Knowledge that Transforms

We demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long-term care insurance market. Two types of people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. In aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher risk. Our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. The results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information.

China has achieved tremendous economic progress in the last three decades, but there is much work to be done to make the economy resilient to large shocks, ensure the sustainability of its growth, and translate this growth into corresponding improvements in the economic welfare of its citizens. We discuss the complex challenges that Chinese policymakers face in striking the right balance in terms of speed and coordination of reforms. We argue that China's current stage of development, along with its rising market orientation and increasing integration with the world economy, may make the incremental and piecemeal approaches to reforms increasingly untenable and, in some cases, could even generate risks of their own. The present favorable domestic and external circumstances provide an excellent window of opportunity for bolder reforms and for tackling some deep-rooted problems without causing much economic disruption.

Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth by Lena Edlund and Nils-Petter Lagerlöf. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 304-307 of American Economic Review, May 2006

This paper reports results for a class of dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models with credit constraints that can account for some of the empirical regularities of the Sudden Stop phenomenon of recent emerging markets crises. In these models, credit constraints set in motion Irving Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism and they bind as an endogenous equilibrium outcome when agents are highly indebted. The quantitative predictions of these models yield three key lessons: (1) Sudden Stops can occur as an endogenous response to typical realizations of adverse shocks to fundamentals, in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of Sudden Stops into account. (2) Credit constraints cause output declines during Sudden Stops when collateral constraints limit debt to a fraction of the market value of capital, when there are limits on access to working capital, or when debt-deflation lowers the value of the marginal product of factors of production. (3) The debt-deflation mechanism has significant quantitative effects in terms of the amplification, asymmetry and persistence of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to standard shocks, and in the occurrence of Sudden Stops as infrequent events nested within regular business cycles. Precautionary saving rules out the largest Sudden Stops from the stochastic stationary state, but Sudden Stops remain a positive-probability event in the long run.

This paper shows that a large fraction of the 1973–2003 growth in residual wage inequality is due to composition effects linked to the secular increase in experience and education, two factors associated with higher within-group wage dispersion. The level and growth in residual wage inequality are also overstated in the March Current Population Survey (CPS) because, unlike the May or Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) CPS, it does not measure directly the hourly wages of workers paid by the hour. The magnitude and timing of the growth in residual wage inequality provide little evidence of a pervasive increase in the demand for skill due to skill-biased technological change.

Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply by Dirk Engelmann and Martin Strobel. Published in volume 96, issue 5, pages 1918-1923 of American Economic Review, December 2006

Emerging equity markets witness occasional surges in prices (frenzies) and cross-market price dispersion (herds), accompanied by abundant media coverage. An information market complementarity can explain these anomalies. Because information has high fixed costs, high volume makes it inexpensive. Low prices induce investors to buy information that others buy. Given two identical assets, investors learn about one; abundant information reduces its payoff risk and raises its price. Transitions between low-information/low-asset-price and high-information/high-asset-price equilibria resemble frenzies. Equity data and new panel data on news coverage support the model's predictions: Asset market movements generate news and news raises prices and price dispersion.

Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con by Lars E. O. Svensson. Published in volume 96, issue 1, pages 448-452 of American Economic Review, March 2006