Knowledge that Transforms

The problem of integrating back from an incomplete set of demand functions to a utility function is considered. Conditions permitting local integrability are analogous to those which arise in local integrability theorems for complete systems. But the analysis of the global integrability of incomplete systems differs markedly from that of complete systems.

If the representative consumer of a country is risk averse then the choice of trade controls must take account of their effects on the fluctuations of domestic real income. If the world price of the importable is uncertain and risk aversion is high then the optimal policy for achieving a ceiling on expected imports involves a reduction in imports and a rise in the domestic price as the world price falls. Moreover, a quota is superior to a tariff in achieving the ceiling. Under domestic uncertainty, a tariff is superior to a quota but it could be optimal to reduce the domestic price as imports increase.

The point of this paper is that inventory adjustment attenuates downward pressure on price when realized demand is low because firms accumulate inventory hold-overs, speculating that demand will be stronger in the succeeding period. When realized demand is high the firm draws down its inventories until a "stock-out" occurs and price rises to clear the market.

The effect of conventional and final-offer compulsory arbitration on negotiated settlements is characterized, using Nash's variable-threats bargaining solution, with particular attention to the interaction between arbitral risk and bargainers' risk preferences. When there is no arbitral risk, both schemes are shown to have the same effect on negotiated settlements under very general conditions, even when bargaining is over several issues. Whether or not there is arbitral risk, negotiated settlements favour a bargainer more if his opponent is more risk-averse. On the other hand, increases in arbitral risk need not improve the position of the less risk-averse bargainer. As a by-product of the analysis, Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler's risk-sensitivity results for the Nash and Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are generalized from fixed-threats to variable-threats bargaining.

It is frequent practice to model an industry or economy as if it were a single agent solving a single optimization problem. A model of firm behavior which has had extensive use as an aggregative model is the adjustment cost model of investment. We assume there are a number of competitive firms in an industry that choose investment paths to maximize their present value; the technologies of the firms exhibit capital stock adjustment costs. For general concave technologies of the firms, there is no aggregate concave technology that can represent the technological possibilities available to the industry. We find conditions on the technologies of the firms that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of an aggregate technology that can consistently model the industry's behavior and discuss their empirical implications.

A consumer faces list prices for commodities, but can buy one at a discount. Discounts vary randomly between sellers. The number of quotations sought depends on list prices, search costs and wealth. This function is homogeneous of degree zero, and, provided some sufficient conditions are satisfied, is; increasing in wealth; decreasing in search cost; independent of the list price of the discounted commodity if indirect utility is multiplicatively separable; increasing in the list price if the commodity is a necessity; increasing in the list price of substitutes. Slutsky's equation is generalized to include search.

This paper contains a generalization of the General Possibility Theorem to situations where choice over two-element (more generally, “small”) sets is not possible. The analysis is developed in terms of the social choice function formulation rather than the social welfare function approach. In this formulation, assumptions concerning the size of sets of feasible alternatives are explicit, allowing the role of these assumptions in inducing impossibility results to be explored.

A simple regression test of the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias has been suggested by J. J. Heckman. Because of its computational simplicity, this test is widely used by applied researchers. This paper shows that Heckman's test is equivalent to the Lagrange multiplier test of the null hypothesis. This allows us to readily deduce that the simple regression test also has desirable large sample properties.

This paper examines the interactions between market structure and resource allocation over time when there is endogenous technical progress. The structures considered are a planned economy, pure monopoly, and competition with patent rights. In an efficient allocation the date of invention coincides with the date of innovation (the date at which technology is used). This is also true with a pure monopoly, but monopoly retards technical progress relative to the efficient level. Competition for patents rights to a new technology results in excessively rapid technical progress if the resource endowment of the economy is sufficiently large. Also, competition may lead to “sleeping patents” where invention strictly precedes the date of innovation.

Accepting the hypothesis that the time-series “facts” of the aggregate labour market may be summarized by the linear autoregressive and moving average representations of wages, prices, unemployment, and interest rates implies that a useful theory ought to lead to predictions about these representations. Following this approach, this paper first catalogues many of the time-series facts about the aggregate labour market and then compares them against alternative models of the labour market based on the intertemporal substitution and staggered contract hypotheses.