We provide a general theoretical characterization of how firms' technology choice on a technology frontier determines the long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. We show that the shape of the frontier determines factor shares and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. If there are adjustment costs to technology choice, the short-and long-run elasticities differ, with the long-run always higher. If the technology frontier is log-linear, the production function becomes Cobb-Douglas in the long run but, consistent with empirical evidence, short-run dynamics are characterized by gross complementarity. The approach is easily implementable and yields a powerful way to introduce CES-type production functions in macroeconomic models. We provide an illustration within an estimated dynamic general equilibrium model and show that the use of our production technology provides a good match for the short-and medium-run behaviour of the U.S. labour share.

[We examine how bank capital and borrower bargaining power affect loan spreads. Consistent with previous studies, higher bank capital has a negative impact on loan rates, but borrower cash flow has a significant effect on this impact: compared with high-capital banks, lowcapital banks charge more for borrowers with low cash flow, but offer greater marginal discounts as these borrowers’ cash flow rises. These effects are largely focused on more bank-dependent borrowers. We find some evidence that low-capital banks charge a higher premium for bank-dependent borrowers’ systematic risk, but not for their total equity risk or default risk.]

Two well-known stylized facts on earnings management are that the earnings surprise distribution has a discontinuity at zero, and that positive earnings surprises are associated with positive abnormal returns. We link these two facts in a model of the earnings management decision in which the manager trades off the capital market benefits of meeting earnings benchmarks against the costs of manipulation. We develop a new structural methodology to estimate the model and uncover the unobserved cost function. The estimated model parameters yield the percentage of manipulating firms, magnitude of manipulation, noise in manipulation, and sufficient statistics to evaluate proxies for identifying firms suspected of manipulation. Finally, we use the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as a policy experiment and find that by increasing costs, the Act reduced equilibrium earnings management by 36%. This reduction occurred despite an increase in benefits, consistent with the market rationally becoming less skeptical of firms that just meet benchmarks.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.

ABSTRACT In recent years, public accounting firms have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of their revenues generated from consulting services. Although growth in consulting revenue following the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) has been generated primarily from services provided to nonaudit clients, regulators have expressed concerns about the potential implications of this increase for audit quality. In contrast, accounting firms assert that the expertise developed by their consulting professionals helps them to provide better quality audits. We examine the relation between the proportion of accounting firm consulting revenue to total revenue and audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. Because SOX drastically altered the source of consulting revenues for public accounting firms, we also separately examine these relations in the pre‐ and post‐SOX eras. We find evidence suggesting that before SOX, higher proportions of audit firm consulting revenues negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality. However, we do not find a statistically significant association between audit firm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality following SOX. Our analyses suggest that even if these relations exist following SOX, the potential economic magnitude of the effect is small.

We examine changes in risk following US bank mergers in the period 1981–2014. Short-run increases in acquirer risk following mergers occur only in the first few mergers undertaken by the same acquirer, and only in systematic risk. The equity volatility of acquirers does not increase. Using a new approach to measure the long-run effect we find that these results persist, consistent with banks maintaining a constant level of total equity risk in the long run. Constant acquirer risk means that all diversification benefits of the mergers are dissipated. We measure the loss of diversification associated with mergers and find it to be 40% of the risk level in 1981. Almost all of this occurred prior to 2004. In addition, there has been a large increase in correlations between the largest banks, much of which has come from sources other than mergers. The results are inconsistent with these mergers being motivated by the ‘too big to fail’ put. They suggest that if one wanted to reduce the risk of the banking system by demerging major banks one would have to reach back to the structure that existed before 2004. Simply reversing recent mergers would not have much effect on stock market measures of risk.