Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the long-term and life cycle consequences of increasing access to mother and child health care centers in the first year of life. Access to these centers increased completed years of schooling by 0.15 years and earnings by 2%. These effects were stronger for children from a low socioeconomic background and contribute to a 10% reduction in the intergenerational persistence in educational attainment. Better nutrition within the first year of life is a likely mechanism. In particular, we find positive effects on adult height, fewer health risks at age 40, and decreased infant mortality from diarrhea.

We document intracity spatial persistence and its causes. Streetcars dominated urban transit in Los Angeles County from the 1890s to the early 1910s, and were off the road entirely by 1963. However, we find that streetcars' influence remains readily visible in the current pattern of urban density and that this influence has not dissipated in the sixty years since the streetcar's removal. We examine land use regulation as both a consequence of streetcars and a mechanism for the persistent effect of streetcars. Our evidence suggests that the streetcar influences modern behavior through the mutually reinforcing pathways of regulation and agglomerative clustering.

Despite evidence that many consumers in health insurance markets are subject to information frictions, approaches used to evaluate these markets typically assume informed, active consumers. We develop a general framework to study insurance market equilibrium in the presence of choice frictions and evaluate key policy interventions. We identify sufficient relationships between the underlying distributions of consumer costs, surplus from risk protection, and choice frictions that determine the welfare impact of friction-reducing policies. We implement our approach empirically, showing how these key sufficient objects can be measured and the link between these objects and policy outcomes.

We study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large-scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform. We exogenously vary default options along two choice dimensions: the charitable donation decision and the “co-donation” decision regarding how much to contribute to supporting the platform. We document a strong effect of defaults on individual behavior but nevertheless find that aggregate donation levels are unaffected by defaults. In contrast, co-donations increase in the default amount. We complement our experimental results with a structural model that investigates whether personalizing defaults based on individuals' donation histories can increase donation revenues.

A Spanish reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting in substantial tax differentials. Using administrative data, we find that conditional on moving, taxes have a significant effect on location choice. A 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate for a region relative to others increases the probability of moving to that region by 1.7 percentage points. We estimate an elasticity of the number of top taxpayers with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.85. The mechanical increase in tax revenue due to higher tax rates is larger than the loss in tax revenue from the net outflow of migration.

I study a dyadic linking model in which agents form directed links that exhibit homophily and reciprocity. A fixed-effect approach accounts for unobserved sources of degree heterogeneity. I consider specification testing and inference with respect to the homophily and reciprocity parameters. The specification test compares observed transitivity to predicted transitivity. All test statistics account for the presence of an incidental parameter by using formulas based on an asymptotic approximation. In an application to favor networks in Indian villages, the specification test detects that the dyadic linking model underestimates the true transitivity of the network.

We examine how income shocks affect the suicide rate in Indonesia. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the cash transfer's nationwide rollout, and corroborate the findings using a randomized experiment. Our estimates show that the cash transfers reduce the yearly suicide rate by 0.36 per 100,000 people, corresponding to an 18% decrease. Moreover, a different type of income shock, variability in agricultural productivity, also affects the suicide rate. The cash transfer program reduces the causal impact of the agricultural productivity shocks, suggesting an important role for policy interventions. Finally, we provide evidence for depression as a psychological mechanism.

We analyze a model of R&D alliance networks where firms are engaged in R&D collaborations that lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We then structurally estimate this model using a unique panel of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to study the impact of targeted versus nondiscriminatory R&D subsidy policies and empirically rank firms according to the welfare-maximizing subsidies they should receive.

Using a unique data set linking preschool blood lead levels, birth, school, and detention records for 125,000 children born between 1990 and 2004 in Rhode Island, we estimate the impact of lead on school suspension and juvenile detention. Sibling fixed-effect models suggest that omitted variables related to family disadvantage do not bias OLS estimates. However, measurement error does. We use IV methods that exploit local (within-neighborhood), variation in lead exposure deriving from road proximity and the deleading of gasoline. For boys, a 1 unit increase in lead increased the probability of suspension from school by 6% and detention by 57%.

In this paper, we study the effects of the timing of nutritional aid disbursement on crime, using two main sources of variation: (a) a policy change in Illinois that substantially increased the number of SNAP distribution days and (b) an existing Indiana policy that issues SNAP benefits by last name. We find that staggering SNAP benefits leads to large reductions in crime and theft at grocery stores by 17.5% and 20.9%, respectively. Findings also show that theft decreases in the second and third weeks following receipt but increases in the last week of the benefit cycle due to resource constraints.