Knowledge that Transforms

We study the impact of ring-fencing on bank riskiness using short-term money markets. Ring-fencing is when the government restricts some banking activities to a subsidiary of the group whilst restricting intra-group transfers. Exploiting confidential data on sterling-denominated repo transactions, we document that banking groups subject to ring-fencing are perceived to be safer—repo investors lend to ring-fenced groups at lower rates—and that the safety perception is amplified during times of market stress. We show that ring-fenced groups also intermediate more cautiously. Our article suggests that structural reforms can create a “safe-haven” bank in the financial system.

We study how the Volcker rule affects bond pricing in the pritmary market. Following implementation, Volcker-affected bonds have greater credit spreads at issuance than non-affected bonds. Bond liquidity in the year after issuance is also negatively affected by the Volcker rule. These effects are concentrated in the Rule 144A bond market. The Volcker rule’s impacts on credit spreads and liquidity are stronger for bonds with lower expected liquidity. The results suggest that expected liquidity deterioration due to the Volcker rule increases the liquidity premium demanded by primary market investors.

We study the influence of multi-sector conglomerate firms on sectoral comovement. Using an innovative network model of firms and industries, we derive a novel measure of the co-concentration of industries in which two industries are more co-concentrated if they share greater exposure to the same conglomerate firms. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and longitudinal tests on establishment-level data from nearly all US firms over 1991 to 2019, we find that industries with higher co-concentration exhibit stronger comovement in employment, sales, and asset growth. Controlling for alternative explanations, a one-standard deviation increase in co-concentration corresponds to a 0.32-standard deviation increase in the comovement of employment growth. In variance-covariance decompositions, we find that firm-specific shocks explain nearly half of aggregate volatility and industry comovement and that conglomerates play a significant role in sectoral comovement. Our framework helps explain how idiosyncratic, firm-level shocks contribute to aggregate fluctuations and influence business cycles.

We investigate the role of strategic security design in the market for retail investment products. Focusing on a dominant yet understudied design feature, we provide evidence consistent with issuers’ strategic increase of product complexity to mitigate price competition. Complexity facilitates product differentiation, thereby impairing investors’ ability to compare products. Because more complex products entail greater markups, imply higher tail risk, and are first-order stochastically dominated by simpler products, the empirically observed rise in market complexity increases uncompensated risk-taking, particularly among less sophisticated investors. Overall, our findings indicate that complexity is shaped by issuers’ deliberate design choice to preserve product rents.

This study estimates analyst-level stickiness in forecast updating and investigates its underlying determinants. Consistent with recent experimental findings on belief updating under cognitive noise, analysts often compress their forecasts toward an intermediate default, such as prior forecasts, when uncertain about forecast precision, leading to forecast stickiness. This tendency is more evident among analysts with characteristics associated with higher cognitive noise, including lower forecast accuracy, limited experience, and complex portfolio coverage, and during periods of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty. A model incorporating sticky updating behavior shows that the consensus revision by sticky analysts exhibits stronger return predictability than the traditional consensus revision by all analysts, with this predictability increasing with the proportion of sticky analysts covering a stock. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. Additionally, the return predictability of sticky revisions is especially pronounced when forecast difficulty is elevated. Analyst-level stickiness provides more information about the cross-section of stock returns than firm-level stickiness.

The tax rate on capital gains of equity has varied substantially over time and correlates negatively with realized capital gains and tax revenue. In our model, investors who anticipate the dynamics of the tax rate in their bond–equity mix realize greater gains when realized equity returns are higher, the capital gains tax rate is lower, and capital losses carried forward are larger. Simulating a calibrated population of investors produces model data consistent with tax revenue from capital gains realizations. Our model can inform the policymaker’s choice of the capital gains tax rate.

We study the effects of state-level Paid Family Leave (PFL) laws on US firms across a broad panel of private and public companies. Following PFL adoption, female employee turnover declines, labor productivity increases, and treated firms experience significant improvements in operating performance. These effects are stronger in regions with a larger supply of childbearing-age female labor, among R&D-intensive firms and firms with high intangible capital, consistent with a mechanism in which PFL reduces job separation expectations and encourages investment in firm-specific human capital. Our findings suggest that PFL can generate tangible firm-level benefits by enhancing workforce stability and productivity.

In over-the-counter markets, dealers facilitate trade by providing liquidity and acting as intermediaries. We use proprietary data on US single-name credit default swap trades and positions to study how dealer intermediation networks shape liquidity. For each reference entity, we reconstruct interdealer and dealer-to-client networks and introduce Shapley value-based measures of dealer and market connectivity. We present a cooperative game framework that links these measures to predictions for the liquidity that dealers provide at both individual and market levels. Empirically, we find that Shapley values are strongly associated with trade volumes, inventory management, execution costs, and bid–ask spreads.

This article studies the disclosure of stress test results by a regulator who is privately informed about bank health when she chooses the stress scenario. I show that the regulator’s choice of the stress scenario depends on how heterogeneous health is across banks. There can be fewer runs than under transparency. However, there are more runs than when the regulator chooses the scenario before becoming informed, highlighting a time-inconsistency problem. Moreover, disclosure can become a source of informational contagion, as changes in the health of one bank affect beliefs about other banks. The model explains the empirical puzzle that a bank’s share price can fall even though it passes the stress test.

Corporate scandals cause employee sentiment to fall sharply and persistently, driven by diminished perceptions of firm culture and management. Workers are not compensated for this loss in job satisfaction, as neither base nor variable pay rise. In fact, employees are six percentage points less likely to receive variable pay and those who do see it decline by an average of 10 percent. We also find suggestive evidence that corporate scandals induce voluntary turnover, particularly for longer-tenured workers. Together, our results demonstrate that rank-and-file employees are not insulated from organizational wrongdoing.