During the late 1990s, the SEC alleged that banks were overstating loan loss allowances to establish cookie jar reserves. Their intervention in bank accounting culminated in 2001 with new guidance (SAB 102) designed to improve financial reporting quality. We show that banks' allowance estimation changed in response to the SEC's intervention. While allowance informativeness (as proxied by the ability to explain future losses) improved for Strong Banks, informativeness declined for Weak Banks whose incentives are to understate allowances. Our results help to explain why some (Weak) banks delayed loss recognition during the recent financial crisis.

A two-date rational expectations model is analyzed. At the first date, traders can privately acquire a costly signal that provides imperfect information about a public report that will be issued at the second date. Equilibrium characterizations are provided for the fraction of traders that become informed and the informativeness of the first-date price, as well as the price change variance and the expected trading volume at the second date. Comparative statics identify how the above variables are influenced by changes in the information content of the public report, and in particular how market phenomena at the public release date are influenced by endogenous prior information acquisition and trading in response to the forthcoming public release.

This paper analyzes economic characteristics of firms that correct previously reported quarterly earnings. The basic findings are that, relative to their industry, the sample (correcting) firms are smaller, less profitable, have higher debt, are slower growing, and face more serious uncertainties. Their average stock returns between the issuance of erroneous quarterly reports and their correction are negative. Also, correction disclosure frequently precedes SEC or stockholder suits against firm management. Results are consistent with predictions based on the economic interests of management and their auditors.

This study assesses the stock market's reaction to a series of events leading up to a mandated change in accounting for retail land sales. Evidence is found to support the conclusion that the market reacted to some of these events in a manner consistent with the effects of the accounting change on debt annagement contracts. A distinctive aspect of the analysis is the efficient use of security returns data to detect market reactions and to derive empirical distributions of test statistics employed. The analysis is extended by a model for grouping regression equations known as seemingly unrelated regressions. However, the gains from this extension are modest.

In the Sixties, the qualified stock option was the predominant form of long-term incentive compensation contract for major industrial firms in the U.S. In the early Seventies these same firms replaced their tax-qualified stock option plans with non-qualified sttock options and later modified these plans to include a variety of new contingent compensation arrangements, some of which were based on accounting numbers instead of stock prices. This paper develops the hypothesis that tax considerations play an important role in explaining the form of compensation contracts. The pattern and timing of changes in the compensation plans of the top 100 industrial firms provides evidence consistent with the tax hypothesis.

Estimation Problem, Capital allocation, Verifiability, Decomposition Model

This article integrates strategic product market analysis with price-taking asset pricing theory. We demonstrate that a firm's market power can lead to scale-dependent and potentially infinite required returns. Scale dependency, which we relate to risk spillovers between expansionary and existing cash flows, reflects the divergence of incremental from existing required returns. The firm-specific nature of risk spillovers potentially destroys the concept of a common industry "risk class". Our analysis raises important questions regarding the validity of widely used "comparables" methods for determining risk-adjusted discount rates.