The natural growth rate of most renewable resource stocks is in part stochastic. This paper examines the implications of such ecological uncertainty for competitive equilibrium in a market with property rights. We show that stochastic fluctuations add a risk premium to the rate of return required to keep a unit of stock in situ, and we examine the effects of fluctuations on resource rent. Examples are used to show that extraction can increase, decrease, or be left unchanged as the variance of the fluctuations increases, depending on the extent of market "self-correction". Regulatory implications are also discussed.
This paper presents new identifiability conditions for the Cox proportional hazard model for duration data when unobserved person specific variables are present. We compare our conditions with those presented by Elbers and Ridder. We also present identifiability conditions for a rich class of parametric hazard models without regressor variables.
The preserving of flexibility when faced with uncertainty is a neglected aspect of behaviour under risk. Yet it is an important factor in decisions to hold liquid assets or delay irreversible investment. This paper formalizes the notion of flexibility in a sequential decision context, and relates its value to the amount of information an agent expects to receive. A rudimentary money demand model is developed embodying these ideas, and the history of flexibility as an economic concept is traced.
This paper considers the problem of estimating distributed lags in short panels. Though the N time series contained in a panel may allow for relatively precise estimates of identified lag coefficients, identification requires restrictions on the contribution of the unobserved pre-sample x's to the current values of y, and the shortness of panels focuses attention on this matter. We investigate two such restrictions. The first constrains the relationship between the presample and insample x's, while the second constrains the lag distribution itself. An example, which investigates empirically how to construct “capital stocks” for the analysis of rates of return, closes the paper.
This paper presents an experimental study of a computerized “posted-offer” pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the U.S. Posted-offer market performance is evaluated relative to “double-auction” market performance using two supply and demand designs. Subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable. The market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted-offer pricing relative to double auction. However, the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions. When feasible, the predictive power of competitive, Nash, and limit-price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated.
This paper is an econometric examination of female fertility and labour-supply decisions. Based upon utility-maximizing choice, fertility and labour-supply demand functions are specified and estimated jointly with a wage-accumulation equation. A main contribution of the paper is the demonstration of a maximum-likelihood estimation method which avoids the main selectivity-bias problems in this area.
This paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination. A fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good. Consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase. The sellers typically vary their prices over time, charging a high price in most periods, but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price. In some equilibria, all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level.
The paper shows that between two competitive but risky economies with no insurance markets, free trade may be Pareto inferior to no trade. The model is simple enough to show clearly the role prices play in transferring and sharing risk when there is an incomplete set of markets, but rich enough to exhibit the resulting inefficiencies dramatically.
This paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote-maximizing third party. The resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the Hotelling "median" equilibrium. Established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election. This provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two-party systems. Namely that non-cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning.
The Grossman-Hart principal-agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting. Under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as Nash equilibria, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts, of rank-order tournaments, and for attainability of the first-best. In this context the relation of the principal's welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated. Finally, some problems with the Nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed.