Knowledge that Transforms

Using a large sample of debt contracts, we study the determinants of excluding nonrecurring items from covenant calculations. We investigate this choice across firms, across items, and through time. We find that nonrecurring items are more likely to be excluded when the agency costs of debt are higher and less likely to be excluded when they predict borrowers' performance. Our evidence further suggests that the interplay between agency costs and nonrecurring items' predictive ability affects the decision to exclude these items from covenant computations. Finally, when examining the exclusion by different nonrecurring item types, we find confirmatory evidence that the probability of exclusion decreases with the predictive ability for borrowers' future performance of major nonrecurring item types. Overall, our research extends the literature on the determinants of contract design and improves understanding of the usefulness of accounting information in debt contracting.

Demand for disclosures on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues has increased dramatically. Using corporate political spending disclosures as our setting, we conduct a detailed inquiry of 541 political spending‐related shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2012 to highlight the role of shareholder activism as a mechanism to motivate ESG disclosure. Unlike earlier studies, we examine both proposals that went to a vote and proposals that were withdrawn by the activist, allowing us to assess more comprehensively the success of shareholder activism. We find that 20 percent of firms targeted by disclosure proposals begin disclosing in the subsequent year, although implementation rates vary by proposal type—8 percent for proposals subject to a vote versus 56 percent for proposals withdrawn. The sponsor is also important: unions and public pension funds are less likely than other activists to target firms with agency problems and are less successful in having proposals withdrawn, and the implementations they obtain are viewed more negatively by the broader investor base. Our findings highlight shareholder proposals as one mechanism through which investors can successfully express their preferences for corporate disclosure policies. Given activists' long‐standing interest in environmental and social disclosure policies, we believe our findings generalize to a broader set of ESG disclosures.

The financial security of the investing public relies on high‐quality service by broker‐dealers (BDs), investors' gateway to the financial markets. The SEC has long required auditors to attest to BDs' internal controls and compliance with regulations (including those privately owned). Following the unraveling of the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008, the SEC required auditors of all BDs to register with the PCAOB, and Congressional initiatives signaled imminent transition from private (AICPA) to public (PCAOB) oversight. We investigate whether audit quality increased following this transition by measuring whether auditors report material internal control and compliance problems for BD clients where a deficiency presumably existed (i.e., BDs sanctioned by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority for transgressions against stakeholders). Overall, we do not find increased reporting quality following the regulatory shift but do observe variation by auditor group and BD ownership. While reporting quality for global network firms (GNFs) increases slightly, lower reporting quality observed prior to the regulatory shift for specialist audit firms (having large BD portfolios but small overall size) is exacerbated afterward. This finding complements results of PCAOB inspections and other research identifying audit quality problems among small, industry‐specialized firms in non‐public client settings. Focusing on deficiencies likely more difficult to detect, we find lower reporting quality for private relative to publicly affiliated BDs prior to PCAOB oversight, and lower reporting quality for very small audit firms relative to GNFs following the regulatory shift.

We investigate whether firms' tax planning affects the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Tax planning can exacerbate the complexity of firms' operations through strategic choices to exploit tax laws. Because of its effect on firms' operations, tax planning can influence analysts' efforts to understand and forecast earnings. Specifically, if the additional complexity arising from tax planning makes firm attributes less representative of expected earnings, analysts may issue less accurate forecasts. Using auditor‐provided tax services (APTS) as a measure of tax planning, we find that, as firms spend more on tax planning, the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of both earnings per share and tax expense declines. We also document that firms with higher levels of APTS have greater year‐to‐year volatility in, and lower persistence of, effective tax rates and earnings. Our results suggest that increased firm complexity, due to greater tax planning, makes earnings and tax expense more difficult to forecast and that analysts do not properly adjust for these effects. Thus, when deciding to engage in tax planning, firms appear to make trade‐offs between potential tax savings and negative effects on earnings properties and analysts' forecasts.

