individual may indeed lead him to reject his sincere strategy. In the present paper, the same class of voting procedures is analyzed, and a similar result is shown to hold in terms of a new concept, that of weak domination in the extended sense between the strategies of an individual. The basic idea of the extension is to account for situations where only partial information on other individuals' preferences is held by members of the society, and to show that this partial would be sufficient for a rational individual to choose nonsincere strategies under certain conditions. The main motivation of this note is thus to relax the rather restrictive assumption of perfect knowledge underlying most of the analysis in the literature on strategic voting, and to examine the problem of strategic voting with a weaker assumption.
Three different forms of congestion of production factors are defined and analyzed within an axiomatic theory of production. These forms of congestion are used to characterize a law of variable proportion. (Author)
For the regression equation C = A,B + e where A is a p x q stochastic matrix whose elements are independently distributed and contemporaneously correlated with the elements of 8, the lth moment of the least squares estimator of (3 exists if and only if l < p - q + 1. In particular, this implies that the lth moment of the k-class estimator of the coefficients of the G1 -1 non-normalizing endogenous variables of an equation with K1 included and K2 excluded exogenous variables in a simultaneous system with N observations exists if and only if 1 < M where
[We solve the problem of the restrictions imposed on the Jacobian A at prices p̄ of the aggregate excess demand function x(p) of m agents in an exchange economy with l commodities, under the assumption of individual rationality. Given an arbitrary differentiable function x(p) satisfying homogeneity and Walras' law, we attribute rational individual excess demand functions x^1 (p), ..., x^m (p) to the m agents such that at any arbitrarily specified vector p̄ aggregate excess demand is equal to x(p̄) and the following condition is satisfied: There exists a subspace M of dimension m such that the Jacobian at p̄ of x(p) and the Jacobian at p̄ of the aggregate excess demand function define the same linear function on M. If x(p̄) ≠ 0, M can be taken to have dimension (m+1). As an immediate consequence of our proof for m=1 we show that even if p̄, x(p̄), and Dx(p̄) are known for the excess demand function of a single agent, the substitution effect and the income effect cannot be unambiguously determined without knowledge of the utility function. We extend the results proved at a point to large open neighborhoods. We show that if x(p) is an arbitrary function which bounded from below and satisfies homogeneity and Walras' law, and if x(p̄) ≠ 0, then we can find an open neighborhood G of p̄ and (l-1) individually rational excess demand functions x^1(p), ..., x^l-l (p), such that Σ_k=1^l-1 x^k (p) = x(p) everywhere on G.]
[This paper shows how a number of questions about dominant strategy mechanisms in models with public goods can be conveniently formulated as systems of partial differential equations. The question of the existence of dominant strategy mechanisms with given desirable properties becomes equivalent to the integrability of these equations.]
The implications for applied econometrics of the assumption that unobservable expectations formed rationally in Muth's sense examined. The statistical properties of the resulting models and their distributed lag and time series representations described. Purely extrapolative forecasts of endogenous variables can be constructed, as alternatives to rational expectations, but less efficient. Identification and estimation considered: an order condition is that no more expectations variables than exogenous variables enter the model. Estimation is based on algorithms for nonlinear-in-parameters systems; other approaches surveyed. Implications for economic policy and econometric policy evaluation described. EXPECTATIONS VARIABLES ARE WIDELY USED in applied econometrics, since the optimizing behavior of economic agents, which empirical research endeavors to capture, depends in part on their views of the future. Directly observed expectations or anticipations relatively rare, hence implicit forecasting schemes used. Most commonly expectations taken to be extrapolations, that is, weighted averages of past values of the variable under consideration. However, these are almost surely inaccurate gauges of expectations. Consumers, workers, and businessmen ... do read newspapers and they do know better than to base price expectations on simple extrapolation of price series alone (Tobin [31, p. 14]). An alternative approach is offered by the rational expectations hypothesis of Muth [15], which assumes that in forming their expectations of endogenous variables, economic agents take account of the interrelationships among variables described by the appropriate economic theory. Price movements observed and experienced do not necessarily convey information on the basis of which a rational man should alter his view of the future. When a blight destroys half the midwestern corn crop and corn prices subsequently rise, the information conveyed is that blights raise prices. No trader or farmer under these circumstances would change his view of the future of corn prices, much less of their rate of change, unless he is led to reconsider his estimate of the likelihood of blights, again quoting Tobin. This paper examines the implications of the rational expectations hypothesis for applied econometrics, and argues that its full force has yet to be appreciated in empirical work. The discussion is quite general, proceeding in terms of the standard linear simultaneous equation system, and pays little attention to specific applications of the hypothesis, such as the efficient markets literature and
[Production problems in which profit is to be maximized subject to constraints onresources and outputs are frequently modeled as linear programs. While in practice the technology coefficients are often treated as constants, they are frequently better regarded as random variables. Stochastic programming models, first developed in the 1950's, recognized that explicit representation of randomness in factors of production is sometimes necessary to derive program solutions [3]. In 1970 Resh [12] noted that a certain class of implied chance-constrained models with zero-order decision rules were utilizing inappropriately conservative constraints. We have extended his results from integer to continuous decision variables and present experimental evidence from dental services production that substantial undercalculation of "optimal" output does occur when Resh's model variant is not used. We show that solutions for continuous variable models can be closely approximated by linear programming models derived by Resh in an integer case.]
[An additively decomposable inequality measure is one which can be expressed as aweighted sum of the inequality values calculated for population subgroups plus the contribution arising from differences between subgroup means. The paper derives the entire class of measures which are additively decomposable under relatively weak restrictions on the form of the index. The subclass of mean indepedent measures turns out to be a single parameter family which includes thesquare of the coefficient of variation and two entropy formulae proposed by Theil.]