In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller [11], [12] demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant, the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions. Furthermore, if capital markets are perfect, stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm (see [6]). Motivated by this assumption, the firm has been viewed as a “black box;” namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in a growing body of recent literature (see [1], [2], [7], [9], [13], and [14]), researchers recognize that the firm in an “imperfect” capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can, and do, conflict. Jensen and Meckling [9] study the roles of three important groups—the owner-manager, the stockholders, and the bondholders—focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them. They provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts.

Announcements of new equity issues have been seen to have a negative effect on stock prices. Potential explanations of this negative effect - the price-pressure, wealth-redistribution, and information-release hypotheses - imply different bond-price reactions to the announcements. By investigating bond-price behavior around the announcement of new equity issues this paper distinguishes the relative importance of these hypotheses. The evidence presented of a significant drop in bond prices is consistent with the information-release hypotheses.

This paper contains a test of a new aspect of the informational content of dividend; namely, is there information in the timing of the announcements? The empirical evidence indicates that the market expects ‘bad news’ to be delivered late and that these expectations are confirmed. Mean excess returns of stock prices around late announcements are, depending on the assumed returns generating process, either significantly negative or insignificant while significantly positive around the entire population of announcements. Moreover, the proportion and magnitude of dividend reductions associated with late announcements are significantly larger than in the complete universe of announcements.

Past studies indicate that stock prices are affected by announcements of unexpected dividend changes, i.e., unexpectedly large dividends are associated with positive stock price response. Two explanations of this empirical regularity, ‘the information content hypothesis’ and the ‘wealth redistribution hypothesis’, imply different bond price behavior around dividend announcements. The information content hypothesis predicts a positive bond price response to unexpectedly large dividends, while the wealth redistribution hypothesis predicts the opposite. This paper distinguishes between the relative importance of the two hypotheses by empirically investigating bond price behavior around dividend announcements. The evidence presented is consistent with the information content hypothesis. However, the gains associated with positive information are captured by the stockholders, while the losses are shared with the bondholders.

Stock prices on the organized exchanges are restricted to be divisible by ⅛. Therefore, the “true” price usually differs from the observed price. This paper examines the biases resulting from the discreteness of observed stock prices. It is shown that the natural estimators of the variance and all of the higher order moments of the rate of returns are biased. An approximate set of correction factors is derived and a procedure is outlined to show how the correction can be made. The natural estimators of the “beta” and of the variance of the market portfolio, on the other hand, are “nearly” unbiased.