Journal Article Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector Get access Eric A. Verhoogen Eric A. Verhoogen Department of Economics and Department of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 123, Issue 2, May 2008, Pages 489–530, https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.489 Published: 01 May 2008

This paper estimates a structural demand model for commercial bank deposit services in order to measure the effects on consumers given dramatic changes in bank services throughout US branching deregulation in the 1990s. Following the discrete choice literature, consumer decisions are based on prices and bank characteristics. Consumers are found to respond to deposit rates, and to a lesser extent, to account fees, in choosing a depository institution. Moreover, consumers respond favorably to the branch staffing and geographic density, as well as to the bank’s age, size, and geographic diversification. Consumers in most markets experience a slight increase in welfare throughout the period.

We use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns. Fund flows are dumb money–by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run. This dumb money effect is related to the value effect: high sentiment stocks tend to be growth stocks. High sentiment also is associated with high corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor demand.

Abstract We apply an event-study methodology on over 10,000 Morningstar star rating changes and find that Morningstar has subsantial independent influence on the investment allocation decisions of retail mutual fund investors. It is the discrete change in the star rating itself and not the change in the underlying performance measures that drives frow. We document econnomically and statistically significant positive abnormal flow following rating upgrades, and negative abnormal flow following rating downgrades. In contrast to the cross-sectional flow performance literature, we find evidence of investor punishment of performance declines, some of which is evident immediately in the month of the rating change.

[Using a new technique, and weekly data for 25 countries from 1994 to 1998, we analyze the relationship between institutional cross-border portfolio flows, and domestic and foreign equity returns. In emerging markets, institutional flows forecast statistically indistinguishable movements in country closed-end fund NAV returns and price returns. In contrast, closed-end fund flows forecast price returns, but not NAV returns. Furthermore, institutional flows display trend-following (trend-reversing) behavior in response to symmetric (asymmetric) movements in NAV and price returns. The results suggest that institutional cross-border flows are linked to fundamentals, while closed-end fund flows are a source of price pressure in the short run.]

This paper develops and analyzes a model in which tax considerations and financial reporting considerations have countervailing effects on a firm's investments in internally developed intangible assets. It also proposes and estimates a new measure of tax preferences, which we call the economic effective tax rate. This measure reflects both investments in intangible assets and the use of debt financing, neither of which generates a book-tax difference. Our measure indicates that the economic effective tax rate was about 18 percent between 1988 and 2005, when the statutory tax rate was either 34 or 35 percent.

In this paper, we develop and test a model of implicit recourse in asset-backed securitizations. Fraud losses on securitized assets are generally incurred by the bank and do not affect the performance of securitization trusts, while credit losses do affect the trust’s performance and are potentially borne by the owner of the securitized assets. Thus, the classification of losses as either fraud or credit losses provides a potential avenue of implicit recourse to manipulate the performance of securitization trusts. Using annual data from 2001 to 2006, we find that the performance of the credit card securitization portfolio is negatively related to fraud losses reported by the bank. We examine these results in light of the proposed Basel II capital rules and argue that a bank’s incentive to provide implicit recourse will increase under the anticipated regime.