Knowledge that Transforms

This paper reconsiders the impact of immigrants over time in the US by using the technique of generational accounting introduced by Auerbach et al. Generational accounting considers not only the net contribution of immigrants to balance but also the size of this impact in relation to the overall balance. It further compares changes in immigration policy to other policies. From the analysis three conclusions were formulated. 1) Whether immigration contributes to or helps alleviate stress depends on the future generations. If the entire imbalance currently estimated for the US is placed on future generations then the presence of new immigrants reduces the burden of the natives. 2) Fiscal gain from immigration is reduced when a policy of fiscal responsibility is followed. The gain is dependent on the extent to which government purchases rise with the immigrant population. 3) The impact of immigration on balance is extremely small in relation to the size of the overall imbalance itself. Thus immigration should not be perceived as a major source of the existing imbalance or as a potential solution to it.

Trading volume on the world’s markets seems high, perhaps higher than can be explained by models of rational markets. For example, the average annual turnover rate on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is currently greater than 75 percent and the daily trading volume of foreign-exchange transactions in all currencies (including forwards, swaps, and spot transactions) is roughly one-quarter of the total annual world trade and investment flow (James Dow and Gary Gorton, 1997). While this level of trade may seem disproportionate to investors’ rebalancing and hedging needs, we lack economic models that predict what trading volume in these market should be. In theoretical models trading volume ranges from zero (e.g., in rational expectation models without noise) to infinite (e.g., when traders dynamically hedge in the absence of trading costs). But without a model which predicts what trading volume should be in real markets, it is difficult to test whether observed volume is too high. If trading is excessive for a market as a whole, then it must be excessive for some groups of participants in that market. This paper demonstrates that the trading volume of a particular class of investors, those with discount brokerage accounts, is excessive. Alexandros V. Benos (1998) and Odean (1998a) propose that, due to their overconfidence, investors will trade too much. This paper tests that hypothesis. The trading of discount brokerage customers is good for testing the overconfidence theory of excessive trading because this trading is not complicated by agency relationships. Excessive trading in retail brokerage accounts could, on the other hand, result from either investors’ overconfidence or from brokers churning accounts to generate commissions. Excessive institutional trading, too, might result from overconfidence or from agency relationships. Dow and Gorton (1997) develop a model in which money managers, who would otherwise not trade, do so to signal to their employers that they are earning their fees and are not “simply doing nothing.” While the overconfidence theory is tested here with respect to a particular group of traders, other groups of traders are likely to be overconfident as well. Psychologists show that most people generally are overconfident about their abilities (Jerome D. Frank, 1935) and about the precision of their knowledge (Baruch Fischhoff et al., 1977; Marc Alpert and Howard Raiffa, 1982; Sarah Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Security selection can be a difficult task, and it is precisely in such difficult tasks that people exhibit the greatest overconfidence. Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky (1992) write that when predictability is very low, as in securities markets, experts may even be more prone to overconfidence than novices. It has been suggested that investors who behave nonrationally will not do well in financial markets and will not continue to trade in them. There are reasons, though, why we might expect those who actively trade in * Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, CA 95616. This paper is based on my dissertation at the University of California-Berkeley. I would like to thank Brad Barber, Hayne Leland, David Modest, Richard Roll, Mark Rubinstein, Paul Ruud, Richard Thaler, Brett Trueman, and the participants at the Berkeley Program in Finance, the National Bureau of Economic Research behavioral finance meetings, the Conference on Household Financial Decision Making and Asset Allocation at The Wharton School, the Western Finance Association meetings, and the Russell Sage Institute for Behavioral Economics, and seminar participants at the University of California-Berkeley, the Yale School of Management, the University of California-Davis, the University of Southern California, the University of North Carolina, Duke University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, the University of Oregon, Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dartmouth College, the University of Chicago, the University of British Columbia, Northwestern University, the University of Texas, UCLA, the University of Michigan, and Columbia University for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Jeremy Evnine and especially the discount brokerage house which provided the data necessary for this study. Financial support from the Nasdaq Foundation and the American Association of Individual Investors is gratefully acknowledged. 1 The NYSE website (http://www.nyse.com/public/ market/2c/2cix.htm) reports 1998 turnover at 76 percent.

Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse? by Renate Schubert, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler and Hans Wolfgang Brachinger. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 381-385 of American Economic Review, May 1999

After 30 years of egalitarian rhetoric and collectivist practice, the introduction of market reforms to rural China entailed obvious risks for policymakers. Increases in average income might not compensate for the inequality generated by market-based income determination. Concern for this possibility may help explain the slow relaxation of administrative control over the allocation of resources like land. In order to evaluate the effect of market reforms, we could begin by comparing the current Gini coefficient to that which prevailed during the collective era (see Louis Putterman [1993] for early evidence). Yet, this might tell us little about the specific impact of market organization on income determination. Government policies, such as collective land ownership, mobility restrictions, and fertility limits cloud the picture. Furthermore, industrialization, though itself a product of the reforms, has changed the basis upon which individuals earn income. Isolating a pure effect of ‘‘market organization’’ is a difficult but important task since many current Chinese policies reflect an ambivalent attitude toward decentralized, market-based resource allocation. We offer a few suggestions on issues that need to be considered as this evaluation proceeds, by exploring current inequality in rural northeast China from the vantage point of the 1930’s. We begin with the observation that the level of inequality is similar in 1995 and 1935, and moreover, that most contemporary inequality exists within villages, as was the case in the 1930’s. We then focus on two institu-

Economists and psychologists argue that individuals skew personal beliefs to accord with their own interests. To test for the presence of self-serving beliefs, we surveyed 1,200 members of the Mormon Church about tithing. A tithe is a voluntary contribution equal to 10 percent of income. Since respondents must decide privately what income items to tithe, we observe how the income definition depends on an individual's religious and financial incentives. We find surprisingly little evidence that an individual's financial situation influences beliefs about what counts as income for the tithe. However, ambiguity increases the role for self-serving biases. (JEL A12, D63)

Oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation, environmental protection, and international competition. We discuss properties of such models when a Cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage. Aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal-cost sum. Therefore, unless the cost of inducing second-stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs, the private and social optima are asymmetric. (JEL D43, L13, L40)

Recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero, creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations. We present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations. The mechanisms overcome three major challenges: first, evaluations, which are public goods, are likely to be underprovided; second, an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise; third, the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations. (JEL D70, D83, H41, L15)

Recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade, even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting. These studies typically considered “selfish” investments that benefit the investor (e.g., the seller's investment reduces her production costs). We find very different results for “cooperative” investments that directly benefit the investor's partner (e.g., the seller's investment improves the buyer's value of the good). Most importantly, if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible, then contracting has no value, i.e., the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation. (JEL C70, J41, K12, L22)

We analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a “voracity effect,” by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more-than-proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks. (JEL F43, O10, O23, O40)