We examine the valuation impact of an employee-friendly (EF) culture. Using a sample of 3446 firms from 43 countries for the period 2003 to 2014, we show that firms with a more EF culture are valued higher and perform better (ROA, ROE). Consistent with the good governance view, the impact is stronger for firms in countries with better investor protection and for firms with better governance and lower agency costs. We further document a positive valuation associated with the enactment of laws aimed at improving parental leave policies. The impact on valuation stems from improved technical efficiency. Using various approaches, our results suggest that the impact of an EF culture on firm value is causal.

I develop a dynamic model of leverage with tax deductible interest and an endogenous cost of default. The interest rate includes a premium to compensate lenders for expected losses in default. A borrowing constraint is generated by lenders' unwillingness to lend an amount that would trigger immediate default. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the trade‐off theory of debt holds: optimal debt equates the marginal interest tax shield and the marginal expected cost of default. Contrary to conventional interpretation, but consistent with empirical findings, increases in current or future profitability reduce the optimal leverage ratio when the trade‐off theory holds.

We develop a Clawback Strength Index and show that while some firms adopt unambiguous and strong clawback provisions, others adopt weak ones. We find that strong clawback adopters experience improvements in financial reporting quality, fewer CEO turnovers, and lower CEO pay. We advance two possible explanations: First, clawback strength may be primarily responsible for the improvements in reporting quality. Second, strong clawbacks may yield benefits because they are part of a broader reform package. While our findings on reporting quality and CEO turnover are consistent with both explanations, our results on CEO pay support only the broader reform explanation.

The authors have been editors of the Journal of Corporate Finance for nineteen years and are now stepping down. Here we offer some observations from our years as editors of the Journal. We hope they are useful to the new editors, the publisher, referees and authors. Thank you to all those who helped us in our task as editors.

Promotion decisions for professors are critical for any university and this is especially true when promotion also involves the granting of tenure. In this paper, we report the number of publications for Finance professors promoted to Associate or Full Professor at schools similar to the University of Georgia and also at the Top 10 Finance Departments. We also provide evidence on citations of the individuals' research. Our data reveal similarities in terms of the total number of articles published (between 6 and 8 for promotion to Associate Professor), the number of articles published in Finance “A” journals (about 3), and the number of citations between peer and aspirant schools. We find evidence that Associate Professors at Top 10 Departments have slightly more “A” articles and receive more citations to their work than those at lower ranked institutions. We find similar results for those promoted to Full Professor – similar publication records but with more “A” publications and citations for those in Top 10 Departments. Our paper provides up-to-date information on some of the factors considered for promotion of Finance professors. However, the much more difficult part of promotion decisions is determining the impact of past research and the potential for future contributions. In addition, teaching, service, and other departmental contributions are key to the promotion decision.

We augment standard log earnings equations for workers in US manufacturing with variables reflecting measured and unmeasured attributes of their employer. Using panel employee-establishment data, we find that establishment-level employment, education of coworkers, capital equipment per worker, and firm-level R&D intensity affects earnings substantially. Unobserved characteristics of employers captured by employer fixed effects also contribute to the variance of log earnings, although less than unobserved characteristics of individuals captured by individual fixed effects. The observed and unobserved measures of employers mediate the effects of individual characteristics on earnings and increase earnings inequality through sorting of workers among establishments.

We present evidence that earnout agreements in acquisition contracts provide a substantial source of financing for acquirers. Acquirers in transactions with earnouts are significantly more likely to be financially constrained, face tighter credit market conditions, and use less debt and equity to fund acquisitions. Financially constrained acquirers also book lower fair values for the contingent claim. Earnout use is more likely in transactions that involve liquid sellers, and earnout bids garner higher transaction valuation multiples. Overall, the evidence suggests that earnouts are an economically material and increasingly common source of acquisition financing for acquirers with limited access to external capital.

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic shareholder voting that allows outside shareholders to mitigate the influence of insiders. Consistent with our model, we find empirical support for strategic voting by outside shareholders and that strategic voting is more apparent when management-sponsored proposals are controversial or complex, when votes are close, or when other agency risks are greater.

We prove that a subtle but substantial bias exists in a common measure of the conditional dependence of present outcomes on streaks of past outcomes in sequential data. The magnitude of this streak selection bias generally decreases as the sequence gets longer, but increases in streak length, and remains substantial for a range of sequence lengths often used in empirical work. We observe that the canonical study in the influential hot hand fallacy literature, along with replications, are vulnerable to the bias. Upon correcting for the bias we find that the long-standing conclusions of the canonical study are reversed.

We study the role and performance of private equity (PE) in corporate asset sales. Corporate sellers obtain significantly positive excess returns in PE deals, gains in wealth significantly greater than for intercorporate asset sales. Based on exit valuations for 98% of PE deals, we find gains in enterprise value in buyouts are significantly greater than for benchmark firms. Corporate seller excess returns are positively correlated with subsequent gains in asset enterprise value. A parsimonious auction model suggests that only restructuring capabilities of PE (not acquisition of undervalued assets) can explain the pattern of the gains generated in these PE deals.