We examine the impact of CEOs’ public charity affiliations on corporate labor violations and find that public-charity-affiliated CEOs have a lower likelihood of engaging in labor violations than their non-affiliated peers. In a disaggregated analysis, we find the result to be driven primarily by wage and hour violations. This finding is validated when we compare changes in wage and hour violations around different types of CEO turnover. We further identify the promotion of a positive corporate culture and an increase in labor-related expenditures as the main channels through which CEOs’ public charity affiliations affect wage and hour violations. In addition, we find that firms led by public-charity-affiliated CEOs experience lower employee turnover. The impact of public-charity-affiliated CEOs on reducing the likelihood of wage and hour violations is persistent and is more pronounced for CEOs who exhibit more altruistic behavior prior to assuming office. Overall, we provide persuasive evidence that CEOs’ public charity affiliations are beneficial to firms.

This paper examines the value-added role of industry specialist advisors in M&As. We find that compared to non-industry specialists, advisors specializing in the target industry help acquirers garner higher announcement returns. However, there is no significant difference in acquirer returns between advisors specializing in the acquirer industry and non-industry specialists. The choice of a specialist advisor in the target industry benefits acquirers most when there is significant information asymmetry surrounding the targets. Moreover, the bulk of value creation comes from small- to medium-sized financial advisors, rather than large, top-tier investment banks. Finally, our results suggest that advisors specializing in the target industry add value mainly through their ability to help acquirers purchase targets at a lower price.