Owning valuable brands enhances the financial well-being of firms not only through increased revenues and profitability but also by mitigating agency problems, earnings management, and financial reporting irregularities. Firms with high brand equity are less likely to have income-inflating discretionary accruals, announce earnings restatements, or experience SEC investigations. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of manipulation through incentive and opportunity channels, which we capture in CEO characteristics and compensation, and corporate governance measures. Brand equity reduces the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities more for durable goods firms and firms with shorter-tenured CEOs, as the latter are most vulnerable to performance pressures. (JEL G31, G34, M31, M37, M41, M42) Received September 28, 2019; editorial decision May 27, 2020 by Editor Isil Erel.

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.

We measure the effect of bank failures on economic growth using data from 1900 to 1930, a period without active government stabilization policies and several severe banking crises. VAR model estimates suggest bank failures have long-lasting negative effects on economic growth. A bank failure shock involving one percent of system liabilities leads to a 6.5% reduction in GNP growth within three quarters and a measurable reduction for 10 quarters. Panel VAR model estimates for the 48 states show bank failures aggravate commercial non-bank failures. Institutional and regulatory features affect the intensity of the bank failure effect. We find that bank failures have a larger impact in states with deposit insurance, in states more heavily concentrated in agriculture, and in states with fewer large firms. However, because a number of states exhibit all three characteristics, we are not able to clearly identify the true marginal effects of these factors independently.

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.

We provide an applied introduction to Bayesian estimation methods for empirical accounting research. To showcase the methods, we compare and contrast the estimation of accruals models via a Bayesian approach with the literature’s standard approach. The standard approach takes a given model of normal accruals for granted and neglects any uncertainty about the model and its parameters. By contrast, our Bayesian approach allows incorporating parameter and model uncertainty into the estimation of normal accruals. This approach can increase power and reduce false positives in tests for opportunistic earnings management as a result of better estimates of normal accruals and more robust inferences. We advocate the greater use of Bayesian methods in accounting research, especially since they can now be easily implemented in popular statistical software packages.

Social and emotional learning (SEL) programs that target disruptive students aim to improve their classroom behavior. Small-scale programs in high-income countries have demonstrated positive effects. Using a randomized experiment, we show that a nationwide SEL program in Chile has no effect. Very disruptive students seem to reduce the program’s effectiveness. With attention deficit hyperactivity disorder being more prevalent in middle- than high-income countries, very disruptive students may be more present there, which could diminish the effectiveness of SEL programs. Moreover, implementation fidelity seems lower in this program than in the small-scale ones considered earlier, which could also explain the program’s null effect.

This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces. Finally, the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment.

The employment and earnings effects of the minimum wage are estimated by parameterizing a hypothesized relationship between underlying market employment and wage relationships versus observed wage and employment distributions in the presence of a legislated minimum. If there had been no minimum during the 1973-78 period, we estimate that employment among out-of-school men 16-24 would have been approximately 4% higher than it was. Among young men 16-19 employment would have been about 7% higher; among those 20-24, 2% higher. Employment among black youth 16-24 would have been almost 6% higher than it was, compared with somewhat less than 4% for white youth. Although it is sometimes argued that the adverse employment effects of the minimum are offset by increased earnings, we find virtually no earnings effect. Had the minimum not been raised over the 1973-78 period, inflation would have greatly moderated the adverse employment effects of the minimum, with approximately two-thirds of the potential employment gains from elimination of the minimum attained. The weight of our evidence is inconsistent with a general increase in youth wage rates with increases in the real minimum. Our findings support the hypothesis that the effects of the minimum are concentrated on youth with subminimum market wage rates.

