The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. The authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
Experimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others, to exhibit "herd behavior" is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions. The information cascade models of Banerjee [1992] and Bikhchandani et al. [1992] are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior. But these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers. Differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission. Patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups.
The authors present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines their price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. The authors perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments that show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
The authors report the first results for Japanese firms on the effects of employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs) and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data. They find that the introduction of an ESOP will lead to a 4-5 percent increase in productivity; this productivity payoff takes three to four years. There is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. The authors also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of ESOPs, suggesting that ESOPs may create a climate conducive to profit-sharing by enhancing long-term commitment and peer monitoring. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
This paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor. The framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk-averse poor who face some possibility of loss. The government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf. With unconditional transfers, the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss. This reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects. These may be avoided if the government makes in-kind transfers of insurance. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
The time-series literature reports two stylized facts about output dynamics in the United States: GNP growth is positively autocorrelated, and GNP appears to have an important trend-reverting component. This paper investigates whether current real-business-cycle (RBC) models are consistent with these stylized facts. Many RBC models have weak internal propagation mechanisms and must rely on external sources of dynamics to replicate both facts. Models that incorporate labor adjustment costs are partially successful. They endogenously generate positive autocorrelation in output growth, but they need implausibly large transitory shocks to match the trend-reverting component in output.
The use of dichotomous choice (DC) methods has become increasingly common in applications of the contingent-valuation method (CVM)1 to elicit the that an individual might have for nonmarket environmental goods.2 This hypothetical DC method involves a subject responding yes or no to a hypothetical question that asks whether or not he would be willing to make a commitment to pay some stated amount contingent upon the provision of an environmental good. The growing use of this method is primarily based on the assumption that the method yields incentive-compatible results. This implies that subjects will answer the CVM's hypothetical question in the same way as they would answer an identical question asking for a real economic commitment and that, therefore, the hypothetical DC method will result in accurate estimates of true willingness to pay. Explicit or implicit acceptance of this assumption is seen in a number of recent studies. For example, the use of the DC method in CVM studies is strongly recommended by a panel3 convened by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States Department of Commerce to examine the use of hypothetical CVM survey questions (see NOAA, 1993 pp. 4608, 4608, 4612). The hypothetical DC method has been used by the Attorney General of the State of Alaska in a major application of the CVM to assess damages caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 (see Richard T. Carson et al., 1992). A major CVM study of potential environmental damages due to proposed mining activity in the Kakadu Conservation Zone of Australia employed the DC method with a similar rationale (see David Imber et al., 1991 p. vi). It is clear that if a subject perceives that his expected utility is affected by the possibility of the good actually being provided he has no incentive to misrepresent. We can presume that in an application of a real DC method, where payment and provision of * Cummings: Policy Research Center, College of Business Administration, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083; Harrison and Rutstr6m: Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. We are grateful to Peter Bohm, Bengt Kristr6m, and three referees for helpful comments. Ashley Abbott, Lloyd Brown, Colin Day, Tanga McDaniel, Helen Neill, and Melonie Williams provided excellent research assistance. We acknowledge financial support provided by the State of New Mexico's Waste Management Education and Research Consortium and Resources for the Future. We retain responsibility for all errors. 'For a critical review of the debate over the CVM, see Cummings and Harrison (1994) 2Homegrown is a term primarily used in experimental economics. It refers to a subject's value that is independent of the value which an experimenter might induce for the good (see Vernon L. Smith, 1976). The idea is that homegrown values are those that the subject brings to an experiment. 3Consisting of Kenneth Arrow (Co-chair), Robert Solow (Co-chair), Paul R. Portney, Edward E. Leamer, Roy Radner, and Howard Schuman.
This paper establishes an empirical link between firm capital structure and product-market competition using data from local supermarket competition. First, an event-study analysis of supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs) suggests that a LBO announcement increases the market value of the LBO chain's local rivals. Second, the author shows that supermarket chains were more likely to enter and expand in a local market if a large share of the incumbent firms in the local market undertook LBOs. The study suggests that leverage increases in the late 1980s led to softer product-market competition in this industry. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.