This paper examines the intertemporal behavior of the short-term rate of interest in a mean-reverting model (Vasicek's elastic random walk model). Using the Goldfeld-Quandt switching regressions technique, we show that the mean-reverting model switched regimes three times over the sample period (March 1959 to December 1985) and that two of these switches coincide with the 1979 and 1982 changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy on interest rates. Parameter estimates prove to be unstable over the sample period. There is evidence of slow mean reversion over the entire sample period; yet significant mean-reversion emerges only in the 1979n1982 regime.

This paper reports the results of an empirical investigation of auditor judgment involving the assessment of audit risk and planning of an audit strategy. The study focuses on whether methodological techniques used for conducting research affect decision behavior; in particular, whether silent versus think‐aloud elicitations of auditor responses lead to different responses. Auditors performed the experimental tasks under two methods of eliciting responses: they responded to half of the cases silently, and to the other half while thinking aloud into a tape recorder. Comparisons of the silent and aloud responses suggest a systematic influence exerted by method of eliciting responses, but one which varies depending on the subjects' positions in the firm and the particular judgment being made. Résumé. Il est question dans le présent article des résultats d'une étude empirique des jugements portés par le vérificateur sur l'évaluation du risque lié à la vérification et la planification d'une stratégie de vérification. L'étude traite des répercussions des techniques méthodologiques utilisées dans le cadre de la recherche sur le comportement décisionnel; elle vise en particulier à déterminer si les réponses des vérificateurs diffèrent selon le mode d'expression, en silence ou à voix haute. Dans le cadre de cette étude, les vérificateurs participants ont accompli les tâches expérimentales en communiquant leurs réponses selon deux modes d'expression: en silence pour la moitié des cas et à voix haute pour l'autre moitié, avec enregistrement sur bande. La comparaison des deux séries donne lieu de croire que le mode de communication des réponses exerce une influence systématique, mais une influence variable selon le poste occupé par le sujet au sein du cabinet et selon le jugement précis qu'il porte.

This paper uses cross-sectional and longitudinal data to examine differences in pay for equally-skilled workers in different ind ustries. The major finding is that there is substantial dispersion in wages across industries, even after allowing for measured and unmeas ured labor quality, working conditions, fringe benefits, transitory d emand shocks, the threat of union-ization, union bargaining power, fi rm size, and other factors. In addition, evidence is presented demons trating that turnover has a negative relationship with industry wage differentials. These findings suggest that workers in high-wage indus tries receive noncompetitive rents.

A self-interest explanation is presented for opposition by some farm groups to futures markets. During the twenties and thirties political opposition to futures markets was greater in the grain-producing states. The opposition was centered in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and a few other states. The line elevator companies were prominent in these states and not others and used futures prices to facilitate a buying cartel. Futures prices were used to derive a suggested buying price for elevator purchases in each local market. The political opposition to futures by farmers was designed to raise the cost of operating local cartels. Political opposition was greater and gross profit margins of elevators were higher in states with line elevators.

A self-interest explanation is presented for opposition by some farm groups to futures markets. During the twenties and thirties political opposition to futures markets was greater in the grain-producing states. The opposition was centered in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and a few other states. The line elevator companies were prominent in these states and not others and used futures prices to facilitate a buying cartel. Futures prices were used to derive a suggested buying price for elevator purchases in each local market. The political opposition to futures by farmers was designed to raise the cost of operating local cartels. Political opposition was greater and gross profit margins of elevators were higher in states with line elevators.