In the 1960s, two landmark statutes-the Equal Pay and Civil Rights Acts-targeted the long-standing practice of employment discrimination against U.S. women. For the next 15 years, the gender gap in median earnings among full-time, full-year workers changed little, leading many scholars to conclude that the legislation was ineffectual. This article revisits this conclusion using two research designs, which leverage (i) cross-state variation in preexisting state equal pay laws and (ii) variation in the 1960 gender gap across occupation-industry-state-group cells to capture differences in the legislation's incidence. Both designs suggest that federal antidiscrimination legislation led to striking gains in women's relative wages, which were concentrated among below-median wage earners. These wage gains offset preexisting labor market forces, which worked to depress women's relative pay growth, resulting in the apparent stability of the gender gap at the median and mean in the 1960s and 1970s. The data show little evidence of short-term changes in women's employment but suggest that firms reduced their hiring and promotion of women in the medium to long term. The historical record points to the key role of the Equal Pay Act in driving these changes.

We explain the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible. A discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract. It is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states. In addition, discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation. This explains discretion among highly confident letters, holding-company relationships, mutual-fund contracts, bank loan commitments, and other financial and nonfinancial contracts.

AbstractThis article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk. Two types of credit risks are considered. The first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default. The second is where the writer of the derivative security may default. We apply the foreign currency analogy of Jarrow and Turnbull (1991) to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a spot exchange rate. Arbitrage-free valuation techniques are then employed. This methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives, such as swaps and caps.

ABSTRACT This article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk. Two types of credit risks are considered. The first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default. The second is where the writer of the derivative security may default. We apply the foreign currency analogy of Jarrow and Turnbull (1991) to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a “spot exchange rate.” Arbitrage‐free valuation techniques are then employed. This methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives, such as swaps and caps.