining the type of corruption that theory suggests will be most prevalent:

Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, the World Trade Organization members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals. In this paper we empirically investigate the welfare effects of this requirement on developing countries using data for the fluoroquinolones subsegment of the systemic anti-bacterials segment of the Indian pharmaceuticals market. Our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of TRIPS may have some basis. We estimate that the withdrawal of all domestic products in this subsegment is associated with substantial welfare losses to the Indian economy, even in the presence of price regulation. The overwhelming portion of this welfare loss derives from the loss of consumer welfare.

What stands out in retrospect about U.S. monetary policy during the Greenspan Era is the ongoing movement away from mechanistic restrictions on the conduct of policy, together with a willingness on occasion to depart even from what more flexible guidelines dictated by contemporary conventional wisdom would imply, in the interest of carrying out the Federal Reserve System's dual mandate to pursue both stable prices and maximum employment. Part of this change was procedural -for example, the elimination of money growth targets. The most substantive demonstration of policy flexibility came in the latter half of the 1990s, as unemployment fell below 6% (in 1994), then below 5% (in 1997), and then remained below 5% for more than four years, yet the Federal Reserve did not tighten monetary policy. This policy stance was consistent with a view of the economy, including faster productivity growth and increased exposure to international competition, that Chairman Greenspan had articulated nearly a decade before.

A multivariate regime-switching model for monetary policy is confronted with U.S. data. The best fit allows time variation in disturbance variances only. With coefficients allowed to change, the best fit is with change only in the monetary policy rule and there are three estimated regimes corresponding roughly to periods when most observers believe that monetary policy actually differed. But the differences among regimes are not large enough to account for the rise, then decline, in inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. Our estimates imply monetary targeting was central in the early 1980s, but also important sporadically in the 1970s.

Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might prevent entry of a more efficient competitor by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers is weak. Under fierce downstream competition, if entry took place, a free buyer would become more competitive and increase its output and profits at the expense of buyers that sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Anticipating that orders from a single buyer would trigger entry, no buyer will sign the exclusive deal and entry will occur. This result is robust across different specifications of the game.