This paper studies empirically the determinants of new account fraud risk within two dimensions: the probability of fraud, and the expected and unexpected (monetary) loss-per-account due to fraud. By fraud risk, we mean the risk that a bank fails to enforce a debt because the identity of the person incurring the debt cannot be ascertained. Using a unique and rich data set of account applicants, provided by a German Internet-only bank, we find that fraud risk is highly sensitive to demographic and socio-economic variables like nationality, gender, marital status, age, occupation, and urbanisation. For example, foreigners are 22.25 times more likely to commit account fraud than Germans, and men are 2.5 times more risky than women

Reviews the book " Bank Frauds, Their Detection and Presentation," Lester A. Pratt

We analyze whether price fixing firms modify their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities around the revelation of the corporate misconduct. Our paper is the first empirical study to specifically explore the timing and the stability of the new CSR investments in firms involved in corporate misconduct. Our results show that firms that participate in illegal price fixing schemes increase their CSR initiatives around the time when they become the target of an antitrust investigation - not before. Moreover, the new CSR initiatives are mainly concentrated on improving positive CSR rather than in reducing further CSR concerns. Finally, we show that the new CSR efforts are not only associated with lower fines. We find that colluding firms tend to lose sales following a cartel breakup, although the decline in sales is less pronounced for those cartel firms that take anticipatory CSR actions to limit the negative impact of fraud revelation

In this paper, we develop and test a model of implicit recourse in asset-backed securitizations. Fraud losses on securitized assets are generally incurred by the bank and do not affect the performance of securitization trusts, while credit losses do affect the trust’s performance and are potentially borne by the owner of the securitized assets. Thus, the classification of losses as either fraud or credit losses provides a potential avenue of implicit recourse to manipulate the performance of securitization trusts. Using annual data from 2001 to 2006, we find that the performance of the credit card securitization portfolio is negatively related to fraud losses reported by the bank. We examine these results in light of the proposed Basel II capital rules and argue that a bank’s incentive to provide implicit recourse will increase under the anticipated regime

This study investigates the nature and magnitude of abuse in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP or the Program) using PPP loans made to 2999 investment advisory firms registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The data suggest that PPP abuse was relatively widespread as approximately 25% of firms receiving PPP loans indicated they would retain more jobs in their loan application than the number of employees they disclosed on their most recent regulatory filing (Form ADV). We show an existing model of investment advisor fraud predicts the most egregious PPP loans at a rate similar to actual cases of fraud. Investment advisors abusing the Program were significantly more likely to disclose a history of past fraud and other legal and/or regulatory misconduct. Using a conservative approach, we estimate that more than 6% of the $590 million in PPP funds received by SEC registered investment advisors consisted of overallocations to firms abusing the Program. We test a variety of hypotheses to shed further light on the nature of PPP abuse

This paper investigates the impact of financial penalties on the profitability and stock performance of banks. Using a unique dataset of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks over the period 2007 to 2014, we find a negative relation between financial penalties and pre-tax profitability but no relation with after-tax profitability. This result is explained by tax savings, as banks are allowed to deduct specific financial penalties from their taxable income. Moreover, our empirical analysis of the stock performance shows a positive relation between financial penalties and buy-and-hold returns, indicating that investors are pleased that cases are closed, that the banks successfully manage the consequences of misconduct, and that the financial penalties imposed are smaller than the accrued economic gains from the banks’ misconduct. This argument is supported by the positive abnormal returns accompanying on the announcement of a financial penalty

Over two hundred million dollars a year is lost to industry through employee frauds. This, however, is only the amount that is ferreted out and made public. There is no telling how much additional is lost either in undetected frauds or those that for one reason or another are hushed. That the record should contain fraud in such prolific measure is not the exciting feature. The part about these frauds that does cause blush, at least to the cheek of an auditor, is that when the frauds do "pop," it is found that so many of them had been started and blithely going on for long periods of time untouched by auditing pursuit. Even more damaging is the fact that frequently some of these frauds come to light not as a result of internal control or auditing technique, but wholly out of accidental or adventitious circumstances. Chance, rather than auditing, prevails. In the hope that laboratory dissection and analysis of frauds might, through the development of some new or modified auditing technique, narrow if not eliminate the fortuitous aspects of detection, a case study was undertaken. The study was confined to employee frauds and did not consider skullduggery by employers themselves. For case material, accountants, surety companies, banks, stock brokerage concerns and industrial and commercial organizations were invited to submit details of frauds that were unearthed by "happenstance" rather than by the normal workings of accounting controls

This article synthesizes the large literature regarding the role of various players in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) securitization at the center of the 2008–09 US housing and financial crisis. Underwriting banks facilitated wide-scale mortgage fraud by knowingly misreporting key loan characteristics underlying mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Under the cover of complexity, credit rating agencies catered to investment banks by issuing increasingly inflated ratings on both RMBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Originators who engaged in mortgage fraud gained market share, as did CDO managers who catered to underwriters by accepting the lowest-quality MBS collateral. Appraisal targeting and inflated appraisals were the norm. RMBS and CDO prices indicate that the marginal AAA investor was unaware of pervasive mortgage fraud and ratings inflation, but these factors were strongly related to future deal performance. The supply of fraudulent credit was not uniform, but clustered in certain geographic regions and zip codes. As these dubious originators extended credit to those who could not afford the loans, the credit expansion led to house price booms and subsequent crashes in these zip codes. Overall, a consistent narrative based on substantial research indicates that conflicts of interest, misreporting, and fraud were focal features of the financial crisis

Using supervisory data from U.S. financial institutions on fraud-related losses in foreign markets, we find that losses in countries with poor governance have lower recovery rates. Our results are robust to accounting for potential endogeneity and reverse causality concerns, among numerous robustness checks. The association is driven by intuitive governance dimensions such as control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in fraud recovery for firms with poor risk management quality. Overall, this paper presents unique and novel evidence tying country governance quality to firm-level risk realizations

This paper investigates the impact of newspaper articles about skimming fraud on debit card usage in the Netherlands using daily transaction data and daily newspaper announcements from January 1st 2005 to December 31st 2008. Key finding is that articles about skimming fraud significantly affect same day debit card usage. The direction and strength of the media effects strongly depend on the specific characteristics of the publications, such as type of fraud addressed and their position in the newspaper, but above all on the frequency with which they come out. The effects, however, are economically small compared to other factors, such as calendar and holiday effects, and do not sustain or accumulate in the long run. Yet, some first cost calculations demonstrate that the impact of media attention on total retail payments efficiency is not to be underestimated