Empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated, meaning that PACs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway. Thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior, which is a cornerstone of economic analysis. In this paper, a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of PACs to vary for different contribution recipients. I analyze the behavior of farm PACs over three election cycles. In contrast to previous findings, I find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior. Contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of Congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and PACs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in contributor interests anyway

Proper evaluation of cost-quality trade-offs inherent in regulatory policy requires identifying the structure of production from the behavioral response of quality to the policy change. However, estimating the structure of production with endogenous quality is difficult because of both measurement problems and data availability. We develop a simple method for identifying and estimating cost functions in the presence of endogenous and unobserved quality. Using this method, we estimate that a quality-adjusted cost function for nursing homes treating quality as exogenous yields seriously misleading estimates of marginal cost and economies of scale. We then used the parameter estimates to evaluate the cost-quality trade-off in nursing home regulatory policy.

This paper develops a two-sector neoclassical model of international trade with endogenous capital accumulation and intertemporal optimization. In contrast to the traditional "2 × 2 × 2" model, there is a Ricardian implication that countries specialize according to comparative advantage. Consequently, the theory predicts that government expenditure policies are unlikely to affect the established pattern of specialization and trade, but that changes in tax policies can result in a dramatic reorganization of world production. Further, the dynamic 2 × 2 × 2 model can explain many of the salient features of international trade that are problematic for the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model