A theory of intrafirm allocation under information asymmetry based on Myerson's general theory of mechanisms is developed. From the general model, it is shown that every Myerson equilibrium resource allocation mechanism is a “cost plus” type of transfer pricing. Specializing the general model to allow risk‐neutral agents, we derive the exact form of the compensation schemes in dominant strategy equilibrium transfer pricing mechanism. The general Myerson agency problem is transformed into a central planner's problem enabling us to bypass the first‐order approach to the problem. The closed form solution shows that each of the agents' compensation schemes is composed of a profit‐sharing component, a cost refund, taxes, and subsidies, making it a Groves‐like scheme. Additional results show that if the principal is asymmetrically informed about one of the agents only, the agent may derive rent from private information under monotonic compensation schemes, and we provide additional conditions under which Hirshleifer's classical marginal cost pricing is in equilibrium. Résumé. Les auteurs élaborent une théorie d'affectation des ressources internes au sein de l'entreprise, en situation d'asymétrie de l'information, à partir de la théorie générale des mécanismes de Myerson. En se fondant sur le modèle général, les auteurs démontrent que chaque mécanisme d'affectation des ressources correspondant à l'équilibre de Myerson tient du prix de cession interne de type « prix coûtant majoré ». En spécialisant le modèle général de façon à permettre l'introduction de mandataires neutres à l'égard du risque, ils dérivent la forme exacte de régimes de rémunération correspondant au mécanisme de détermination du prix de cession en situation d'équilibre de la stratégie dominante. Le problème mandant‐mandataire général de Myerson se transforme en problème de planificateur central, ce qui permet de court‐circuiter le premier ordre d'analyse du problème. La solution de nature fermée révèle que tout régime de rémunération des mandataires est composé d'un élément de participation aux bénéfices, de remboursement de frais, de taxes et de subventions, ce qui l'apparente à celui de Groves. D'autres résultats indiquent que si le mandant obtient de l'information asymétrique de l'un des mandataires seulement, ce dernier peut tirer, dans le cadre de regimes de remuneration monotoniques, un loyer de l'information privilégiée qu'il communique. Les auteurs ajoutent des conditions supplémentaires selon lesquelles l'établissement du prix selon la méthode classique de Hirshleifer en fonction des coûts marginaux est en équilibre.

In decentralized economies with transaction costs in contracting, it is demonstrated that an endogenous demand exists for the recording of events that affect the firm's value (“historical events”) and for the perpetual maintenance of audit trails to those records. A demand for the aggregation of records into reports (such as the financial statements) is derived from the costliness of the design, implementation and processing of contracts based on the primary data. But if principals do not control the recording or the reporting process, the agents will distort both the records and reports to their advantage. This gives rise to a demand for auditing services, which in turn creates a demand for audit trails, the causal links to verifiable facts underlying the records. Due to the costs of verification, with sufficient penalties and a positive probability of detection, random sample verification is as efficient as exhaustive verification. For random sample verification to be effective, the maintenance of audit trails for the life of the firm is necessary. Résumé. Dans les économies décentralisées où les contrats mandants‐mandataires ajoutent des coûts aux opérations, l'expérience démontre qu'il existe une demande endogène pour l'enregistrement des événements qui affectent la valeur de l'entreprise («événements historiques») et le maintien perpétuel de pistes de vérifications sous‐jacentes à ces enregistrements. La sollicitation d'une agrégation de ces enregistrements sous forme de rapports (les états financiers, par exemple) procède du fait que la conception, la mise en place et le traitement des contrats basés sur les données d'origine sont peu coûteux. Mais si les mandants ne contrôlent ni renregistrement ni le processus de communication de l'information, les mandataires sont susceptibles d'altérer les enregistrements aussi bien que les rapports en leur faveur. Cette constatation est à l'origine de la demande de services de vérification qui, à son tour, crée une demande de pistes de vérification, c'est‐à‐dire l'identification des liens accidentels des faits vérifiables sous‐jacents avec les enregistrements. Compte tenu des coûts de vérification, lorsque des pénalisations suffisantes et une bonne probabilité de détection existent, la vérification à partir d'échantillons aléatoires constitue une vérification aussi efficace qu'une verification exhaustive. Pour que la vérification à partir d'échantillons aléatoires soit efficace, elle exige cependant le maintien perpétuel des pistes de vérification.