The term sounds like a reference to the simple business event of one business combining with another. A perceptive look at the process of combining, however, reveals a series of complex problems, accounting and otherwise. Valuation and disposition of intangible assets are inherent in almost every combination as are the problems of specific asset revaluations and price level adjustments; usually differences between tax accounting and general accounting arise. Unfortunately, these problems all appear simultaneously and beg for answers. The accounting profession's interest in business combinations is, in part, evidenced by Accounting Research Bulletins 40, 43, and 481; these necessarily lack the color provided in the following description:

Investors, regulators, academics, and researchers all emphasize the importance of financial statement comparability. However, an empirical construct of comparability is typically not specified. In addition, little evidence exists on the benefits of comparability to users. This study attempts to fill these gaps by developing a measure of financial statement comparability. Empirically, this measure is positively related to analyst following and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to analysts? dispersion in earnings forecasts. These results suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of information available to analysts about the firm.

Laureen A. Maines, Linda S. McDaniel, Mary S. Harris, Implications of Proposed Segment Reporting Standards for Financial Analysts' Investment Judgements, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 35, Studies on Experts and the Application of Expertise in Accounting, Auditing, and Tax (1997), pp. 1-24

We examine the effect of personal taxes on CEOs’ decisions to sell their equity, controlling for diversification, managerial overconfidence, and other determinants. While CEOs frequently sell large amounts of their unrestricted firm equity, the tax burden associated with the sale significantly deters them from selling equity even after controlling for other determinants like diversification. We also find that both taxable institutional investors and CEOs respond to taxes in their selling of equity, although CEOs appear to be less tax-sensitive. Our findings underscore the importance of taxes in corporate and managerial decisions and they have implications for executive compensation policies.

The solution to the problem of portfolio choice is relevant in a positive financial economics context because it provides models of individual maximizing behavior which when aggregated to the level of the market provide models of equilibrium asset pricing. These models generally assume that the parameters of the probability distribution of security returns are known to individual investors. In practice, however, the individual has to estimate these parameters. To the extent that there is parameter uncertainty or “estimation risk”, what are the observable implications of a market equilibrium derived on the assumption that the information set of all investors is equivalent to a given set of sample data?

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.

In this article, I use the principal‐agent framework to examine the incentives of risk‐and work‐averse agents to work on projects that are long‐term, multistage, and subject to abandonment. Periodic applications of effort by the agent are required. The agent also obtains private information as the project evolves, and he decides whether the project should be abandoned or continued. The principal not only seeks to provide incentives to induce the agent to take up such risky investments and work hard at them, but also seeks to provide incentives for the agent to abandon the project if the profit prospect is low. We show that the agent's decision to continue is not always aligned with the principal's desire. The result provides an economic rationale for the sunk cost phenomenon. There also exist conditions under which the agent chooses to prematurely abandon the project.

Résumé. L'auteur examine comment le risque d'épuisement des obligations fiscales des sociétés avant la déduction des intérêts débiteurs influe sur leur niveau d'endettement. L'étude diffère des travaux précédents sous trois aspects: 1) elle fait usage de données compilées par l'Internal Revenue Service (IRS) à partir des déclarations de revenus des sociétés plutôt que de données comptables; 2) elle mesure le risque d'épuisement de l'impôt avec plus de précision; et 3) elle fait appel à une méthode reposant sur les séries chronologiques et le calcul des différences d'ordre 1, de sorte que les sociétés servent d'élément d'autocontrôle entre années successives. Ces innovations méthodologiques réduisent les distorsions attribuables à l'erreur de mesure et aux variables omises que l'on retrouvait dans les travaux précédents. Les résultats donnent à penser que, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, le risque élevé d'épuisement de l'impôt amène les sociétés à réduire leur utilisation du levier financier. L'étude fournit également des données confirmant pour la première fois que les impôts des particuliers influent de manière sensible sur le niveau d'endettement des sociétés. Les effets des décisions relatives au niveau d'endettement sur d'autres variables font également l'objet de tests dont les résultats confirment les prévisions énoncées dans les travaux théoriques précédents.