While prior research focuses on the audit team made up of auditors, we focus on the collective audit team made up of auditors and specialists—in our context, information technology (IT) specialists. Complex systems in today's audits and researcher and regulator concerns regarding ineffective coordination and communication between the two specializations motivate better understanding of this collective audit team. We investigate how auditors and IT specialists perceive their relationship and how the audit process unfolds when these relationships are good and when they are difficult. Results of interviews conducted with Big 4 audit and IT practitioners provide evidence that they perceive their relationship quality to depend on the level of mutual value and respect. Auditors assert a one‐team view of the collective audit team that includes IT specialists, but IT specialists feel auditors see them as a separate team and a “necessary evil.” The audit process vastly differs between relationships perceived as difficult and good. In difficult relationships, the two specializations often struggle for status, with limited communication or effort to understand how their work fits together. Our findings imply difficult relationships are at risk for poor integration and unsupported reliance on IT functions, shedding light on recurring threats to audit quality identified by PCAOB inspections. In good relationships, auditors and IT specialists appear motivated to engage in frequent and open communication to help understand, coordinate, and complete the audit. Inferences gleaned from good relationships let us highlight prescriptions for audit firms to improve effectiveness of collective audit teams.

We investigate whether tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the costs of diversion are low by comparing dividend payouts, performance, and overinvestments of tax haven firms versus other multinational firms based in countries with weak and strong investor protections. Desai and Dharmapala (2006, 2009a, b) and Desai et al. (2007) set forth a theory of tax avoidance within an agency framework (the D&D theory) based on the assumption that tax avoidance and manager diversion are complementary when the corporate governance system is “ineffective” (i.e., the manager's expected costs of diversion are low). Tax haven firms are corporate groups whose parent firms are incorporated in tax haven countries that are not the countries where the groups’ headquarters or primary operations are located (i.e., their “base” countries). We argue that tax haven incorporation potentially lowers the costs of diversion for managers of firms based in countries with weak investor protections. Using a sample from 28 base countries, we provide evidence that manager diversion and tax avoidance are complementary for tax haven firms based in countries with weak investor protections but not for tax haven firms based in countries with strong investor protections. Our results are consistent with the complementarity assumption underlying the D&D model and provide additional insights into the potential impact of the decentralization of the global firm.

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.

Prior research finds that controls that induce cooperation among collaborators on a project increase trust, and that this increased trust increases subsequent cooperation among collaborators. We extend this work by investigating how controls influence cooperative behavior in two settings. The first is an interactive setting where people work together and can benefit from each other's work. The second is a non‐interactive setting where people do not work together directly but where behavior can be observed. We propose that because controls are likely to engender greater trust and reciprocity in interactive settings than in non‐interactive settings, the effect of controls on future cooperative behavior will be greater for controls in interactive settings than for controls in non‐interactive settings. We find that controls in both settings increase future cooperative behavior, but the effect is significantly greater in interactive settings (where reciprocity and trust are more likely to develop). Furthermore, this increased cooperation is observed in an uncontrolled task, suggesting that the control fosters trust in others rather than trust in the control. These findings suggest that the benefits of controls are more substantial in work environments characterized by extensive teamwork and where employees benefit from each other's work.

In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.

In this paper, we investigate whether the current references to probability in standard setters' conceptual definitions of assets and liabilities cause individuals to believe that the probability of a future transfer of economic benefits must be above some meaningful threshold for an asset or a liability to exist—a belief that is contrary to standard setters' intent. Results of multiple experiments indicate that the majority of individuals do use a high probability threshold to determine asset existence, whereas for liabilities the majority use a very low threshold. Thus, even under ceteris paribus conditions, liabilities are more frequently judged to exist than assets—a phenomenon analogous to accounting conservatism, as has been discussed in terms of the performance statement. These findings are robust to variation in formal training and in type of liability, and cannot be explained by alternative approaches to judging existence. Consistent with standard setters' intentions, results also suggest that their proposed changes to the definitions of assets and liabilities—changes that attempt to clarify the intended role of probability—do cause a greater proportion of participants to indicate that the relevant financial statement element (asset or liability) exists, relative to participants with no definition. Our study provides important insights for standard setters as they continue work on their missions to update their Conceptual Frameworks and for researchers regarding the role of conservatism on the balance sheet.