[We examine how bank capital and borrower bargaining power affect loan spreads. Consistent with previous studies, higher bank capital has a negative impact on loan rates, but borrower cash flow has a significant effect on this impact: compared with high-capital banks, lowcapital banks charge more for borrowers with low cash flow, but offer greater marginal discounts as these borrowers’ cash flow rises. These effects are largely focused on more bank-dependent borrowers. We find some evidence that low-capital banks charge a higher premium for bank-dependent borrowers’ systematic risk, but not for their total equity risk or default risk.]

Investor relations officers (IROs) play a central role in corporate communications with Wall Street. We survey 610 IROs at U.S. public companies and conduct 14 follow-up interviews to deepen our understanding of the role of IROs in corporate disclosure events. Three important themes emerge from our results: (i) the value, nature, and timing of private communication between IROs, analysts, and investors; (ii) the significant influence IROs have on corporate disclosures; and (iii) the degree of “theater” involved in public earnings conference calls, even the Q&A portion. We provide insights into the investor relations, analyst, institutional investor, and disclosure literatures.

We explore the governance effect of short-selling threat on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We use equity lending supply (LS) to proxy for the threat, as short sellers incentives to scrutinize a firm depend on the availability of borrowing shares. Our results show that acquirers with higher LS have higher announcement returns. The effect is stronger when acquirers are more likely to be targets of subsequent hostile takeovers and when their managers wealth is more linked to stock prices. We conduct four sets of tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Finally, the governance effect exists only for deals prone to agency problems.

ABSTRACT This study uses a confidential data set of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on firms' tax reporting behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Although the ability and incentive to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS assigns firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a detectable effect on tax payments. Our results show that tax payments do not change when firms enter the CIC program, suggesting the CIC program does not have higher deterrence or enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program. However, supplemental analysis suggests that audit certainty does alter managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of certain audit programs.

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.

Social media platforms are becoming increasingly important channels for information dissemination. This study examines how microblogging by top executives affects the information environment for listed firms in an emerging market. Using a manually collected data set of Sina Weibo, one of China's most popular and largest social media platforms, we find that a board chair having a Weibo account is associated with the dissemination of more firm-specific information to the capital market. This result holds up to a battery of robustness tests, including an alternative noise-trading explanation and alternative measures of information flows and definitions of Weibo usage. We also show that the relationship between board chairs' Weibo usage and information dissemination is stronger for smaller firms, firms that went public more recently, and firms characterized by less analyst coverage. In addition, Weibo usage primarily disseminates firm-specific news rather than industry news. Finally, we document that institutional trading is an important channel through which private information is incorporated into stock prices. Findings in this study have important implications for the understanding of the role of social media in the dissemination process of corporate information and corporate communication strategy.

This paper uses earnings announcements to analyze the trading behavior and associated price impacts of institutions that have a lending or underwriting relationship with client firms and also hold client firms' shares. Buying support from relationship institutions mitigates the negative impact of earnings surprises on client firms' stock prices, predicts subsequent negative earnings surprises, and is also associated with less selling by independent institutions holding the same firms' shares. Price reactions for firms without relationship institutions are significantly larger. Price support from relationship institutions appears to help resolve uncertainty accompanying clients' temporary earnings shocks, thus reducing noise in the capital markets.

Active corporate executives are a popular source of independent directors. Although their knowledge, expertise, and network can bring value to firms on whose boards they sit, independent executive directors may be more likely to be distracted than other directors due to their outside executive roles. Using newly constructed data linking independent directors to their employers, we identify periods when employers' poor performance may distract them from board service. We find that firms with distracted independent executive directors have lower performance and value, higher CEO compensation, reduced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, lower earnings quality, and lower M&A performance. These adverse effects are mainly driven by distracted directors who sit on relevant committees, and are stronger for small boards.