This study examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock returns and risk. We find that FDICIA had a generally positive effect on bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk. The extent of the risk reduction varies based on the capitalization, size, and credit risk of the institutions with poorly capitalized, large, and high credit risk banks experiencing the greatest risk reduction. The results obtained using two separate control groups also bolster the conclusion that FDICIA’s passage resulted in a significant decline in bank risk.

The acquisition of a partial stake in a target firm has been positively linked to the likelihood that the target will be involved in a follow on full acquisition involving either the original bidder or a third party bidder. Existing studies provide only suggestive evidence of this linkage by comparing the abnormal returns to partial targets that are ultimately acquired to those that are not. Using a sample of partial acquisitions, we identify characteristics that impact the probability of a full acquisition and provide a tangible link between partial target gains and the ex ante probability of acquisition. Partial targets experience positive announcement effects, and the gains are greater for subsequently acquired targets. Partial bids initiated by corporate bidders are more likely to result in a full acquisition, and the size of the acquired stake and the level of institutional ownership are positively linked to the probability of acquisition. Further, the partial target gains are positively linked to the ex ante probability of acquisition even after controlling for any increased monitoring and discipline that the partial bidder is expected to impose. The findings are robust across various time horizons and model specifications.

We examine whether investors are able to fully anticipate the pricing implications of cash flow hedges in the banking industry. We show that mark-to-market adjustments on cash flow hedges are inversely related to future cash flows and that investors underestimate the extent of this inverse relation. Our evidence supports the notion that incomplete information on value relevant parameters makes it difficult for investors to accurately predict the effects of current cash flow hedge adjustments on future cash flows. Our results are also consistent with the evidence that investors have limited attention such that information, particularly information that is difficult to discern, is not fully reflected in stock prices. Thus, the additional disclosures mandated by regulatory agencies in the banking industry are not sufficient to overcome the challenges associated with incomplete information and investors’ limited attention.