Paper presented at the September l980 meetings of the American Economic and American Finance Associations in Denver, Colorado.

"Paper presented at the September l980 meetings of the American Economic and American Finance Associations in Denver, Colorado."

This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model emphasizes the (economically arbitrary, from a welfare point of view) importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation. We explore the implications of a legislator's objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale.

By considering investor order placement strategy, this paper demonstrates that transaction costs cause bid-ask spreads to be an equilibrium property of asset markets. With transaction costs, the probability of a limit order executing does not go to unity as the order is placed infinitesimally close to a counterpart market quote; thus, with certainty of execution at the counterpart market quote, a "gravitational pull" is generated that keeps counterpart quotes from being placed infinitesimally close to each other. An equilibrium spread is defined and its size linked to market thinness; implications are noted for the design of a trading system.

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the FDIC. Essentially, the FDIC sells two products—insurance and regulation. To span the product space, it must and does set two prices. We argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk‐taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value (i.e., the value of their right to continue in business) stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the FDIC's insurance reserves.

ABSTRACT The term structure of interest rates is an important subject to economists, and has a long history of traditions. This paper re‐examines many of these traditional hypotheses while employing recent advances in the theory of valuation and contingent claims. We show how the Expectations Hypothesis and the Preferred Habitat Theory must be reformulated if they are to obtain in a continuous‐time, rational‐expectations equilibrium. We also modify the linear adaptive interest rate forecasting models, which are common to the macroeconomic literature, so that they will be consistent in the same framework.