We use a new data set to study the determinants of the performance of open–end actively managed equity mutual funds in 27 countries. We find that mutual funds underperform the market overall. The results show important differences in the determinants of fund performance in the USA and elsewhere in the world. The US evidence of diminishing returns to scale is not a universal truth as the performance of funds located outside the USA and funds that invest overseas is not negatively affected by scale. Our findings suggest that the adverse scale effects in the USA are related to liquidity constraints faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks. Country characteristics also explain fund performance. Funds located in countries with liquid stock markets and strong legal institutions display better performance.

We infer a term structure of interbank risk from spreads between rates on interest rate swaps indexed to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight indexed swaps. We develop a tractable model of interbank risk to decompose the term structure into default and non-default (liquidity) components. From August 2007 to January 2011, the fraction of total interbank risk due to default risk, on average, increases with maturity. At short maturities, the non-default component is important in the first half of the sample period and is correlated with measures of funding and market liquidity. The model also provides a framework for pricing, hedging, and risk management of interest rate swaps in the presence of significant basis risk.

Microfinance clients were randomly assigned to repayment groups that met either weekly or monthly during their first loan cycle, and then graduated to identical meeting frequency for their second loan. Long-run survey data and a follow-up public goods experiment reveal that clients initially assigned to weekly groups interact more often and exhibit a higher willingness to pool risk with group members from their first loan cycle nearly 2 years after the experiment. They were also three times less likely to default on their second loan. Evidence from an additional treatment arm shows that, holding meeting frequency fixed, the pattern is insensitive to repayment frequency during the first loan cycle. Taken together, these findings constitute the first experimental evidence on the economic returns to social interaction, and provide an alternative explanation for the success of the group lending model in reducing default risk.

This paper examines whether firms that deviate from an empirically modeled (“expected”) credit rating engage in earnings management activities, as measured by abnormal accruals and real activities earnings management. We find evidence that firms use income-increasing (-decreasing) earnings management activities when they are below (above) their expected ratings. We then test whether such actions are successful in helping these firms move toward their expected credit ratings. The results suggest that firms below or above their expected credit ratings may be able to move toward expected ratings through the use of directional earnings management.

We provide a model of governance in which a board arbitrates between an activist investor and a manager facing reputational concerns. The optimal level of internal board governance depends on both the severity of the agency conflict and the strength of external governance. Internal governance creates a certification effect, so greater intervention by the board can lead to worse managerial behavior. Internal and external governance are substitutes when external governance is weak (the board commits to an interventionist policy to induce participation from the activist) and complements when external governance is strong (the board relies to a greater extent on the activist's information).

Recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to observe asset values.When consumers observe the value of their wealth, they decide whether to transfer funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment portfolio of equity and riskless bonds.Transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces wealth and consists of two components: one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred, and the other is a fixed resource cost.Because it is costly to transfer funds, the consumer may choose not to transfer any funds on a particular observation date.In general, the optimal adjustment rule---including the size and direction of transfers, and the time of the next observation---is state-dependent.Surprisingly, unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large, the consumer's optimal behavior eventually evolves to a situation with a purely time-dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations.This interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs.When this situation is attained, the standard consumption Euler equation holds between observation dates if the consumer is sufficiently risk averse.

We demonstrate that existing differences in financial development between countries can be explained by the cumulative variations in their levels of state experience since 1AD. This dimension of early historical development has not been considered so far in studies that analyze the determinants of financial development. The estimation allows for all major theories established in the literature as possible explanations for the disparity of financial development across the globe. Significance of state antiquity is robust to the use of alternative indicators of financial development, the consideration of different lengths and periods of statehood, and controlling for a range of variables or country characteristics. Our results highlight the important role of statehood in propelling financial system development, and thus provide some support to the view that historically determined differences in the early-start developmental advantage provide the basis for explaining the fundamental sources of variations in financial development between countries today.

In recent years, reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory in many countries. The capital-market effects around this change have been extensively studied, but their sources are not yet well understood. This study aims to distinguish between several potential explanations for the observed capital-market effects. We find that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS reporting had little impact on liquidity. The liquidity effects around IFRS introduction are concentrated in the European Union (EU) and limited to five EU countries that concurrently made substantive changes in reporting enforcement. There is little evidence of liquidity benefits in IFRS countries without substantive enforcement changes even when they have strong legal and regulatory systems. Moreover, we find similar liquidity effects for firms that experience enforcement changes but do not concurrently switch to IFRS. Thus, changes in reporting enforcement or (unobserved) factors associated with these changes play a critical role for the observed liquidity benefits after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, the change in accounting standards seems to have had little effect on market liquidity.

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.