Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT In this article we compare three models of the stochastic behavior of commodity prices that take into account mean reversion, in terms of their ability to price existing futures contracts, and their implication with respect to the valuation of other financial and real assets. The first model is a simple one‐factor model in which the logarithm of the spot price of the commodity is assumed to follow a mean reverting process. The second model takes into account a second stochastic factor, the convenience yield of the commodity, which is assumed to follow a mean reverting process. Finally, the third model also includes stochastic interest rates. The Kalman filter methodology is used to estimate the parameters of the three models for two commercial commodities, copper and oil, and one precious metal, gold. The analysis reveals strong mean reversion in the commercial commodity prices. Using the estimated parameters, we analyze the implications of the models for the term structure of futures prices and volatilities beyond the observed contracts, and for hedging contracts for future delivery. Finally, we analyze the implications of the models for capital budgeting decisions.

Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corpo-rate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to con-tribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepre-neurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that

ABSTRACT Substantial progress has been made in developing more realistic option pricing models. Empirically, however, it is not known whether and by how much each generalization improves option pricing and hedging. We fill this gap by first deriving an option model that allows volatility, interest rates and jumps to be stochastic. Using S&P 500 options, we examine several alternative models from three perspectives: (1) internal consistency of implied parameters/volatility with relevant time‐series data, (2) out‐of‐sample pricing, and (3) hedging. Overall, incorporating stochastic volatility and jumps is important for pricing and internal consistency. But for hedging, modeling stochastic volatility alone yields the best performance.

ABSTRACT This article develops and applies new measures of portfolio performance which use benchmarks based on the characteristics of stocks held by the portfolios that are evaluated. Specifically, the benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 125 passive portfolios that are matched with stocks held in the evaluated portfolio on the basis of the market capitalization, book‐to‐market, and prior‐year return characteristics of those stocks. Based on these benchmarks, “Characteristic Timing” and “Characteristic Selectivity” measures are developed that detect, respectively, whether portfolio managers successfully time their portfolio weightings on these characteristics and whether managers can select stocks that outperform the average stock having the same characteristics. We apply these measures to a new database of mutual fund holdings covering over 2500 equity funds from 1975 to 1994. Our results show that mutual funds, particularly aggressive‐growth funds, exhibit some selectivity ability, but that funds exhibit no characteristic timing ability.

Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.

ABSTRACT Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.

ABSTRACT This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

ABSTRACT Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk‐adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) “hot hands” result is mostly driven by the one‐year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst‐return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.