Knowledge that Transforms

Historically, average reported levels of food intake in Eastern Europe have been considerably higher than in most middleincome countries. According to food balance-sheet data, average calories, proteins, and fats in terms of availability per capita rose continuously over the 1961-1988 period and generally exceeded the intake requirements established by the World Health Organization (WHO) (Food and Agriculture Organization, 1991). While it may rightly be argued that these data offer little information about the effective control over food by consumers in different income groups, in the case of pre-reform Eastern Europe, full employment, low income inequality, and low food prices generally ensured a minimal level of food intake even for those in the bottom deciles of the income distribution. While undernutrition did not generally represent a problem, considerable imbalances affected the diet of most people in the region. Particularly in urban areas and among low-income groups, food intake was characterized by a high consumption of cholesterol-rich products (such as eggs and animal fats), sugar, salt, bread, and alcohol and a low intake of good-quality meat, fruit and vegetables, and vegetable oils. The data in Table 1 clearly illustrate this situation for Russia and can be taken as representative of the entire region. Low-income families consumed less food per capita, while their diet was characterized by greater intake, both in relative and absolute terms, of bread and fats and a lower consumption of more nutritious and healthy foods. The dietary imbalances implicit in this consumption pattern caused an abnormally high incidence of nutritionally related health problems, including a high prevalence of overweight people, cardiovascular diseases, micronutrient deficiencies, and anemia. In addition, a fairly high prevalence of low birth weight (LBW) and low breastfeeding rates were common in the region. Inadequate breastfeeding represented a critical nutritional problem for young children, as milk substitutes and baby foods were generally in short supply.

Many economists have expressed concern that approaches borrowed from the humanities or from the softer social sciences will detract from the rigor and objectivity of economic science and give voice to those without proper training-and in so doing reduce the discipline to a science no more defensible than alchemy. Since much feminist thought in economics draws heavily from intellectual traditions alien to mainstream economists (e.g. critical interpretive theory, cultural studies, and feminist theory), some economists may wonder what such modes of inquiry have to offer economics.' Further, they may ask, are there no pitfalls in modes of inquiry not disciplined by accepted economic methodologies? In short, what do those Visigoths know? My purpose is to address issues in method and theory underlying recent feminist work in economics, and to explain how economics may gain by opening its disciplinary gates. From the perspective of traditional mainstream practice in economics, two prominent issues emerge in considering modes of inquiry and theory drawn from other disciplines. The first has to do with what counts as theory and the role of critique in theorizing. The second has to do with the need to sort out better theories from worse and the perceived dangers of rampant relativism. I will address these in turn.

Writers from diverse intellectual traditions inside and outside the social sciences criticize neoclassical economics for neglecting Their criticisms focus on economists' analyses of labor markets and of distribution within families; Marxists and feminists are among the leading critics. The classic definitions of power come from sociology and political science and, not surprisingly, resonate more for sociologists and political scientists than for economists. Instead of discussing lofty abstract definitions, I stay near the ground and focus on a concrete application: specifically, distribution within marriage and, more generally, distribution between women and men. Economists have three alternative models of distribution within marriage: Gary Becker's altruist model, cooperative bargaining models, and noncooperative bargaining models. The altruist model remains the leader. Becker's model implies that the equilibrium distribution maximizes the utility of the altruist (the husband, father, dictator, patriarch) subject to the family's resource constraint. Becker does not describe the altruist model in game-theoretic terms, but I have argued elsewhere (Pollak, 1985) that his model can be interpreted as a twostage bargaining game in which the altruist moves first and confronts other family members with take-it-or-leave-it choices. The game-theoretic interpretation makes it clear that the crucial postulate of the model is not the altruism of Becker's altruist, but his position in the game-one is tempted to say, his power. Altruism does play a role in Becker's model: the altruism of the altruist (the assumption that his utility is an increasing function of his wife's utility or consumption) allows the model to have an equilibrium in which the wife receives more than her reservation level of utility. Within the past 15 years, Becker's altruist model has been challenged by models that explicitly view distribution within marriage as the solution to a cooperative or a noncooperative game. Cooperative bargaining models are exemplified by the divorcethreat models of Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown (1980) and of Marjorie B. McElroy and Mary J. Horney (1981) and by the model of Shelly Lundberg and myself (1993). All of these models use the Nash bargaining solution or a similar axiomatic solution concept to obtain a unique equilibrium corresponding to a point, which specifies the payoffs the players receive if they fail to reach an agreement. In divorce-threat models the threat point is the utility each spouse would receive in the event of divorce; thus, the threat point is external to the marriage. In the separate-spheres model, the threat point is internal to the marriage and, more specifically, is the equilibrium of a noncooperative game in which the quantities of household public goods are determined by voluntary contributions by the spouses. Noncooperative models of distribution within marriage, aside from Becker's altruist model, are less common than cooperative models. Ravi Kanbur and L awrence Haddad (1994) analyze intrahousehold allocation using a Rubinstein alternating-offer game. Lundberg and I (1994) discuss a repeated game in which the voluntary-contri* Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195. This paper is based on a longer manuscript entitled Taking Power Seriously. I am grateful to Jere R. Behrman, Douglas H. Blair, Paula England, Nancy Folbre, Margaret Levi, Shelly Lundberg, Jane J. Mansbridge, Julie A. Nelson, Mark Rosenzweig, Dick Startz, and Diana Strassmann for helpful conversations and to Judith Goff for editorial assistance.

Recent analyses of unemployment-vacancy series suggest that aggregate shocks, rather than sectoral shocks, are the primary factors responsible for unemployment fluctuations. This inference follows from two widely held beliefs: sectoral shocks induce only positive unemployment-vacancy comovements, while negative comovements are necessarily the result of aggregate demand shocks. This paper describes an equilibrium matching model that identifies plausible circumstances in which neither assumption is correct, thus suggesting that unemployment-vacancy data are inconclusive. Interestingly, this model's novel results are due to standard features in the contracting literature: firms experience relative price shocks and negotiate contracts that prescribe temporary layoffs. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.