We investigate the influence of the institutional environment on bank capital ratios. Using a sample of 160 banks operating in the Middle East and North Africa region for the period 2004–2014, we find that, when stock markets have little presence, institutional variables significantly affect risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios but not leverage ratios. Conversely, when stock markets are more developed, only leverage ratios are influenced by institutional factors. Our results also indicate that institutional variables affect non-weighted equity-to-asset ratios of banks that are listed on a stock exchange. Our findings contribute to the bank capital structure literature and have important policy implications for developing countries.

This article investigates risk and stability features of Islamic banking using a sample of 553 banks from 24 countries between 1999 and 2009. Small Islamic banks that are leveraged or based in countries with predominantly Muslim populations have lower credit risk than conventional banks. In terms of insolvency risk, small Islamic banks also appear more stable. Moreover, we find little evidence that Islamic banks charge rents to their customers for offering Shariá-compliant financial products. Our results also show that loan quality of Islamic banks is less responsive to domestic interest rates compared to conventional banks.

We investigate whether excess control rights of ultimate owners in pyramids affect banks׳ capital ratio adjustments. When control and cash flow rights are identical, to boost capital ratios banks issue equity without cutting lending. However, when control rights exceed cash flow rights, instead of issuing equity, banks downsize by reducing lending. Such a finding is mostly prevalent in countries with weak shareholder protection or for family-controlled banks. Other factors also explain the extent to which such banks reduce lending. Our findings contribute to the capital structure adjustment literature and have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel III and the debate on capital requirements and bank lending.

We empirically investigate how bank internationalization, organizational complexity, and geographical complexity stemming from foreign-affiliate type and geographic dispersion affect parent bank stability and profitability. We base our analysis on unique, hand-collected data for the worldwide locations of subsidiaries and branches of EU banks. Our results show that internationalization benefits bank stability by reducing default risk, and it is significantly associated with lower earnings volatility but poorer profitability. With regard to foreign organizational complexity, banks with both foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches are more stable than banks with foreign branches exclusively, which are more stable than banks with only foreign subsidiaries. Nevertheless, higher geographic complexity is associated with lower default risk, higher volatility in earnings, and higher profitability. Further investigations on the sovereign debt crisis and bank size indicate that the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 amplified the relationship and our findings mainly hold for small banks.

Frictions prevent banks to immediately adjust their capital ratio towards their desired and/or imposed level. This paper analyzes (i) whether or not these frictions are larger for regulatory capital ratios vis-à-vis a plain leverage ratio; (ii) which adjustment channels banks use to adjust their capital ratio; and (iii) how the speed of adjustment and adjustment channels differ between large, systemic and complex banks versus small banks. Our results, obtained using a sample of listed banks across OECD countries for the 2001–2012 period, bear critical policy implications for the implementation of new (systemic risk-based) capital requirements and their impact on banks’ balance sheets, specifically lending, and hence the real economy.

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the European banking industry. Based on a broad set of European banks for the period 1996–2002, our study first shows that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans. However, considering size effects and splitting non-interest activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by commission and fee activities. A higher share of trading activities is never associated with higher risk and for small banks it implies, in some cases, lower asset and default risks.

This paper investigates the pricing of insolvent banks in the U.S. that are sold under the purchase and assumption resolution method of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We consider quarterly data for 444 acquisitions of insolvent U.S. banks between 2009 and 2016. We find that acquirers not only pay higher prices for insolvent banks with larger core deposits, as has been highlighted by the literature (and is consistent with the FDIC’s beliefs), but also for those banks with larger branch networks that are less dispersed geographically. When the acquirers bid (separately) for the assets of the insolvent banks, they place a positive value on the number of branches of the insolvent bank, but appear to be insensitive to geographic dispersion. Acquirers also pay more for banks with a national charter. The results additionally show that failed banks are most likely to be acquired by relatively large and highly capitalized banks whose organic growth is not affected in the years following the acquisition. Overall, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the implications of the purchase and assumption resolution method for the FDIC and for the banking industry.

Bank liquidity shortages during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 led to the introduction of liquidity regulations, the impact of which has attracted the attention of academics and policymakers. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. As a setting, we use the Netherlands, where a Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) was introduced in 2003. The LBR was imposed on Dutch banks only and did not apply to other banks operating elsewhere within the Eurozone. Using this differential regulatory treatment to overcome identification concerns and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the LBR increased the volume of lending by Dutch banks relative to other banks located in the Eurozone. Increased equity, an inflow of retail deposits and subsequent increase in balance sheet size allowed Dutch banks to increase lending despite having to meet the LBR requirements. The LBR also affected the loan composition of Dutch banks (with corporate and retail lending increasing more than mortgage lending) and the maturity profile of loan portfolios. Our results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and the real economy.

In this paper, we explore whether economic uncertainty differently affects the default risk of Islamic and conventional banks. Using a sample of 568 banks from 20 countries between 2009 and 2018, we use the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) by Ahir et al. (2018) to conduct a study based on a comparable measure across countries. Our findings indicate that economic uncertainty increases the default risk of conventional banks but does not affect Islamic banks’ default risk. To understand why, we explore the influence of religiosity, institutional factors, and bank-level heterogeneity. We observe that Islamic banks’ default risk is not significantly affected by uncertainty in all types of countries, but such a difference with conventional banks mainly holds for banks with higher income diversification, larger size, and that are publicly traded. Moreover, our findings show that conventional banks suffer more from uncertainty in terms of stability in countries with higher religiosity and with a higher share of profit-loss sharing (PLS) contracts. Our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques to deal with endogeneity and to alternative variable measurements.