Knowledge that Transforms

Using granular gas price data and rich variation in corporate tax rates, we find that corporate taxes increase consumer prices. About 64% of the corporate tax is borne by consumers. The effect is stronger when firms have limited access to tax planning opportunities, face stricter tax enforcement, or when consumer demand is less elastic. Taxes also reduce the number of firms and their scale, consistent with a tax‐induced increase in marginal cost. Our results suggest that tax policies that increase effective corporate tax rates may have unintended consequences for consumers through higher prices.

This study uses machine‐learning methods to predict next‐period change in profitability based on a model proposed by Penman and Zhang (2004, Working paper, Columbia University and University of California, Berkeley; “PZ”). We find that new machine‐learning methods predict out of sample substantially better than traditional regression methods and provide richer interpretations about the role and impact of different predictor variables through their nonlinear relationships and interaction effects. For example, our results contrast with previous research by showing that both components of the DuPont decomposition (change in profit margin and change in asset turnover) are informative of next‐period changes in profitability. Our results are robust across different performance metrics, alternative machine‐learning models, and software. Furthermore, an unconstrained machine‐learning model using a larger feature space could not significantly improve the performance of the PZ model. PZ variables alone accounted for most of the explanatory power of the unconstrained model, suggesting the PZ model is both well specified (in terms of feature selection) and robust in higher dimensional settings. With respect to the economic significance of this information, we find mixed results. The market appears to adjust its expectations more in line with the machine‐learning predictions relative to the PZ model but the portfolio returns are not significantly different.

We examine a regulatory change that increased the reporting frequency of mutual funds' portfolios. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with greater ownership by mutual funds increase share repurchases following the regulatory change. We show that these share repurchases are a firm's rational response to undervaluation, which occurs because fund managers become shortsighted following the regulation and sell companies with good long‐term prospects. Collectively, our results shed light on an unintended consequence of more frequent reporting in a delegated asset management framework.

ABSTRACT I analyze US multinationals' (MNCs) use of foreign holding companies in their organizational structures and the impact of holding companies on internal capital markets. The look‐thru rule in the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA) reduces the after‐tax cost of foreign intercompany financing transactions. I use TIPRA as a natural experimental setting to test whether a shift in US tax policy that reduces the cost of moving foreign capital increased firms' reliance on foreign holding company subsidiaries. I find that MNCs responded to TIPRA by creating more foreign holding companies. Furthermore, consistent with the policy objectives of TIPRA, I document that MNCs that rely on holding companies gained tax efficiencies in their post‐TIPRA foreign internal capital markets, reducing domestic taxation on foreign earnings and easing financial constraints. Overall, my results expand our understanding of foreign organizational structure decisions and their internal financing benefits. I contribute to the tax literature by documenting a response to TIPRA that sheds light on the growing complexity of foreign subsidiary ownership structures.

Exploiting a quasi‐natural experiment in China in which some firms become investible to foreign investors across different times (i.e., pilot firms), we explore the role that stock market liberalization plays in shaping firms' earnings management activities. In one direction, the national‐level liberalization reform may elicit public attention from various stakeholders, piling pressure on managers to refrain from distorting their firms' earnings. In the other direction, the various restrictions that the government imposes on foreign investors cast doubt on whether China's capital control reform will materially affect pilot firms' incentives and scope to manipulate their earnings. To gauge which force is more dominant, we rely on a staggered difference‐in‐differences research design and find that pilot firms significantly reduce the magnitude of their discretionary accruals and the incidence of financial reporting irregularities from the pre‐ to the post‐liberalization period, compared to non‐pilot firms during the same time frame. Additional analysis implies that externalities in the form of stricter external monitoring from the media, institutional investors, and auditors is the major mechanism that helps market liberalization curb firms' earnings management. Our research provides insight on the importance of financial global integration to firms' earnings management practices.

We present a model in which investment capacity is reallocated in response to aggregate shocks and examine the resulting general equilibrium effects. The theory predicts a positive association between aggregate liquidity shocks, cost of capital, and conservative accounting. When capital becomes scarce, the accounting system is designed to preserve collateral, which depletes the supply of traded capital and leads to a higher cost of capital. The economy may accelerate small shocks with large (discontinuous) readjustments in financial reporting policies, cost of capital, and investment activity. We show that accounting policies set by firms to increase their market value may imply multiple equilibria, with self‐fulfilling inefficient equilibria exhibiting excessive collateral requirements and reduced aggregate investment.

We investigate how firms' use of derivatives impacts voluntary disclosure and offer four main findings. First, we find that when firms begin using derivative instruments, they increase the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Second, using path analysis, we find a direct link between derivative usage and forecast frequency, as well as an indirect link through reduced earnings volatility. Third, we find that CEOs with more pronounced career concerns increase forecast frequency only when derivatives make earnings easier to forecast and find no evidence that investor demand drives the decision to provide a forecast. These results suggest that the primary mechanism for the association between derivative usage and forecast frequency is a reduction in the manager's costs of providing the forecasts. Finally, we find that the majority of derivative‐induced forecasts are uninformative to capital market participants, especially after FAS 161 provided the necessary underlying data to understand how firms use derivatives. Overall, we provide the first empirical evidence that firms that use derivatives issue more management forecasts, but we also find that these incremental forecasts are largely uninformative and appear driven by managerial career concerns.

ABSTRACT We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre‐bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post‐filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.

We examine the role of CEO power in the appointment of accounting financial experts (AFEs) to firm audit committees. Our results show that firms with powerful CEOs have a lower likelihood of appointing AFEs to their audit committees. In addition, effective AFEs—those characterized by experience, high status, and social independence from the CEO—are less likely to be appointed in firms with powerful CEOs. In the presence of powerful CEOs, effective AFEs are also less likely to be designated audit committee chair. The absence of effective AFEs is associated with the use of accounting discretion by powerful CEOs to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts. We find no evidence that AFEs choose to avoid serving on the boards of firms with powerful CEOs. Our findings are consistent with powerful CEOs influencing board appointments post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Act through informal channels, including through their social ties with nominating committees. Our results suggest that current regulations prohibiting CEO involvement in the director nomination process and specifying who qualifies as a financial expert may be insufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the benefits and consequences of building trust through corporate social responsibility (CSR) vary when the company engages in material or immaterial CSR, and the conditions under which these benefits hold. Our study informs companies about the relative benefits and consequences of engaging in particular types of CSR activities. Prior archival research finds that CSR performance can buffer companies against negative stock reactions caused by subsequent adverse events, such as financial restatements. However, theory suggests that there are boundary conditions for this buffering effect through the multiple dimensions of trust violations. We predict and find using Experiment 1 that positive performance in material CSR enhances competence trust, while positive performance in immaterial CSR enhances integrity trust in the company. We predict and find using Experiment 2 that positive material CSR performance alleviates investors' negative reactions to an error restatement but that this effect does not occur for a fraud restatement. In contrast, positive immaterial CSR performance results in greater negative reactions to a fraud restatement, but this effect does not occur for an error restatement. These effects can be explained through the multiple dimensions of trust and trust violation, in accordance with the schematic model of dispositional attribution. Lastly, a supplementary experiment supports the robustness of our results to the baseline of neutral CSR performance. Our study has important implications for companies and standard setters about the trust‐building effects of engagement in CSR and, more generally, of how CSR issues with different materiality levels buffer against the adverse effects of negative events.