Knowledge that Transforms

Scope of the paper: systematic analysis of the causes of rigid union wage policies, 522. — Union objectives: income, 523; philosophy, 524. — Demand schedules for union labor: oligopoly, 525; product price rigidity, 527; partial unionization, 528; relative importance of labor cost, 529. — Misinterpretation of the demand schedules: imperfect knowledge, 530; socio-economic structure of unionism, 531; method of negotiating wage agreements, 533. — Arbitrators' decisions, 536. — Employers' attitudes and policies, 539.

Three definitions of consumer's surplus, 422. — The assumption of universal independence, 422. — The "marginal-utility demand curve, " 423. — Open-topped marginal utility curves, 426. — Interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of utility, 426. — Marshall's first version: extra expenditure, 427. — Its diagrammatic analysis, 429. — Nicholson's criticism of Marshall, 432. — Marshall's second version: the demand curve, 433. — Cannan's criticism, 435. — A necessary condition of independence, 437. — Relaxing the independence assumption: (1) One utility independent of all others, 438. — Alternative tests of independence, complementarity, competitiveness, 442. — (2) Independence between groups, 443. — (3) The case of "least independence, " 444. — Summary of basic tests, 447. — Conclusions, 448.

Four different schools now to be found among economists, 398. — Assumptions made here, 399. — Conflicting views where the total demand for houses is inelastic, 400. — Brown's position substantially correct, 401. — But the "partial equilibrium" approach is open to certain objections, 404. — Separability of the tax into a tax on site value and a tax on building value, 405. — Houses in different locations not quantities of a single commodity but different competing commodities, 409. — Summary of conclusions, 411. — Mathematical appendix, 412.

The problem, 91. — Groping for a policy, 92. — The case goes to the country, 98. — Demobilization speeds on, 101. — Conclusions, 103.

Introduction, 169. — I. Structural controls: the Agricultural Estate, 171; the Estate of Industry and Trade, 173; the Transport Organization, 174; the Labor Front, 174; the Estate of German Handicrafts, 175; control boards for imports, 175; the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 176; the Reich Defense Council, 176. — II. Industrial concentration and the control structure, 178. — Small business, 183. — Rationalization, 184. — III. Price control, 185. — IV. Fiscal and related controls, 190. — Control of the capital market, 192. — Dividend distributions, 196. — V. The dispersion of German enterprise, 199. — VI. Conclusions, 204.

Individual goods and social goods compared, 27. — Quantitative measurement of social goods, 28. — Ideal output of social goods, 30. — Individual voting on outputs, 32. — Individual voting on increments to existing outputs, 40. — Alternatives to voting, 42. — Distributing the cost of social goods, 44. — Social goods not equally available to all voters, 47.

Reviews the book "Theory of Accounts," by Arthur H. Rosenkampff and William Wider.

Reviews the book "Guide for the Study of American Social Problems."

Accounting is such a field, and, like other fields of knowledge and of work, it stands to benefit from a continuing exchange of views. The range of the exchange need not be confined to the results of extensive research, or to the analysis and reporting of complex experience. Exchange of opinions can also make a contribution. What one thinks at the moment need not commit him irrevocably to a certain position, nor is his idea necessarily put forward with the purpose of securing converts to the view presented. A good perspective on professional attributes would be helpful, for example, whenever the problem to be faced had to do with setting and maintaining standards of admission to the profession and standards of professional practice after admission. Good perspective would also be useful whenever organization activities or educational programs are under consideration. When and if the profession might be under fire of criticism, perspective would be indispensable. A number of tests could perhaps be devised and tried on experienced accountants in an experimental way. Those tests that seemed most revealing could then be subjected to further observation by using them experimentally with young men recently accepted for professional work and still under training and scrutiny, and by using them experimentally upon college students who wish to major in accountancy and may later be further observed in class and office.

Banks of deposit, managed by local moneychangers, existed in Venice, Florence, Genoa, Barcelona, Bruges, and probably in Antwerp and Paris. After 1400, there was a municipal bank in Barcelona, but the private banks continued to exist beside the new institution, and attempts to drive them out of business were un-successful. In Valencia also, a municipal bank was created but it failed to prosper and was dissolved after a few years. As a result of the use of oral orders in lieu of written checks, banking practices and accounting procedure were quite different from what they are today. Making payments by assignment involved going in person to the bank. The banker wrote the transfer in his journal at the customer's dictation, so to speak. In principle, law, but this rule required the presence of both the assignor and the assignee was often disregarded in practice. Bank transfers were frequently made on the strength of an order given by the debtor alone, without the creditor being present. According to a case decided by the Bruges municipal court, payment by book transfer was not complete, however, unless the creditor declared himself satisfied with this mode of settlement.