Unlike Dutch auction repurchases and tender offers, open‐market repurchase programs do not precommit firms to acquire a specified number of shares. In a sample of 450 programs from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement. We find that share repurchases are negatively related to prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase their purchasing depending on its degree of perceived undervaluation. In addition, repurchases are positively related to levels of cash flow, which is consistent with liquidity arguments.

An institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading (“speculation”) and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance. Intervention increases the value of the institution's existing shareholdings, but intervention only increases the institution's trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution's information relative to that of uninformed traders. Thus, the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention. We examine key factors that affect the intervention decision, the usefulness of “short‐swing” provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention, and implications for ownership structure across different firms.

We provide evidence that corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions, which induces a spurious relation between measures of financial policy and many commonly used tax proxies. Using a forward‐looking estimate of before‐financing corporate marginal tax rates, we document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates, and a positive relation between debt levels and tax rates. This is the first unambiguous evidence supporting the hypothesis that low tax rate firms lease more, and have lower debt levels, than high tax rate firms.

This paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private‐market corporate lending, adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature. Comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies, we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information‐problematic firms. However, finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers, particularly more leveraged borrowers. Evidence supports both regulatory and reputation‐based explanations for this specialization. In passing, we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies.

There is now considerable evidence suggesting that estimated betas of unconditional capital asset pricing models (CAPMs) exhibit statistically significant time variation. Therefore, many have advocated the use of conditional CAPMs. If we succeed in capturing the dynamics of beta risk, we are sure to outperform constant beta models. However, if the beta risk is inherently misspecified, there is a real possibility that we commit serious pricing errors, potentially larger than with a constant traditional beta model. In this paper we show that this is indeed the case, namely that pricing errors with constant traditional beta models are smaller than with conditional CAPMs.

The existing empirical literature fails to agree on the nature of the intertemporal relation between risk and return. This paper attempts to resolve the issue by estimating a conditional two‐factor model motivated by Merton's intertemporal capital asset pricing model. When long‐term government bond returns are included as a second factor, the partial relation between the market risk premium and conditional market variance is found to be positive and significant. The paper also helps explain the convoluted empirical relation between the market risk premium, conditional market variance, and the nominal risk‐free rate previously reported in the literature.

Without the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity, a general asymptotic distribution theory for the two‐stage cross‐sectional regression method shows that the standard errors produced by the Fama–MacBeth procedure do not necessarily overstate the precision of the risk premium estimates. When factors are misspecified, estimators for risk premiums can be biased, and the t ‐value of a premium may converge to infinity in probability even when the true premium is zero. However, when a beta‐pricing model is misspecified, the t ‐values for firm characteristics generally converge to infinity in probability, which supports the use of firm characteristics in cross‐sectional regressions for detecting model misspecification.

This paper investigates the market reaction to short sales on an intraday basis in a market setting where short sales are transparent immediately following execution. We find a mean reassessment of stock value following short sales of up to −0.20 percent with adverse information impounded within fifteen minutes or twenty trades. Short sales executed near the end of the financial year and those related to arbitrage and hedging activities are associated with a smaller price reaction; trades near information events precipitate larger price reactions. The evidence is generally weaker for short sales executed using limit orders relative to market orders.

Why does stock volatility increase when output declines? The theory of investment under uncertainty implies that political uncertainty may simultaneously increase volatility and reduce output. Though cause and effect are typically hard to separate, the transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany offers a natural experiment because major political events left clear traces on stock prices. Current and past increases in volatility are associated with output declines, consistent with U.S. experience. However, political events are more clearly the source of volatility, and the results support the view that the relationship between volatility and output reflects the joint effects of political factors.

This paper develops static hedges for several exotic options using standard options. The method relies on a relationship between European puts and calls with different strike prices. The analysis allows for constant volatility or for volatility smiles or frowns.