Abstract We present a real options model of a firm’s make-or-buy decision under demand uncertainty. “Making” is subject to decreasing returns to scale, fixed costs, and capital investment. “Buying” happens at a fixed price and requires no investment. Three distinct procurement regimes endogenously arise: buying, making, or concurrent sourcing for, respectively, low, intermediate, and high demand. Capital constraints encourage buying or concurrent sourcing. Operating leverage peaks when the firm switches between buying and making, and it is lowest (and negative) at the switch between making and concurrent sourcing. This non-monotonic pattern mirrors and drives the behavior of the firm’s beta.

We examine whether chief financial officers (CFOs) with accounting backgrounds (accountant CFOs) are associated with more conservative corporate outcomes. We find that, in high-growth industries, firms with accountant CFOs invest less in research and development and capital expenditures and are less likely to engage in external financing. In low-growth industries, we find that firms with accountant CFOs exhibit greater cost efficiency. Our results are consistent with risk aversion on the part of accountant CFOs. We further document that accountant CFOs are negatively associated with firm value in high-growth industries and positively associated with firm value in low-growth industries.

High-frequency reversals are an economically important characteristic of the returns to tradeable claims to the market portfolio. This paper demonstrates that short-horizon negative autocorrelation can arise in a tractable model of agents with tournament-type preferences. Intuitively, investors act as if they are averse to missing out on a trend, causing the risk premium to move strongly counter to realized returns. The model features fully rationalizing agents, complete markets, and no exogenous transaction demand. Plausible parameterizations can match the autocorrelation in the data. Supporting evidence on novel first and second moment implications is presented.

We survey 344 buy-side analysts from 181 investment firms and conduct 16 detailed follow-up interviews to gain insights into the activities of buy-side analysts, including the determinants of their compensation, the inputs to their stock recommendations, their beliefs about financial reporting quality, and the role of sell-side analysts in buy-side research. One important finding is that 10-K or 10-Q reports are more useful than quarterly conference calls and management earnings guidance for determining buy-side analysts׳ stock recommendations. Our results also suggest that sell-side analysts add value by providing buy-side analysts with in-depth industry knowledge and access to company management.

We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.

We investigate a simple dynamical model for the systemic risk caused by the use of Value-at-Risk, as mandated by Basel II. The model consists of a bank with a leverage target and an unleveraged fundamentalist investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered volatility. The parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where the system has a fixed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable region, characterized by cycles with chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable region. A calibration of parameters to data puts the model in region (ii). In this region there is a slowly building price bubble, resembling the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis, followed by a crash resembling the crisis, with a period of approximately 10–15 years. We dub this the Basel leverage cycle. To search for an optimal leverage control policy we propose a criterion based on the ability to minimize risk for a given average leverage. Our model allows us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage increases when volatility increases. We find the best policy depends on the market impact of the bank. Basel II is optimal when the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and leverage is low; in the opposite limit where the bank is large and leverage is high the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage. In the latter regime systemic risk can be dramatically decreased by lowering the leverage target adjustment speed of the banks. While our model does not show that the financial crisis and the period leading up to it were due to VaR risk management policies, it does suggest that it could have been caused by VaR risk management, and that the housing bubble may have just been the spark that triggered the crisis.

Affirmative action policies have come increasingly under attack in recent years. Both in the courts and in public discourse questions have been raised about the legitimacy of government efforts on behalf of blacks and other racial minorities.' The criticism seems to have two central themes. First, it is argued that those policies which have been tried have not had a noticeable effect on the economic standing of minority group members. (See James Smith and Finis Welch.) They thus constitute yet another example of costly but ineffective government regulation, according to this view. The second theme strikes more deeply at the foundation of these policies. Its adherents argue that even if effective programs could be designed, they ought not be implemented. There have been philosophical and empirical arguments advanced to support this conclusion. Essentially, the philosophical argument states that it is wrong for government to intervene on behalf of certain groups (and thus, necessarily, at the expense of others); this amounts to reverse discrimination-a visiting of the fathers' sins upon the sons.2 The empirical argument concludes that, moral issues aside, such intervention is unwarranted because the consequences of historical discrimination have been (or will soon be) largely eliminated. (See B. Wattenberg and W. Wilson.) In this essay I would like to offer a defense of affirmative action policies against the second of these thematic criticisms. That is, I shall hold in abeyance questions concerning the efficacy of particular programmatic efforts, and concentrate instead on whether government should in principle be taking actions to facilitate economic progress for minority group members. This would seem to be the logical first step in constructing an intellectual basis for affirmative action policies. Of course, philosophers and legal scholars interested in theories of distributive justice have devoted considerable attention to this question in the past ten years. (See R. Dworkin and T. Nagel.) The approach adopted here differs from these earlier efforts in two ways. First, I shall endeavor to meet the empirical argument directly, by pointing to evidence which suggests that significant racial economic disparity persists. Secondly, I will treat the philosophical argument in a manner in keeping with the economist's traditional approach to the question of the desirability of laissez-faire. This approach is based upon the concept of failure. Intervention is favored over laissez-faire when, because of some externality, the outcome is inefficient. Below I argue that an analogous market failure contributes to the maintenance of economic inequality between racial groups in our society. As such, intervention which redresses this inequality is warranted.