This paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors. Dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats. Nevertheless, they capture some seats, via mechanisms such as cumulative voting, in over half of the sample contests. Regardless of proxy contest outcome, positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest. That finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests, in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance. The finding runs counter to the claim of Berle (1962) that the economists' view of proxy contests is ‘a wholly imaginary picture’. A portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent, however, and as suggested by Manne (1962) is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares.

The process of security price adjustment to the release of new information has long held the interest of the finance profession, both in academics and in practice. The efficiency of financial markets in reflecting new information significantly impacts the allocation of capital and income within the markets1 and, consequently, can affect social welfare. Thus, public, business, and investment policies are all related to an understanding of the functioning of security markets and their utilization of information. As a result, a significant body of economic research has considered the impact of information upon security markets under a number of alternative market structures. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to this literature by extending previous research in the two related areas of speculation and information dissemination.

This article proposes a new approach to small sample theory that achieves a meaningful integration of earlier directions of research in this field. The approach centers on the constructive technique of approximating distributions developed recently by the author in [10]. This technique utilizes extended rational approximants (ERA's) which build on the strengths of alternative, less flexible approximation methods (such as those based on asymptotic expansions) and which simultaneously blend information from diverse analytic, numerical and experimental sources. The first part of the article explores the general theory of approximation of continuous probability distributions by means of ERA's. Existence, characterization, error bound, and uniqueness theorems for these approximants are given and a new proof is provided for the convergence result obtained earlier in [10]. Some further aspects of finding ERA's by modifications to multiple-point Pade approximants are presented and the new approach is applied to the noncircular serial correlation coefficient. The results of this application demonstrate how ERA's provide systematic improvements over Edgeworth and saddlepoint techniques. These results, taken with those of the earlier article [10], suggest that the approach offers considerable potential for empirical application in terms of its reliability, convenience, and generality.

This paper tests the hypothesis that horizontal mergers generate positive abnormal returns to stockholders of the bidder and target firms because they increase the probability of successful collusion among rival producers. Under the collusion hypothesis, rivals of the merging firms benefit from the merger since successful collusion limits output and raises product prices and/or lower factor prices. This proposition is tested on a large sample of horizontal mergers in mining and manufacturing industries, including mergers challenged by the government with violating antitrust laws, and a ‘control’ sample of vertical mergers taking place in the same industries. While we find that the antitrust law enforcement agencies systematically select relatively profitable mergers for prosecution, there is little evidence indicating that the mergers would have had collusive, anticompetitive effects.

The Government of the People's Republic of China considers that the prospects for rapid and broadbased economic growth in China depend crucially on the ability to increase production in the agricultural sector. The major instruments available to the government include reform of the institutional structure of farm management, modification of the farm price structure, and increase of budgetary expenditure in support of agriculture. Since 1978, the central government has stressed use of the first two instruments and some initial judgments can be made about the effectiveness of its measures based on recent official statistics.