Knowledge that Transforms

Do corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance using unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities. OLS estimates indicate that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm governance, as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. Instrumental variables estimates based on exogenous changes in tax regulations yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result, as do several robustness checks. The results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.

With climate change as prototype example, this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low-probability, high-impact catastrophes. Even when updated by Bayesian learning, uncertain structural parameters induce a critical “tail fattening” of posterior-predictive distributions. Such fattened tails have strong implications for situations, like climate change, where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages. This paper shows that the economic consequences of fat-tailed structural uncertainty (along with unsureness about high-temperature damages) can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate-change policy analysis.

We are very sorry to report that Jane Martin, the Review's administrator for many years, passed away on 26 September 2009. As a tribute to her, we reproduce here a short extract from a reading at her funeral service: Since 1997, Jane was the administrator and production editor for the The Review of Economic Studies. In that post she blossomed, and with her literary and technical skills, her goodwill, quick wit, helpfulness and sense of humour became the hub for the ever-changing cast of editors, referees and authors. I knew Jane more or less from when she joined the journal, first as one of her editors and more recently as Chairman of the journal. Although physically frail, Jane had a strong and unflappable personality. She must have corresponded with an astonishing number of people over the years, many of whom had large egos and—if they had received a rejection letter from the editors, say—were not necessarily on their best behaviour. Jane invariably calmed the stormy waters. The fact that the journal has such a loyal community of board members, authors and referees is due in very large part to her sure touch at the helm. I never did hear a critical word about Jane from anyone.

We examine competitive nonlinear pricing in a model in which consumers have heterogeneous and elastic demands and can buy from more than one supplier.It is an equilibrium for firms to offer a menu of efficient two-part tariffs.Compared with linear pricing, nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumers when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iii) consumers face substantial shopping costs when buying from more than one firm, and (iv) a consumer's brand preference for one product is correlated with her brand preference for another product.Nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (iii) and (iv) hold, but (ii) does not.