This paper investigates the connection between credit rationing and private intergenerational transfers. The research is motivated by the idea that private transfers may be a source of funds for consumers who have difficulty borrowing from financial intermediaries. This idea has important implications for consumer behavior, and economists have begun to think about it, but they have given it little empirical attention. Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, we find that private transfers do tend to be targeted toward consumers who face credit rationing. But we also find that a substantial fraction of U.S. consumers are liquidity-constrained even if one allows for the possibility of private transfers.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence on the following question: Are there more banking offices available per person to furnish consumer and business services in branch banking states than in unit banking states? This question is a central part of a broader issue of what limitations should be placed on the ability of individual banks to branch. Indeed, in a recent review of the literature dealing with the branching question, and prepared for the Senate Banking Committee (McIntyre Committee), Guttentag [8] stated: “One of the most pervasive arguments for branch banking is that branch banks provide more office facilities than unit banking.” Yet the available evidence on the question is sparse and existing research contains methodological difficulties which make the findings of questionable value.

The phenomenal growth in corporate merger activity of the 1960s revived interest in the motives and effects relating to corporate mergers. In recent years, many theories for explaining mergers have been discussed and tested in the literature of finance, law, and economics. Various authors have argued that motives for merger include increased market power [15, 21, 23], achievement of operating or managerial scale economies [2, 8], diversification [6], tax reduction [19], growth maximization [14, 16], and bankruptcy avoidance [7, 10, 12, 13]. The bankruptcy avoidance motive is perhaps the most recently articulated of all merger motives, and perhaps the only one for which no systematic attempts at empirical validation have been forthcoming.

The commercial banking industry has been buffeted by a variety of forces in recent years. Alternating periods of intense monetary restraint and the severity of the 1973–74 economic contraction (especially as it affected the real estate industry), huge losses on loan portfolios, a heavy commitment of funds to less developed countries on the part of a few major banks, and the failures of a number of individual banks have created considerable discussion about the stability of the banking system. Questions have been raised about the risk involved in committing funds to the securities of banking organizations. Moreover, the importance of these questions has been underscored for bank management by the necessity for many banking organizations to raise substantial amounts of external funds to prevent further depletion of existing capital ratios.

Robert C. Klemkosky, Donald L. Tuttle, A Ranking of Doctoral Programs by Financial Research Contributions of Graduates, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Sep., 1977), pp. 491-497

Donald C. Aucamp, Walter L. Eckardt, Jr., A Sufficient Condition for a Unique Nonnegative Internal Rate of Return-- Comment, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 329-332