Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of the All‐Star award on the performance of Chinese financial analysts. Leveraging unique voting data from 2007 to 2016 and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we find that the All‐Star award significantly enhances recipients' fundamental analysis. Awarded analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts, and their stock recommendations convey greater information content for firms with higher information asymmetry. RDD results also indicate that award recipients gain increased resources and greater flexibility in reallocating time and effort. Post award, analysts concentrate on fewer industries, cover more firms within each industry, issue forecasts more frequently, expand their teams, and conduct more site visits. Surveys of analysts and institutional investors corroborate these findings, highlighting increases in site visits and roadshows following the award. Overall, the results suggest that the All‐Star award boosts analyst performance by fostering more concentrated coverage and improving access to both internal and external resources.

Abstract In this study, we examine how achievement‐related tendencies are expressed in the professional auditing context, particularly through the interplay between the CEO and the audit partner. We use the facial width‐to‐height ratio (fWHR), a stable morphological trait widely applied in prior research, as a proxy for achievement drive. Using a sample of US audit partners from 2016 to 2019, we find that higher achievement drive is associated with enhanced audit quality, evidenced by fewer restatements and lower abnormal accruals. Auditors with higher achievement drive are also more likely to become industry experts, attain leadership positions, and achieve partnership status more quickly. Importantly, we find that high‐achievement‐drive audit partners are more inclined to assert dominance in negotiations, particularly when working with equally driven CEOs, leading to improved audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that, when activated in auditing contexts, achievement‐oriented tendencies, as proxied by fWHR, are linked to higher audit quality.

ABSTRACT Exploiting the staggered rollout of third‐generation (3G) mobile broadband networks across 40 countries between 1999 and 2012, we examine how technological progress affects capital markets. We find that the introduction of 3G networks is followed by a reduction in bid‐ask spreads and an increase in price informativeness. These effects are more pronounced among firms with lower institutional ownership, indicating that information access through mobile broadband networks disproportionally benefits retail investors. We further show that these effects are concentrated in countries with well‐functioning markets, as characterized by transparent accounting information, broad investor participation, and strong legal protections for investors. Taken together, our findings suggest that mobile broadband connectivity reduces information frictions and improves price informativeness. They further highlight the institutional conditions under which these benefits materialize.

ABSTRACT During the COVID‐19 pandemic, states imposed restrictions intended to slow the spread of the virus. We investigate whether states' reliance on consumption tax revenue, relative to other tax revenue sources, is associated with the duration of COVID‐19 mobility restrictions. We find that states that are more dependent on consumption taxes experienced shorter durations of stay‐at‐home orders, restaurant closures, and bar closures. We conduct a series of analyses to mitigate concerns that state‐level political preferences and biases may be influencing our findings. Our findings suggest that anticipated shortfalls in consumption tax revenue may have shaped public health responses, consistent with tax system structures relating, unintentionally, to crisis management decisions.

ABSTRACT We investigate investors' voluntary disclosure decisions under uncertainty about their information endowment. In our model, an investor may receive initial evidence about a target firm. Conditional on learning the initial evidence, the investor may receive additional evidence that helps them interpret the initial evidence. The investor takes a position in the firm's stock, then voluntarily discloses some or all of their findings, and finally closes their position after the disclosure. We present two main findings. First, the investor will always disclose the initial evidence, even though the market is uncertain about whether the investor possesses such evidence. Second, the investor's disclosure strategy of the additional evidence increases stock price volatility: they disclose extreme news and withhold moderate news. Due to the withholding of the additional evidence, misleading disclosure arises as an equilibrium outcome, where the investor's report decreases (increases) price despite their news being good (bad). These results remain robust when considering the target firm's endogenous response to the investor's report.

ABSTRACT Prior literature extensively documents that financial analysts obtain information from interactions with firm managers; however, the reciprocal information flow from financial analysts to firm managers during these interactions remains underexplored. This paper examines whether managers learn from face‐to‐face interactions with analysts to increase the precision of management earnings range guidance. Using a unique dataset of analyst site visits in China, we find that firms hosting more analyst site visits issue more precise management earnings range guidance. This effect is stronger among firms with greater uncertainty, which is consistent with the concept of managerial learning. Importantly, our evidence contradicts the arguments of social transmission bias and firm managers' impression management. We further demonstrate that firm managers can learn from interactions with both buy‐side analysts and sell‐side analysts to improve their guidance precision. Overall, this study provides robust evidence that firm managers can acquire valuable insights from interactions with financial analysts to issue more precise earnings range guidance to market participants.

ABSTRACT This article studies how the mandatory disclosure of audit risk and targeted regulatory inspections influence audit quality. We develop a model in which the auditor tests a firm's internal control over financial reporting before auditing the financial report and must issue an opinion on both. Due to higher regulatory scrutiny received by audits with weak internal control opinions, we show that targeted inspections generate countervailing effects: they reduce the auditor's internal control audit effort while increasing substantive testing effort. We show that a positive level of targeted inspections can improve audit quality when the level of random inspections is high. Furthermore, we show that targeted inspections are not always consistent with risk‐based inspections, due to the auditor's strategic response to the oversight measures. Nevertheless, such targeting can still result in higher audit quality. Our results suggest the need to exercise caution when using audit risk disclosures as a basis for enforcement.

ABSTRACT We study how analysts' inherited cultural attitudes to time orientation affect their production of long‐term information and the profitability of their stock recommendations. We find that analysts from long‐term‐oriented cultures exhibit a longer forecast horizon and issue more long‐term forecasts. They also produce more accurate long‐term forecasts and ask more long‐term‐focused questions during conference calls, eliciting greater long‐term disclosure from managers. In addition, they are more likely to use discounted valuation models that explicitly incorporate expectations about firms' long‐term prospects. Further, their stock recommendations are more profitable, consistent with their production of long‐term information enhancing valuation. Our findings highlight the role of cultural long‐term orientation in shaping analysts' information production in capital markets.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the association between CEOs' prosocial tendency and their firms' likelihood of accounting manipulation. We measure CEOs' prosocial tendency based on their involvement with charitable organizations. We find that prosocial CEOs are less likely to engage in accounting manipulation, as proxied by material non‐reliance restatements and SEC or US Department of Justice enforcement actions. The effect is more pronounced when CEOs are involved with charities that directly aim to improve the welfare of others and when they face stronger incentives to misreport. These results continue to hold in analyses of changes in CEOs' prosocial tendency around turnover events. Taken together, our findings suggest that CEOs' prosocial tendency, a fundamental personal trait, plays a significant role in shaping the quality of accounting information.

ABSTRACT We document that firms held by mutual fund managers who have public accounting experience earlier in their careers exhibit higher‐quality financial reporting, as evidenced by a lower likelihood of financial statement restatements. Additional evidence shows that fund managers with public accounting experience are more likely to conduct site visits to their portfolio firms and discuss accounting policy–related topics during those visits. Moreover, the restatement likelihood falls after fund managers' site visits, particularly when they raise accounting policy–related issues during their visits. In cross‐sectional results consistent with expectations, we find that the role that fund manager public accounting experience plays is amplified when the firm suffers more severe agency problems, firm information asymmetry is worse, fund managers are more risk averse, fund managers have prior work experience at larger accounting firms, fund managers hold a larger proportion of the firm's shares, or there is coordination among mutual funds. Collectively, our evidence suggests that fund managers with public accounting experience impose stricter external monitoring on their portfolio firms' financial reporting choices.