Knowledge that Transforms

SEC rules require managers to reconcile their non-GAAP earnings forecasts with the most directly comparable GAAP forecasts unless doing so would entail ‘unreasonable effort.’ A significant number of managers rely on the unreasonable efforts exception to justify the omission of comparable GAAP forecasts. We analyze firms that rely on the unreasonable efforts exception and find that their non-GAAP earnings forecasts are more likely to exclude significant recurring expenses that are not excluded by analysts. Our results suggest that almost a third of managers exploit the unreasonable efforts exception to exclude significant recurring expenses from their earnings guidance.

We examine the effect of CSR information on stakeholder decision-making, specifically on supply-chain contracting. To obtain plausibly exogenous variation in CSR information, we exploit the 2017 expansion of CSR rating coverage from Russell 1000 to Russell 2000 firms (hereafter, “treated firms”) by Thomson Reuters Asset4. Using a difference-in-differences design with the previously covered Russell 1000 supplier firms as the control group, we find a negative effect of the CSR information shock for treated suppliers with comparatively low CSR ratings. On average, these suppliers experience reductions in their number of contracts and corporate customers. In cross-sectional analyses, we document variation in our treatment effects consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (i) benchmarking of suppliers' CSR by corporate customers and (ii) CSR-related public pressure on customer-supplier contracting. Collectively, our findings provide novel evidence on the causal effect of CSR information on stakeholder decision-making.

This paper recasts the consumption asset pricing model in terms of accounting numbers that connect to consumption and the risk to consumption under accounting principles. The modeling yields an expected return measure that forecasts realized returns and the risk to those returns. It leads to the construction of a pricing factor from the accounting information. The factor performs well relative to extant factors in explaining cross-sectional returns. The factor return has negative correlation with the market portfolio and exhibits the property of protecting payoffs in bad states when consumption is low. This then prompts a two-factor representation that combines the market portfolio with a hedge portfolio against loss to consumption.

This paper provides empirical evidence for the role of technology spillover, an important innovation externality, in asset pricing. Using patent and R&D data, I show that firms with more technology spillover earn 7.7% higher annualized returns than firms with less technology spillover. Exploiting three quasi-natural experiments, I find that the return effect is strengthened (attenuated) when there is a plausibly exogenous increase (decrease) in the flow of technological information across firms. I also find that firms with more technology spillover have higher cash flow sensitivity to aggregate consumption, numbers of new products, and stock return synchronicity. These findings are consistent with models on learning about new technology; specifically, spillover enables learning about new technology to facilitate timely and large-scale adoption of new technology, which in turn exposes spillover recipients to additional systematic risk. These findings highlight the influence of innovation externality on stock returns.

Firms that wish to raise capital from external investors can signal favorable private information about their long-term prospects by publicly adopting a liberal accounting system that increases the probability of an overstated financial report. All else equal, the liberal bias deteriorates investors' ability to make efficient investment decisions, which increases the firm's cost of raising capital as investors price protect. But the fact that the firm is willing to adopt such a bias signals booming long-term prospects, which ultimately allows the firm to raise capital at more favorable terms. We also study the effects of accounting standards that require firms to generate unbiased financial reports. Unbiased reporting leads to efficient investment decisions but prevents firms from signaling private information, which reduces their incentive to improve long-term prospects. We find that giving firms discretion over reporting choices is optimal in innovative industries, whereas enforcing unbiased reporting is optimal in traditional industries.

We survey 170 inspectors, representing 27% of the inspection staff, from auditor public oversight boards (POBs) in 20 countries to understand whether, how, and why auditors respond to POB oversight. We find that a large majority of inspectors believe that auditors frequently respond to their feedback by changing audit procedures and quality control systems. Inspectors perceive inspections to have broad effects on several aspects of auditing, ranging from documentation to the removal of partners. Some inspectors perceive that auditors place greater weight on keeping fees low than on increasing audit quality. Inspectors also believe that auditors on occasion ‘fix’ closed audit files before an inspection, and in rare instances obtain confidential information about upcoming inspections. Inspectors think that the primary reasons why auditors respond to POB feedback are (1) public disclosure, (2) enforcement capabilities, (3) POBs being perceived as authoritative, and (4) POBs having a culture for detecting auditing deficiencies.

A global field experiment with Seeking Alpha shows that textual complexity affects investor attention to news and market outcomes. Investors were randomly assigned different titles for the same news article. Holding the article fixed, a one-standard-deviation increase in complexity leads to 6.1% fewer views. Complexity is more off-putting for less-sophisticated investors, when attention is more limited, and when the news is likely less important. Exploiting an arbitrary rule for breaking ties between tested titles, I find that title complexity affects markets—lowering announcement turnover and volatility.

We show that small innovators (i.e., small firms with recent patent grants) earn higher future returns than small non-innovators. However, we find no such innovation premium among large firms. The higher returns are driven by risk, not underreaction to announcements of recent patent grants. We find that being small and innovative interacts with financial constraints to explain the higher returns. These interactions are more important in the presence of greater information asymmetry. The higher cost of equity among small innovators has implications for their investment, growth, and capital structure decisions.

Research on conference calls documents that the question and answer (Q&A) portion is informative to markets. However, prior studies focus on the attributes of the participating individuals, primarily managers and analysts. We instead use the conversation as our unit of analysis, and examine whether conversational engagement between managers and analysts in earnings calls is informative to market participants. Using an experiment, we first demonstrate that linguistic style matching (LSM), a form of verbal coordination, is a reasonable empirical proxy for conversational engagement. We next use a quasi-experiment to confirm that investors can detect differences in engagement. Finally, using a hand-collected archival dataset comprised of audio recordings and textual transcripts from over 2400 earnings calls, we show that LSM in manager-analyst conversations during the Q&A is positively associated with absolute stock returns during the conversation, suggesting that conversations with greater engagement are more informative to capital markets and facilitate price formation.

This study examines the effect of corporate tax enforcement on managerial self-dealing, with a focus on manipulated gifts of insider stock. Prior work suggests that managers employ a variety of manipulative techniques to maximize their personal tax benefits from donating corporate stock, such as strategically timing gifts based on private information and fraudulently backdating gifts to the date with the highest price. Building on prior literature suggesting that the tax authority can discipline managerial misconduct, we hypothesize that IRS scrutiny from a corporate tax audit raises managers' perceived risk of detection, who refrain from making manipulated stock gifts while the firm is under audit. Using a novel, firm-specific measure to identify firms under audit, we find direct evidence that heightened scrutiny from tax enforcement serves as an effective monitoring mechanism and reduces managers' self-dealing behavior.