Studies document persistent unexplained gender-based wage gap in labor markets. At the executive level, where skill and education are similar, career interruptions and differences in risk preferences primarily explain the extant gender-based pay gap. This study focuses on CFO compensation contracts of Execucomp firms (1992–2020) and finds no gender-based pay gap. This paper offers several explanations for this phenomenon, such as novel evidence on the risk preferences of females with financial expertise and changes in the social and regulatory climate.

A central issue in evaluating the effects of firm-level corporate governance (FLCG) is how to measure it. We focus here on emerging markets (EMs). One common approach to measuring FLCG uses country-specific (CSIs), tailored to each country's laws and institutions. Several studies report that CSIs can predict firm outcomes in a panel data framework with two-way (firm and time) fixed effects (TWFE). An alternate approach uses commercial CG ratings (CCGRs) that apply the same or similar elements across many countries. We assess the three best available CCGRs covering EMs (Asset4, Thomson Reuters, and MSCI), and find that they do not predict firm outcomes with TWFE in EMs. We also provide evidence that the likely cause for CCGRs' lack of performance is their poor construction rather than the inability of FLCG measures to predict outcomes. CSI-based studies suggest that disclosure (beyond country-mandated minimums) is the FLCG aspect that most consistently predicts firm outcomes in EMs. Yet, these CCGRs have no or minimal measures of disclosure. Other important limitations of the CCGRs include the use of elements that are U.S.-centric; reflect firm outcomes rather than CG; are implausible measures of good FLCG, or are vaguely or subjectively defined. We also attempt, but fail, to use element-level information from CCGRs to construct sound measures of FLCG.

The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two‐sided incomplete information. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others. When workers have low individual bargaining power, pay transparency has a muted effect. We test our model with an event‐study analysis of U.S. state‐level laws protecting the right of private sector workers to communicate salary information with their coworkers. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, transparency laws empirically lead wages to decline by approximately 2%, and wage declines are smallest in magnitude when workers have low individual bargaining power.

I use standard setters’ description of comparability to conceptualize two forms of incomparability in financial reporting. Using a laboratory experiment, I construct states of both comparability and incomparability and investigate investors’ capital allocation decisions under each. Benchmarking against states of comparable reporting, I find that incomparable reporting making different economics look alike results in lower-quality investment decisions, relative to incomparable reporting making similar economics look different. My evidence suggests the difference in investment quality is due to the reduced ability of supplemental disclosures to compensate for one type of incomparability relative to the other type. The study uses a setting holding other reporting characteristics, such as faithful representation, constant, and results are robust to alternative configurations of incomparability. Collectively, my results suggest that the type of incomparability has differential effects on the quality of investment decisions. My findings should inform standard setters aiming to help users allocate capital.

We propose a shadow rate without a lower bound constraint that measures the overall stance of monetary policy in any policy environment, prior and during the lower-bound period, as well as in the current “New Normal” environment, where unconventional monetary policies have become more standard. Using daily yield curve data we estimate shadow rates for the US, Sweden, the euro area and the UK, and document that they fall (rise) as monetary policy becomes more expansionary (contractionary), following announcements of policy rate cuts (hikes), forward guidance, and balance sheet expansions (contractions). In addition, we show two applications for our shadow rate. First, we decompose shadow rate responses to monetary policy announcements into conventional and unconventional monetary policy surprises, and assess the pass-through of each type of policy to exchange rates. We find that exchange rates respond more to conventional than to unconventional monetary policy. Lastly, counterfactual experiments in two DSGE models suggest that inflation in the US and in Sweden would have been on average about 0.8 and 0.33 percentage points lower, respectively, had unconventional monetary policy not been used.

This article presents a model of quantitative easing (QE) at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the short-term nominal interest rate. QE, which reduces the maturity of government debt, is effective at the ZLB because it generates expectations of future monetary expansion in a time-consistent equilibrium. Numerical experiments show that this effect can be substantial.

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.

We link survey data on Danish people’s perceived income positions and fairness views on inequality within various reference groups to administrative records on their reference groups, income histories, and life events. People are, on average, well-informed about the income levels of their reference groups. Yet, lower-ranked respondents in all groups tend to overestimate their own position among others because they believe others’ incomes are lower than they actually are, whereas the opposite holds true for higher-ranked respondents. Misperceptions of positions in reference groups relate to proximity to other individuals, transparency norms, and visible signals of income. People view inequalities within their co-workers and education groups as significantly more unfair than overall inequality, yet underestimate inequality the most exactly within these groups. Views on the fairness of inequalities are strongly correlated with an individual’s current position, move with shocks like unemployment or promotions, and change when experimentally informing people about their actual positions. However, the higher perceived unfairness of income differences within co-workers and education groups stays unchanged. The theoretical framework shows that this can have important implications for redistribution policy.

We find that organization capital is negatively related to the cost of bank loans. This finding is robust to additional analyses including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, we find that organization capital reduces all-in-spread-undrawn. When we decompose the bank loan cost, we find that organization capital increases facility fees due to its risk-engendering characteristics. Finally, we find that organization capital is positively associated with a high likelihood of the presence of inventors and innovation output, consistent with the argument that organization capital is embedded in the key talent within a firm.