Knowledge that Transforms

Economies of scale and scope in Finnish non-life insurance are studied. The production process is separated into cost and portfolio management functions. Firms expand their branch network to either gain market power or informational advantages. There are diseconomies of scale at firm and economies of scale at branch level, and economies of scope in production. Large firms in the non-life insurance industry pay a substantial premium to gain market power via branch networks. The retained premiums-curve of portfolio management is U-shaped and a positive function of the number of branches.

This paper addresses a little examined intersection between the problem loan literature and the bank efficiency literature. We employ Granger-causality techniques to test four hypotheses regarding the relationships among loan quality, cost efficiency, and bank capital. The data suggest that problem loans precede reductions in measured cost efficiency; that measured cost efficiency precedes reductions in problem loans; and the reductions in capital at thinly capitalized banks precede increases in problem loans. Hence, cost efficiency may be an important indicator of future problem loans and problem banks. Our results are ambiguous concerning whether or not researchers should control for problem loans in efficiency estimation.

Research on bank efficiency has developed in two separate streams: econometric studies and Data Envelopment Analysis, a linear programming technique. These two branches of literature have developed quickly, but separately; in this paper these two approaches have been tested on a common panel of 270 Italian banks, and this has suggested the following: (i) econometric and linear programming results do not differ dramatically, when based on the same data and conceptual framework; (ii) when differences arise, they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of the models. Moreover, some findings on Italian banks may be of interest also to the international reader: (i) efficiency scores show a high variance; (ii) the banking system is split in two, between northern and southern banks; (iii) there is a direct (rather than inverse) relationship between productive efficiency and asset quality; (iv) the efficiency of Italian banks did not increase over the period 1988–1992.

This paper investigates the deterioration of the banking industry's risk-control system during the 1980s and the time-varying relation between a bank's ex-ante risk-taking incentives and its ex-post risk-taking behavior over the period 1977–1994. We document that banks with high charter value imposed self-discipline on risk-taking behavior at all times. In contrast, banks with low charter value assumed significantly more risk beginning around 1983, and this behavior continued into the early 1990s. These findings have several important policy implications.

In this paper, we examine the foreign exchange exposure of a sample of U.S. and Japanese banking firms. Using daily data, we construct estimates of the exchange rate sensitivity of the equity returns of the U.S. bank holding companies and compare them to those of the Japanese banks. We find that the stock returns of a significant fraction of the U.S. companies move with the exchange rate, while few of the Japanese returns that we observe do so. We next examine more closely the sensitivity of the U.S. firms by linking the U.S. estimates cross-sectionally to accounting-based measures of currency risk. We suggest that the sensitivity estimates can provide a benchmark for assessing the adequacy of existing accounting measures of currency risk. Benchmarked in this way, the reported measures that we examine appear to provide a significant, though only partial, picture of the exchange rate exposure of U.S. banking institutions. The cross-sectional evidence is also consistent with the use of foreign exchange contracts for the purpose of hedging.

Does approximating duration estimates by ignoring default risk lead to error in the two major duration applications — measuring interest — rate price elasticity and immunization? We derive a general expression for duration in the presence of default risk based on Jonkhart's term structure model (On the term structure of interest rates and the risk of default, Journal of Banking and Finance 3, 253–262, 1979) extended to encompass risk aversion. The model includes terms for default probabilities and default payoffs in each period as well as for a delay between the occurrence of default and the final default payoff. Our main conclusion is that practical duration applications involving bonds with default risk must employ duration measures adjusted for default risk.

We studied repeated acquirers in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) assisted acquisitions. Using a sample of 128 FDIC assisted acquisitions and 387 non-assisted acquisitions, we found that FDIC assisted acquirers, on average, produced positive abnormal returns. This result was driven by repeated acquirers. First-time acquirers did not profit in these assisted acquisitions. In a logit analysis, we found that the FDIC repeated acquirer improved its profiting chances by reducing the winning bid and the number of bids. This evidence is consistent with the suggested experience/information effect based on theory and FDIC practices.

The US economy experienced major regulatory changes in the banking and finance industry with the passage of five major acts over the period 1980 to 1991. This has generated an extensive literature investigating the effects of these changes on the US banking industry. In particular, this body of research has examined the share market reaction to regulatory changes, as well as their impact on the risk, return, market value and profitability of banking industry stocks. Generally, it has been found that the regulatory changes have had a substantial impact, although the effect has not been uniform across all depository institutions. This paper extends this literature by analysing the stability of a sample of eighteen US banking industry stock betas across five periods: a pre-regulatory change period, a monetary experiment period, a deregulation period, a reregulation period and a post-regulatory change period. Based on an analysis of weekly returns, we find that the level of bank risk has increased. Further, we also find a tendency towards greater beta instability in both the monetary experiment and deregulation samples. The degree of beta instability is lowest in the pre-regulatory change and post-regulatory change samples. Overall the monetary experiment and regulatory change coincided with an increased tendency towards beta instability. We also compare our results to a randomly selected control sample of non-banks and find some more general effects of regulatory change on individual stock betas.

This paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm-theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion. The model demonstrates how cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank's market power, to the operating costs, to the degree of credit risk, and to the degree of interest rate risk. An increase in the bank's equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk. The effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market. Our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior.