Knowledge that Transforms

This paper reports experiments designed to measure strategic sophistication, the extent to which players' behavior reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to look up hidden payoffs as often as desired, one at a time, while automatically recording their look-ups. Monitoring information search allows tests of game theory's implications for cognition as well as decisions, and subjects' deviations from search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.

This paper develops an asymptotic theory of inference for an unrestricted two-regime threshold autoregressive (TAR) model with an autoregressive unit root. We find that the asymptotic null distribution of Wald tests for a threshold are nonstandard and different from the stationary case, and suggest basing inference on a bootstrap approximation. We also study the asymptotic null distributions of tests for an autoregressive unit root, and find that they are nonstandard and dependent on the presence of a threshold effect. We propose both asymptotic and bootstrap-based tests. These tests and distribution theory allow for the joint consideration of nonlinearity (thresholds) and nonstationary (unit roots). Our limit theory is based on a new set of tools that combine unit root asymptotics with empirical process methods. We work with a particular two-parameter empirical process that converges weakly to a two-parameter Brownian motion. Our limit distributions involve stochastic integrals with respect to this two-parameter process. This theory is entirely new and may find applications in other contexts. We illustrate the methods with an application to the U.S. monthly unemployment rate. We find strong evidence of a threshold effect. The point estimates suggest that the threshold effect is in the short-run dynamics, rather than in the dominate root. While the conventional ADF test for a unit root is insignificant, our TAR unit root tests are arguably significant. The evidence is quite strong that the unemployment rate is not a unit root process, and there is considerable evidence that the series is a stationary TAR process.

This paper is concerned with the Bayesian estimation of nonlinear stochastic differential equations when observations are discretely sampled. The estimation framework relies on the introduction of latent auxiliary data to complete the missing diffusion between each pair of measurements. Tuned Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods based on the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, in conjunction with the Euler-Maruyama discretization scheme, are used to sample the posterior distribution of the latent data and the model parameters. Techniques for computing the likelihood function, the marginal likelihood, and diagnostic measures (all based on the MCMC output) are developed. Examples using simulated and real data are presented and discussed in detail.

This paper studies necessity of transversality conditions for the continuous time, reduced form model. By generalizing Benveniste and Scheinkman's (1982) “envelope” condition and Michel's (1990) version of the squeezing argument, we show a generalization of Michel's (1990, Theorem 1) necessity result that does not assume concavity. The generalization enables us to generalize Ekeland and Scheinkman's (1986) result as well as to establish a new result that does not require the objective functional to be finite. The new result implies that homogeneity of the return function alone is sufficient for the necessity of the most standard transversality condition. Our results are also applied to a nonstationary version of the one-sector growth model. It is shown that bubbles never arise in an equilibrium asset pricing model with a nonlinear constraint.

We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The payoff matrix changes according to a random walk. Players observe these payoffs and the population distribution of actions as they evolve. The game has frictions: opportunities to change strategies arrive from independent random processes, so that the players are locked into their actions for some time. As the frictions disappear, each player ignores what the others are doing and switches at her first opportunity to the risk-dominant action. History dependence emerges in some cases when frictions remain positive.

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well-defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.