ABSTRACT We study an important recent series of buyback auctions conducted by the U.S. Treasury in retiring $67.5 billion of its illiquid off‐the‐run debt. The Treasury was successful in buying back large amounts of illiquid debt while suffering only a small market‐impact cost. The Treasury included the most‐illiquid bonds more frequently in the auctions, but tended to buy back the least‐illiquid of these bonds. Although the Treasury had the option to cherry pick from among the bonds offered, we find that the Treasury was actually penalized for being spread too thinly in the buybacks.

Abstract We offer a new social approach to investment decision making and asset prices. Investors discuss their strategies and convert others to their strategies with a probability that increases in investment returns. The conversion rate is shown to be convex in realized returns. Unconditionally, active strategies (e.g., high variance and skewness) dominate, although investors have no inherent preference for these characteristics. The model has strong predictions for how the adoption of active strategies depends on investors’ social networks. In contrast with nonsocial approaches, sociability, self-enhancing transmission, and other features of the communication process determine the popularity and pricing of active investment strategies.

In a model where investors disagree about the fundamentals of two stocks, the state-price density depends on investor disagreements for both stocks, especially the larger stock. This implies that disagreement among investors in a large firm has a spillover effect on the pricing of other stocks owned by these investors. The pricing effects of investor disagreements crucially depend on the average belief biases. Empirical findings support the novel model prediction of a disagreement spillover effect and help reconcile some mixed evidence in the literature.

We analyze capital allocation in a conglomerate where divisional managers with uncertain abilities compete for promotion to CEO. A manager can sometimes gain by unobservably adding variance to divisional performance. Capital rationing can limit this distortion, increase productive efficiency, and allow the owner to make more accurate promotion decisions. Firms for which CEO talent is more important for firm performance are more likely to ration capital. A rationed manager is more likely to be promoted even though all managers are identical ex ante. When the tournament payoff is relatively small, offering an incentive wage can be more efficient than rationing capital; however, when tournament incentives are paramount, rationing is more efficient.

ABSTRACT We examine the improvements in forecast accuracy that result from analysts' visits to listed companies. We find that company visits significantly enhance the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts for those companies. The benefit from company visits is more pronounced for companies that are more neglected or less accessible and for brokerage firms that face less pressure for optimistic forecasts from buy‐side clients. Our results are robust and remain significant after controlling for endogeneity and selection bias. Overall, our findings show that private interactions with company management provide analysts with an informational advantage and suggest that company visits facilitate the mosaic approach to information acquisition.

Abstract Evidence indicates that people fear change and the unknown. We model this behavior as familiarity bias in which individuals focus on adverse scenarios in evaluating defections from the status quo. The model explains portfolio underdiversification, home and local biases. More importantly, equilibrium stock prices reflect an unfamiliarity premium. In an international setting, our model predicts that while the standard CAPM fails to hold with respect to the world market portfolio, a modified CAPM holds wherein the market portfolio is replaced with a portfolio of the stock holdings of investors not subject to familiarity bias.

ABSTRACT We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than nonconsumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth‐signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure, and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions.

We test the hypothesis that investment constraints in delegated portfolio management may distort demand for stocks, leading to price underreaction to news and stock return predictability. We find that institutions tend not to buy more of a stock with good news that they already overweight; they are reluctant to sell a stock with bad news that they already underweight. Stocks with good news overweighted by institutions subsequently significantly outperform stocks with bad news underweighted by institutions. The impact of institutional investment constraints sheds new light on asset pricing anomalies such as stock price momentum and post–earnings announcement drift.

We explore the link between credit and equity markets by considering the informational content of the term structure of credit spreads. A shallower credit term structure predicts decreases in default risk and increases in future profitability, as well as favorable earnings surprises. Further, the slope of the credit term structure negatively predicts future stock returns. While systematic slope risk is priced, information diffusion from the credit market to equities, particularly in less visible stocks, plays an additional role in accounting for return predictability from credit slopes. That is, such predictability is less evident in stocks with high institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and liquidity, and vice versa.

Abstract We uncover new return predictability in the cross-section of delta-hedged equity options. Expected returns to writing delta-hedged calls are negatively correlated with stock price, profit margin, and firm profitability, but positively correlated with cash holding, cash flow variance, new shares issuance, total external financing, distress risk, and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Our option portfolio strategies have annual Sharpe ratio above two and remain profitable after transaction costs. Their profits can be explained by two option factors, while equity risk factors have no explanatory power. We find support for several economic channels at work, yet the option return predictability remains puzzling.