A prominent feature of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy. Under the provisions of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, or EDP, the success of member states in avoiding during the transition to economic and monetary union (EMU) is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union. Once monetary union has begun, member states are unconditionally required to avoid deficits. A state has an when it is so declared by the European Council upon a report by the European Commission and a judgment by the Monetary Committee. The EDP is set in motion if a country's deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP.' The justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency. If excessive deficits cause a debt crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government. The bailout could be ex post (in which case the ECB would monetize the government's debt) or ex ante (in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt-service burden). Either way, unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ECB will find difficult to resist.

In analyzing the IMF attempts to stabilize private capital flows, we contrast cases where banks and bondholders do the lending. Consistent with banks’ natural advantage in monitoring, they reduce spreads as they obtain more information through repeat transactions with borrowers. By comparison, repeat borrowing has little influence in bond markets, where publicly-available information dominates. But spreads on bonds are lower when they are issued in conjunction with an IMF-supported program, as if the existence of a program conveys positive information to bondholders. The influence of IMF monitoring in bond markets is especially pronounced for countries vulnerable to liquidity crises.