This paper addresses the issue of whether firms are required to pay an ex ante premium to investors for bearing the risk of interest-rate changes. A two-factor APT model with the market and changes in the yield on long-term government bonds as factors is employed. The paper shows that, empirically, most of the interest-sensitive stocks are in the utility industries, and that there is reasonable evidence that the interest factor is priced in the sense of the APT. Several sources for the interest sensitivity are considered, and regulatory lags are focused on as a likely candidate.

This study examines whether stock returns provide forecasts of changes in interest rates and inflation. In contrast to earlier work that indicated that changes in expected inflation negatively affect stock returns, we find a statistically significant positive relation between stock returns and future inflation rate changes as well as a significant positive relation between stock returns and future interest rate changes. Real estate investment trusts, which are particularly interest- and inflation-sensitive securities, provide better forecasts than a broad market index. Finally, we find that most of the evidence supporting the forecasting ability of stock returns occurs in the October 1979 to October 1982 period when the Federal Reserve Board chose not to counteract interest rate changes.

Announcements of successful leveraged buyouts (LBOs) during January 1985 to April 1989 caused a significantly negative return on outstanding publicly traded nonconvertible bonds. Yet the average risk-adjusted debt holder losses are less than 7 percent of the average risk-adjusted equity holder gains. Bond losses are related to the pre-LBO rating, but only weakly to equity holder gains. We demonstrate that trader-quoted data from a major investment bank offers conclusions about the effects of LBOs on debt holders different from those drawn from commonly used matrix and exchange-based data (such as Standard & Poor’s Bond Guide data). This has important implications for event studies involving debt instruments.

Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial agency risk on bond covenants, using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from the 1993–2007 period. Managerial entrenchment and the risk of managerial fraud significantly influence the use of covenants, in the direction predicted by the agency-theoretic framework. Our analysis highlights the varied effects of entrenchment on different types of agency risks faced by bondholders: Entrenched managers aggravate investment risk, but ameliorate risk from shareholder opportunism. Covenant use also responds efficiently to the quality of information available regarding the risk of managerial fraud.

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market. We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution to an information problem or a liquidity problem. We find that underpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings and is highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggests that information problems drive underpricing, with support for both the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetric information theory. We do not find evidence in favor of the Rock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquidity causes underpricing. , Oxford University Press.