A Comment on the Economics of Labor Adjustment: Mind the Gap: Reply by Ricardo J. Caballero and Eduardo M.R.A. Engel. Published in volume 94, issue 4, pages 1238-1244 of American Economic Review, September 2004

The balanced scorecard provides a framework for selecting multiple performance measures that supplement traditional financial measures with operating measures of customer satisfaction, internal processes, and learning and growth activities. An essential aspect of the balanced scorecard lies in its articulation of the linkage between performance measures and business strategy. This study conducts an experiment to assess how individuals' evaluations of the performance of business unit managers depend on strategically linked performance measures of a balanced scorecard. Statistical test results indicate that performance evaluations are influenced by strategically linked measures more than non-linked measures only when evaluators are provided detailed information about business unit strategies. The results also confirm Lipe and Salterio's (2000) finding that evaluators rely more on common measures than on unique measures. Evaluators rely more on strategically linked measures than on common measures when they are provided information on strategic linkages, but the reverse relation holds when they are not.

This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms that previously restricted access to conference calls and a sample of firms that voluntarily allowed unlimited access to their calls in the pre-Reg FD period, we examine the effect of the new rule on managers' decisions regarding the timing, use, and information content of calls, as well as the effect on investors' trading behavior during the call. Our results indicate that Reg FD had a significant negative impact on managers' decisions to continue hosting conference calls and on their decisions regarding the optimal time to hold the call. However, contrary to the concerns of many critics, the magnitudes of these changes are not large. We do not find evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information disclosed during the call period, contrary to the concerns of Reg FD opponents. Finally, we find evidence that the new rule increased price volatility for firms that previously restricted access to their calls (relative to firms that previously held open calls) and that the amount of individual investor trading increased following the rule change. Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD impacted trading during the conference call window for firms most affected by the new regulation.

A simple valuation model with time‐varying investment opportunities is developed and estimated. The model assumes that the investment opportunity set is completely described by the real interest rate and the maximum Sharpe ratio, which follow correlated Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes. The model parameters and time series of the state variables are estimated using U.S. Treasury bond yields and expected inflation from January 1952 to December 2000, and as predicted, the estimated maximum Sharpe ratio is related to the equity premium. In cross‐sectional asset‐pricing tests, both state variables have significant risk premia, which is consistent with Merton's ICAPM.

We test overreaction theories of short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal in the cross section of stock returns. Momentum profits depend on the state of the market, as predicted. From 1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum profit following positive market returns is 0.93%, whereas the mean profit following negative market returns is −0.37%. The up‐market momentum reverses in the long‐run. Our results are robust to the conditioning information in macroeconomic factors. Moreover, we find that macroeconomic factors are unable to explain momentum profits after simple methodological adjustments to take account of microstructure concerns.

Why Is Manufacturing Trade Rising Even as Manufacturing Output is Falling? by Raphael Bergoeing, Timothy J. Kehoe, Vanessa Strauss-Kahn and Kei-Mu Yi. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 134-138 of American Economic Review, May 2004

Managed care organizations rely on incentives that encourage physicians to limit medical expenditures, but little is known about how physicians respond to these incentives. We address this issue by analyzing the physician incentive contracts in use at a health maintenance organization. By combining knowledge of the incentive contracts with internal company records, we examine how medical expenditures vary with the intensity of the incentive to cut costs. Our investigation leads us to a novel explanation for high‐powered group incentives: such incentives can improve efficiency in the allocation of resources when the allocation process is based on the professional judgment of multiple agents. Our empirical work indicates that medical expenditures at the HMO are 5 percent lower than they would have been in the absence of incentives.

We analyze entry, pricing, and product design in a model with differentiated products. Market equilibrium can be “separating,” with multiple sellers and a sorting of heterogeneous consumers across goods, or “exclusionary,” with one seller serving all customer types. Entry into an initially monopolized market can occur because of cost reductions or product improvements, but entry need not lower the incumbent’s price, improve efficiency, or raise consumer welfare. Postentry design incentives favor a softening of price competition and stronger market segmentation, whereas exclusionary design changes typically raise consumer welfare. Potential, as distinct from actual, entry always benefits consumers.

Efficiency in the Use of Technology in Economic Education: Some Preliminary Results by Kim Sosin, Betty J. Lecha, Rajshree Agarwal, Robin L. Bartlett and Joseph I. Daniel. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 253-258 of American Economic Review, May 2004

This paper considers the identification and estimation of hedonic models. We establish that in an additive version of the hedonic model, technology and preferences are generically nonparametrically identified from data on demand and supply in a single hedonic market. The empirical literature that claims that hedonic models estimated on data from a single market are fundamentally underidentified is based on arbitrary linearizations that do not use all the information in the model. The exact economic model that justifies linear approximations is unappealing. Nonlinearities are generic features of equilibrium in hedonic models and a fundamental and economically motivated source of identification.