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How Well Do We Measure Training?

Journal of Labor Economics 1997 15(3), 507-528
This article compares various measures of on-the-job training, from a new source that matches establishments and workers, allowing the authors to compare the responses of employers and employees to identical training questions. Establishments report 25 percent more hours of training than do workers, although workers and establishments report similar incidence rates of training. Both establishment and worker measures agree that there is much more informal training than formal training. Further, informal training is measured about as accurately as formal training. Finally, the authors show that measurement error reduces substantially the observed effect of training, in particular the effect of training on productivity growth. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Spinoffs and Information

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1997 6(2), 153-176
We present an information-based explanation for spinoffs. When the various divisions of a firm are spun off into several firms that have separate stock market listings, the number of traded securities increases. This makes the price system more informative. It improves the quality of the investment decisions made by managers and reduces uninformed investors' uncertainty about the value of the divisions. Both effects serve to increase the sum total of the market values of the spun-off divisions above the market value of the original firm.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G34.

New evidence on the effects of federal regulations on insider trading: The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA)

Journal of Corporate Finance 1997 3(2), 89-111
This paper finds new evidence that the threat of legal sanctions significantly affects the trading behavior of insiders. Specifically, I examine the effects of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) on insider trading around earnings announcements. Given ITSFEA's stated concern with trading on private information prior to its release, I argue that insiders may respond to the Act by altering the timing of their trades. I find that, following ITSFEA, insiders are more likely to postpone liquidity sales until after negative earnings surprises. I also find that insiders increase their relative emphasis on post-event as opposed to pre-event information based trading. Finally, earnings announcements appear to be more informative in the post-ITSFEA period, consistent with less information based trading in front of earnings announcements, after the Act.

Financial reporting, tax costs, and book-tax conformity

Journal of Accounting and Economics 1997 23(3), 225-248
We investigate the role of book-tax conformity in firms' financial reporting activities using a unique set of publicly traded firms that were forced to switch for tax purposes from the cash method to the accrual method. Prior to the mandated change, little trade-off existed between tax planning and financial reporting goals for these firms. After the change, recognition criteria for tax and financial reporting purposes became more alike, increasing the trade-off between financial reporting and tax objectives. Our results suggest that required use of the accrual method for tax purposes causes firms to defer income for financial statement purposes.

The effects of taxes, regulation, earnings, and organizational form on life insurers' investment portfolio realizations

Journal of Accounting and Economics 1997 24(3), 337-361
We exploit a unique experimental setting within the life insurance industry to examine the effects of taxes, regulation, earnings, and organizational form on life insurers' investment portfolio realizations. A unique equity tax levied on mutual life insurers, as well as the statutory rate variation that occurred during our sample period, allow us to disentangle the effects of taxes from earnings or profitability. Consistent with some policymakers' claims, we find mutual insurers' capital gain realizations are affected by company-specific equity tax rate variation. In addition, we find capital regulation and earnings considerations affect both stocks' and mutuals' realizations.