Knowledge that Transforms

In recent years, public attitudes toward single mothers have changed dramatically, and policymakers are being pressed to devise reforms that will reduce their welfare dependency. In the summer of 1994, at least 11 separate welfare reform proposals were being debated by Congressional committees. Because child care is relatively expensive compared to potential earnings for single mothers, extensions to current child-care assistance programs will be an integral component of any welfare reform package. Very little evidence exists regarding child-care utilization patterns and links to employment for low-income mothers. Exceptions include Mark Berger and Dan Black (1992) and the recent Congressional testimony given by Jane Ross (1994) of the GAO. Contributing to the changing attitudes toward welfare recipients is the change in the demographic makeup of the labor force. Overall female labor-force participation rates have grown dramatically in the past 30 years, from 45 percent in the mid-1960's to 75 percent in the early 1990's. As a result, subsidizing poor single mothers so that they can stay at home with their children while more and more married mothers are working for pay has become less popular. This has led to the encouragement of work, particularly full-time work, as a means of poverty reduction for single mothers.! Unfortunately, child care costs represent a significant employment barrier. On average, child care costs $63 per week overall, and $44 per week for care by a relative. For the typical single mother, child-care costs range between 15 percent and 30 percent of earned income, depending on the mode of care and hourly wage.2

During business-cycle expansions, wages appear to rise relative to output prices.1 This fact is easy to square with real-business-cycle models which are based on the assumption that labor is more productive during expansions. But it is inconsistent with standard business-cycle theories based on aggregate demand fluctuations. In these models, fixed technology and diminishing returns imply that labor becomes less productive as output rises. Thus, in an expansion, wages should fall relative to output prices. Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford (1991, 1992) argue that imperfect competition can help to reconcile aggregatedemand theories of business cycles with observed procyclical real wages. If firms compete more aggressively during expansions, reducing the markup of price over marginal cost, the real wage can be driven up even if labor's marginal product falls. Countercyclical markups can therefore induce procyclical real wages. The difficult issue is understanding why markups would be countercyclical. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992)hereafter referred to as RSW-claim that markups are countercyclical because it is harder for oligopolistic firms to sustain collusive prices during booms. When current demand is high relative to future demand, the incentive for any firm to cut its price rises because it becomes more valuable to capture current sales than to maintain collusion in the future. RSW present evidence that markups are indeed more countercyclical in more concentrated industries (where collusion can be more easily sustained). While this finding is consistent with countercyclical collusion, it is also consistent with any other theory in which imperfect competition induces firms to compete more aggressively during booms. In this paper, we analyze an alternative theory of countercyclical markups based on imperfect competition and capital-market imperfections. This theory has been suggested by Bruce Greenwald et al. (1984), Nils Gottfries (1991), and Paul Klemperer (1993). We present some preliminary evidence in an effort to distinguish this explanation from countercyclical collusion.

That firms employ internal labor markets, in which wages and careers are partly shielded from the vagaries of external labor markets, seems well accepted. Yet, Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore's (1985) seminal work on internal labor markets has had a rather limited impact on the economics profession. In contrast to textbooks on human-resource management, which have adopted their paradigm wholeheartedly, labor economics texts tend to pay only cursory attention to internal labor markets. The competitive model, in which wages reflect an individual's marginal product, remains the paradigm of choice. There are many reasons for this lackluster reception, including intellectual convenience. A more acceptable excuse is that while Doeringer and Piore's study, which was based on interviews with 75 companies, identified several key regularities (ports of entry, career ladders, etc.) that have come to shape our perception of internal labor markets, the book never presented a theory to explain these findings. With the advent of information economics and contract theory, models of internal labor markets-or at least selected features of these markets-have begun to emerge. The objective of these theories is to show that internal-labor-market outcomes can be construed as second-best solutions to contracting problems under incomplete information. For instance, tournament theory (Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, 1981) sees the attachment of wages to jobs as part of an efficient incentive scheme. Michael Waldman (1984) explains the same phenomenon as an insurance arrangement against variations in individual productivity. Seniority rules in promotion and wagesetting can be understood as responses to problems of collusion or influence activities (Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 1988). The list could be extended. At this point, there is hardly any feature of internal labor markets that cannot be given some logical explanation using the right combination of uncertainty, asymmetric information and opportunism. Doeringer and Piore (1985), in the preface to the second printing of their book, take exception with this line of theoretical research. They believe that internal labor markets are inherently a social (group) phenomenon and that something fundamental is missed by pursuing individualistic models. Be that as it may, we think there is another, more serious problem with the direction that this research has taken: too much of it relies on the old empirical stereotype. The original study was done 25 years ago and focused almost exclusively on blue-collar, male, unionized, manufacturing workers. One might rightly wonder how relevant these findings are in today's environment and whether they extend to white-collar work as most discussions seem to assume. Before proceeding with the theory, it is prudent to ask: do we have the facts right? In this paper we report on two recent case studies of individual firms that use personnel records to analyze wage and career paths of managerial workers: Lazear (1992) and Baker et al. (1994a,b).1 Person-

One way in which corporate financial structure affects macroeconomic performance is by creating debt overhang. Debt overhang occurs when existing debt deters new investment because the benefits from new investment will go to the existing creditors, not to the new investors. If the economy is booming, debt overhang will not bind because the returns to investing are high. If the economy is stagnant, debt overhang will bind because the returns to investing are low. As a result, high levels of debt can create multiple expectational equilibria in which 'animal spirits' determine economy activity. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

The authors study the implications for shareholder wealth of interfirm antitrust litigation and how the costs of the dispute affect the propensity to settle. Upon filing, defendants experience significant wealth losses that are ten million dollars larger than the wealth gains of plaintiffs. Financial distress, behavioral constraints, and follow-on suits are sources of wealth leakage and influence settlement behavior. Since the threat of a monetary transfer has little power to explain either wealth effects or the likelihood of settlement, the central concern of defendants may be the potential prohibition of profitable business practices. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

Economists view talk as cheap and culture as insignificant. Yet humans are talking animals, talking in their markets. The talk probably matters: why else would the human animals bother doing it? The usual economic view of the talk is that it issues orders and conveys information. Workers at GM are ordered to report for work tomorrow; credit ratings are conveyed. Economic analysis takes these parts of the talk into account without fuss. Production theory can be viewed as the theory of one mind issuing orders. Much of game theory is concerned in one way or another with information (though game theory, as Joseph Farrell (1995) and others have found, requires more than bits of information). But issuing the orders and conveying the information does not account for all of the talk. The third part of the economic talk is persuasion.

The case for central-bank independence (CBI), while not a new one, has been strengthened by a growing body of empirical evidence, by recent developments in economic theory, and by the temper of the times. The case is a strong one,1 which is becoming part of the Washington orthodoxy. The purposes of this paper are both to make more precise the type of CBI that is likely to enhance economic performance, and to point to some remaining open issues and anomalies. I start with the two theoretical approaches to CBI.