This paper reexamines both monthly and quarterly U.S. postwar data to investigate if the observed comovements between money, real interestrates, prices and output are compatible with the money-real interest-output link suggested by existing monetary theories of output, which include both Keynesian and equilibrium models.The major empirical findings are these;1) In both monthly and quarterly data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is exogenous, or Granger-causally prior in the context of a four-variable system which contains money, prices, nominal interest rates and industrial production.2) In quarterly data, there is significantly more information con-tained in either the levels of expected inflation or the innovationof this variable for predicting future output, given current and lagged output, than in any other variable examined (money, actualinflation, nominal interest rates, or ex ante real rates). The effect of an inflation innovation on future output is unambiguously negative. The first result casts strong doubt on the empirical importance of existing monetary theories of output, which imply that money should have a causal role on the ex ante real rates. The second result would appear incompatible with most demand driven models of output.In light of these results, we propose an alternative structural model which can account for the major dynamic interactions among the variables.This model has two central features: i) output is unaffected by money supply;and ii) the money supply process is motivated by short-run price stability.

Since 1964 all the increase in female labor force participation in Australia can be attributed to married women. About 90% of the increase can be attributed to women employed part time. The paper argues that aggregate female participation rate equations cannot be regarded as labor supply curves. The female wage rate relative to that of males is exogenously determined by wage-fixing authorities above market-clearing rates, and the excess supply of labor is not adequately measured by the unemployment rate. Married women and part-time workers have a high propensity to bypass the unemployment pool when leaving or seeking a job. Participation equations are dominated by employment demand for sex-segregated jobs.

Analyse de la structure des preferences intertemporelles, necessaire pour obtenir une planification consistante

[Differences in faculty beliefs as to the economic function of accounting doctoral programs may contribute to the heterogeneity of educational policies and practices that exist across programs. Many accounting doctoral program policy makers appear to adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to either the "human capital" or "screening" theories of occupational licensing/certification. This study compares these two theories and evaluates the educational policies and practices they imply. The analysis suggests that, when relied upon to provide perspective in resolving policy questions, rather than in an orthodox fashion, these theories can provide useful guidance to accounting doctoral program policy makers.]

ABSTRACT: Differences in faculty beliefs as to the economic function of accounting, doctoral programs may contribute to the heterogeneity of educational policies and practices that exist across programs. Many accounting doctoral program policy makers appear to adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to either the "human capital" or "screening" theories of occupational licensing/certification. This study compares these two theories and evaluates the educational policies and practices they imply. The analysis suggests that, when relied upon to provide perspective in resolving policy questions, rather than in an orthodox fashion, these theories can provide useful guidance to accounting doctoral program policy makers.

Between 1971 and 1978, wages of more than one-half million nonwhite laborers in the South African mines tripled in real terms. In the same period, the nonwhites employed in the mines switched from being 62 percent foreign to 62 percent domestic.' These changes followed a period-from 1911 to 1971 -during which real wages of black gold miners did not rise, and terminated almost a century of reliance on foreign labor reserves for the majority of such labor.2 These dramatic events are examined here in the context of an econometric model of the demand for labor by the South African mining sector from 1946 to 1980. This affords an unusual opportunity to study the demand side of a market for internal and international migrants, in a society where racial discrimination is formalized in the apartheid system, where powerful mining houses wield potential monopsony power, and where political factors in the region are major determinants of economic behavior. To comprehend the derived demand for workers in this sector, it is essential to outline at least certain aspects of the industry's organization and that of the market for labor; this is undertaken in Section I. Section II develops a stylized model, which is then estimated, from data described in Section III, for the gold, diamond, coal, and other minerals sectors separately in Section IV. I. Organization of the Mine Labor Market

In another paper (forthcoming), I have contrasted wage setting in the 1920's with that of the post-World War II period. During the 1920's and early 1930's, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics published an incomplete sample of reported wage-change decisions at the establishment level. Perhaps the best way to summarize the results is to direct attention to Table 1, which presents the distribution of manufacturing wagechange decisions during 1924 and 1925, years in which consumer price inflation was, respectively, -.2 and +4.0 percent on a December-to-December basis. The table shows a wide array of wagechange decisions ranging from cuts of over 20 percent to increases of similar magnitude. This dispersion of decisions is remarkable by post-World War II standards. Moreover, the postwar evidence suggests that nominal wage cuts are a rarity, even in periods of low inflation. When they do occur, as in some recent union concessions, the cuts result from a painful negotiations process against a background of threatened or actual mass layoffs. By the 1920's, many features of modern corporate enterprise were present. But were of little significance in most sectors, including manufacturing, the result of a sustained open shop campaign by employers after World War I. There was little labor market intervention by government. Workers resented wage cuts-during periods of generalized wage cutting such reductions became important causes of strikes-but employers implemented them anyway. And when employers did not want to take the blame for wage cuts, they used company unions to negotiate reductions (Robert Dunn, 1927, pp. 21-23). In short, in the absence of or other institutional constraints, the implicit contracts offered by employers in the 1920's provided substantially more wage flexibility than existed after World War II. The wagesetting mechanisms of the 1920's did not approach the flexibility of a classical auction market, a fact of some comfort to implicitcontract theorists. However, it is unclear that one needs to go much beyond simple explanations of how wage cuts (or even relative wage slippage) would lead to worker resentment and management caution.